1 ADF fighter neutralized, AK-47 weapon recovered
This is the result of the clashes that opposed the two parties on Friday in the Bapere sector, in Lubero territory, the same military source said.
Joint operations are continuing reports Lt-Col Mak Hazukay in Ituri.
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and its allies: the Wazalendo announce that they have neutralized more than fifteen M23/RDF rebels in the Lubero territory (North Kivu).
The information was delivered to the press during the day by the spokesperson for the Northern Front operational sector, on Friday, December 13, 2024. According to Second Lieutenant Mbuyi Kalonji Reagan, the army's exploit over the M23/RDF rebels came following the clashes reported on Thursday in the Bamate chiefdom.
"In its second day of response to attacks by M23/RDF terrorists, more than fifteen of these elements were killed in the agglomeration of Luofu, a city located in the south of Lubero territory," he declared.
In addition to neutralizing these rebels, he added, the loyalist army recovered several war effects from the enemy “who did not resist the firepower of the FARDC-Wazalendo coalition.”
“Several AK-47, PKM, mortars and military effects of the attackers were recovered by the country's army,” he said.
It should be noted that clashes have resumed for some time in the Lubero territory between the FARDC/Wazalendo and the M23 rebels supported by the Rwandan army. This has been going on for more than 10 days on the front lines, particularly in the Bamate chiefdom. A situation that has caused the massive displacement of inhabitants to supposedly secure villages in Kirumba, Kanyabayonga and Kayna where they lead a difficult life, according to local civil society.
According to Reagan mbuyi kalonji, the Armed Forces of the DRC Northern Front, a precarious calm was observed on the morning of this ended Friday, December 13 on all the front lines in the Lubero territory, but the m23/RDF have just attacked their positions near two antennas, near the town of Matembe.
Here is the image of the Rwandan Commander of the M23/RDF, Northern Front who the wazalendo claim to have killed in LUBERO.
In the Lubero territory, several sources claim that the rebels who have been trying to advance for 12 days have suffered enormous losses, a heavy toll.
With several dead bodies littered on the Frontline and a lot being sneaked via some borders of the neighbouring countries up to Kigali.
In Butembo, this Saturday at 12:00, a dozen Wazalendo fighters crossed the city on motorbikes honking their horns, leaving the Furu district in the North to head south, causing panic among the population.
The toll of the dawn clashes on Tabora hill, in the concession of the Catholic University of Graben (UCG), reports two dead (one soldier from each side) and one injured admitted for treatment.
Calm returned around 4:30 in the morning, although the version of the security authorities is still awaited.
Suspected of wanting to destabilize the southeast of the DRC from Zambia, several dozen Congolese were repatriated by Kinshasa during an operation conducted with the approval of Lusaka.
Suspected of wanting to destabilize the southeast of the DRC from Zambia, several dozen Congolese were repatriated by Kinshasa during a high secret operation headed by General Tshibangu conducted with the approval of Lusaka.
The operation remained secret despite the significant system put in place by Kinshasa. Under the leadership of General John Tshibangu, a plane was dispatched to Lusaka in mid-October to repatriate several dozen Congolese to the DRC.
According to Kinshasa, the men arrested – whose exact number varies from one source to another – are linked to the M23 rebellion, active in the east of the country, as well as to former general John Numbi, a former security official under President Joseph Kabila, who is now the subject of an international arrest warrant.
You can read more about General John Numbi here
The Congolese authorities suspect them of having fomented a destabilization project in the border provinces of the former Grand Katanga from Zambia.
Upstream, the operation was the subject of direct exchanges between President Félix Tshisekedi and his Zambian counterpart, Hakainde Hichilema, who gave the green light for their extradition. Their repatriation was not a given, as the individuals arrested had filed a request for political asylum with the Zambian authorities.
In this case, Kinshasa was able to count on the support of Friday M. Nyambe, former Zambian ambassador to the DRC, appointed in 2021 to head the "Special Branch - OP", a security service within the presidency.
Among the repatriated individuals are some former senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). This is the case of Lieutenant Colonel John Gasasira N’tawenda, a former member of the rebellion of the National Council for the Defense of the People (CNDP, from which many M23 leaders come), who was attached to military intelligence at the FARDC headquarters before his defection in 2023, and rumoured dead in March 2023 in war skirmishes in Masisi.However,,as many sources try to whisper of General John Numbi being among the arrested,that is not the truth,he is not among those arrested and repatriated to Kinshasha,however negotiations are on going for his repatriation.
He is reputed to have since joined the ranks of the M23, which is however disputed by a source inside the movement, for whom John Gasasira N’tawenda actually answers to the orders of John Numbi. Alerts in the refugee camps
For nearly two years, the government of Félix Tshilombo has been worried about John Numbi’s intentions in the former Grand Katanga, where the latter is still said to have powerful connections in the army.
Fears confirmed by the content of a legal procedure in Belgium, which revealed the existence of a project intended to impose the independence of Katanga that involved John Numbi in 2021.
Since then, Congolese diplomacy has been working, so far in vain, to obtain his extradition from Zimbabwe, where he was granted asylum. Kinshasa particularly fears a rapprochement of interests between the designs of John Numbi and those of the M23, whose leadership has long sought to multiply the hotbeds of tension outside the eastern provinces of the DRC. For several months, Congolese intelligence has been reporting information on the recruitment of militias in refugee camps in Zambia, as well as on the transit of weapons from the Mozambican port of Beira.
Alerts that led Kinshasa to act on the raid in mid-October, in coordination with the Zambian authorities.
Nearly two months later, however, questions are being raised about the modalities of this operation, which has not been the subject of any communication from the Congolese state. In particular, the timing, considered too hasty to uncover possible complicity on the Congolese side, but also the progress of the investigation since mid-October. General John Tshibangu is due to be questioned on this subject soon by the security services.
Intelligence gathered from the Frontline for three days indicate massive attacks on the M23 who are reportedly lacking manpower reinforcements.
Reports also indicated that Young tireless WAZALENDO resistance fighters signed their presence in BWALANDA/RUTSHURU Territory/MUTANDA Group in BWITO chiefdom.
At 9 p.m. tTHURSDAY, Dec. 12,Violent fighting against the M23-RDF broke up.
There were reports that at least 6 people were killed in an attack by M23 rebels, supported by the Rwandan army, on the night of Tuesday to Wednesday, December 11, 2024 in Luofu, an entity in the Lubero territory, North Kivu province, in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
According to local civil society, they asserts or claim that these people, most of whom are men, were killed by these rebels who accused them of collaborating with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Muhindo Tafuteni, a member of this civic structure, deplores this situation and calls on the defense and security services to deploy significant resources to put an end to the suffering of the population, caused by the activism of the M23/RDF rebels.
It should be noted that several towns in the Lubero territory, in North Kivu, have been the scene of clashes for 10 days between the DRC Armed Forces and M23 rebels, supported by the Rwandan army
A new bloody attack by ADF terrorists was deplored on the evening of Tuesday, December 3, 2024 in Tenambo, a town located in the territory of Beni, in North Kivu.
Nine (9) people died during this attack and around ten houses were burned. Several people have also disappeared, said Kambale Kibwana Jean de Dieu, deputy mayor of the commune of Oïcha.
“There were 9 deaths recorded during this bloody attack. Several were also set on fire. The population is in shock,” he explained.
Civilians demand the pursuit of these rebels and not to give up tracking operations. Our sources on site indicate that these attackers aimed to obtain supplies of food and medicine. The rebels seek to reconquer their former strongholds in the Graben. The troops would be led by a certain Abwakasi. The authorities are called upon to take measures to prevent these attacks.
The same sources affirm that it is the same rebels who carried out the attack at PK20 who are the perpetrators of this attack.
An alleged US spy plane breached the airspaces of Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) last month, according to OSINT sources from some Ugandan media.
According to different military citations,The violations were recorded three times on the 14th, 15th, and 26th of November.
According to the Ugandan media reports, a Bombardier Challenger 604 aircraft flew over Kasese and Bundibugyo in Uganda and Beni in the DRC.
The aircraft, with the tail number N9191, is leased by the US Department of Defense and is used for surveillance, the media outlets reported reported.
It is based out of Djibouti, which houses a US Navy base.
False Permission Sought
The US Defence Attaché’s Office in Kampala had sought permission for the aircraft to transport personnel and cargo to the DRC.
However, a probe was ordered after it never landed at its destination and was spotted making “suspicious maneuvers” in both the countries’ airspaces.
Hmmm!!According to some Ugandan media outlets,the “US controllers of the spy aircraft did not bother to even ask the DRC for permission to enter their airspace,” .
“Instead, it was the Ugandan air traffic controllers who notified the understandably enraged DRC air traffic controllers.”
Both Uganda’s President and the Chief of Military Staff have reportedly been apprised of the matter and the aircraft’s earlier authorization has been revoked.
..Thank you the Media of Uganda!!!..this at least is worth ..... UGANDA first!!
The prosecution requested that Sgt Minani Gervais be sentenced to life in prison for murder, five years for theft and destruction of military equipment, and one year for illegal use of a firearm.
The decision of this case will be read on Monday, December 9, 2024, at 8:00 p.m.
This is my last report tonight!
Executive Summary
In the month of November 2024, IS Mozambique (ISM) intensified its operations in Cabo Delgado, launching attacks including ambushes, executions, and bombings, with significant violence in Ancuabe and Macomia and an expansion into southern districts like Nampula, revealing tactical shifts and stretching security forces. In the DRC, IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP) escalated violence in North Kivu and Ituri provinces through military assaults, abductions, and attacks on civilian sites like goldmines. Despite efforts like Operation Shujaa and the extended state of siege, coordination challenges persisted, and violence continued to disrupt the region. In Somalia, IS-Somalia did not conduct confirmed attacks but saw growth, particularly in Puntland’s Cal Miskaad, driven by an influx of foreign fighters and active recruitment, reinforcing its presence and posing an ongoing regional security threat.
MOZAMBIQUE
27th Nov– ISM militants conducted and armed assault and arson attack on Christian population in Juravo and Ntakwani areas in Chiure district.
25th Nov– ISM militants detonated IEDs targeting Mozambican troops IN Unidade in Macomia district.
22nd Nov- A Christian was captured and executed by ISM terrorists in Magaia village in Chiure district.
21st Nov- at least 19 local militias were killed in clashes with ISM militants in Nacuale in Ancuabe district
21st Nov– The village of Novo Cabo Delgado in northern Macomia was burned and looted ISM.
19th Nov– Clashes between the local militia and ISM terrorists in Mbonge village in Ancuabe killed at least one person.
18th Nov- one person was captured and executed in Nacololo in Ancuabe district.
16th Nov- several people were injured in an ISM armed assault against both Mozambican military and civilian targets in Nakuali in Ancuabe district.
16th Nov– ISM militants clashed with Mozambican troops in Nanjua area in Ancuabe district.
14th Nov- ISM conducted and armed assault against Rwandan forces in Namaniko along the R762 road in Macomia district.
13th Nov- clashes were reported between ISM insurgents and the RDF around Mucojo on the Macomia coast.
09th Nov– Mozambican troops were ambushed and attacked by ISM terrorists along the R762 road between Cobre and Natugo in Macomia.
09th Nov- one person was captured and executed by ISM in Matapata in Muidumbe district.
7th Nov- one Christian was captured and executed by ISM in Matapata in Muidumbe district.
06th Nov- several people were injured in an ISM attack in Minhanha village In Meluco district.
06th Nov– Rwandan troops were attacked by ISM militants between Cobre and Namaniko in Macomia.
5th Nov– Several civilians were injured and hundred others fled their homes following an armed assault by ISM rebels in Mbau, Mocimboa da Praia (MDP)
05th Nov– HUMANIT reported the presence of ISM in Litigina, Quinto Congresso, Machava, Mtipuedi and Eduardo Mondlane in Nangade district.
04th Nov- Insurgents attempted to invade Miangalewa village but there were no reported casualties
3rd Nov- ISM militants captured and executed 2 Christians near Mandela in Muidumbe.
29th Oct- at least 1 person was killed after he was attacked using an IED as he drove between Chinda and Mbau in MDP.
The Democratic Republic of Congo
26th Nov- A goldmine located between Tutolito and Kamango was attacked by ISCAP where several civilians were injured.
24th Nov- ISCAP militants led an armed assault against Congolese military in Tutolito in North Kivu province.
20th Nov- 4 Christians were captured and executed along the RN4 in Banko in Ituri Province.
14th Nov- at least a dozen civilians were kidnapped in an armed attack by ISCAP in Mabisio in North Kivu.
5th Nov- the village chief was killed, several people injured and houses razed to the ground in an ISCAP attack in Makidhi village in Irumu territory in Ituri.
02nd Nov- 118 people, including minors and several women, who escaped and were captured by ISCAP in the village of Bogi, before being handed over to the military authorities in Komanda.
ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS
Somalia
In November 2024, no attacks by the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) have been confirmed or widely reported. However, ISS remains active in northern Puntland, particularly in the Cal Miskaad mountains, where they have been bolstering their positions against al-Shabaab. Recent reports highlight their focus on consolidating control over territories and expanding influence through activities such as proselytizing campaigns and public relations efforts, aimed at winning local support.
The Islamic State affiliate in Somalia (IS-Somalia) has experienced significant growth, doubling its size to an estimated 600–700 fighters, fueled by an influx of foreign fighters from countries such as Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Sudan, according to a recent U.N. report. These fighters, who arrive via maritime and overland routes, have notably enhanced IS-Somalia’s operational capabilities, helping the group secure territorial gains against its rival, al-Shabab, in key areas like Puntland’s Cal Miskaad mountains.
This influx highlights a troubling trend, as aspiring extremists from across regions flock to join the group, drawn by the volatile conditions in the Horn of Africa. Bolstered by its al-Karrar office, which supports global Islamic State operations, IS-Somalia continues to strengthen its financial and organizational structure under new leadership. This expansion underscores the growing prominence of IS-Somalia as a regional and global threat, necessitating coordinated and urgent counterterrorism measures.
DRC
The recent uptick in ISCAP (Islamic State Central Africa Province) activity in eastern Congo, especially in North Kivu and Ituri provinces, underscores a disturbing intensification of militant insurgency. This period has witnessed a mix of direct assaults on military forces, abductions, targeted executions, and attacks on local communities, highlighting ISCAP’s strategic focus on disrupting local governance, targeting civilians, and asserting control over key territories.
A preliminary meeting between FARDC and UPDF military experts took place in Kinshasa on November 13, focusing on implementing directives from the October 31 meeting between Presidents Tshisekedi and Museveni regarding Operation Shujaa. Launched in November 2021, this operation targets ISCAP, responsible for violence in eastern DRC. The session, chaired by FARDC’s Ychalingoza Nduru Jacques, follows an earlier one in Beni and will present conclusions to FARDC leadership on November 14. Meanwhile, a Congolese parliamentary delegation, led by Lambert Mende Omalanga, visited Uganda to assess efforts to counter ISCAP attacks in Ituri and North Kivu, which have recently intensified and spread to Lubero, causing civilian casualties.
ISCAP’s recent activities in North Kivu and Ituri province illustrate a calculated escalation in violence aimed at destabilizing the region and challenging the authority of the Congolese government. The group’s attacks on military positions, such as the assault on Congolese forces in Tutolito, reflect its strategic approach to confront state security and weaken military operations. These acts of aggression underscore ISCAP’s determination to project power and maintain a defiant stance against national security efforts, reinforcing its influence through violence and intimidation.
The civilian toll of ISCAP’s actions has been severe, demonstrating the group’s relentless targeting of non-combatants to sow fear, disrupt community life, and destabilize local economies. The recent assault on a goldmine near Tutolito, the killing of a village chief in Makidhi, and multiple instances of abductions are stark examples of how ISCAP seeks to fracture local social structures. By inflicting violence on civilians, the group aims to control communities, generate potential revenue through extortion, and leverage forced labor, particularly in areas where mining operations are economically vital.
Kidnappings and executions further showcase ISCAP’s use of terror to advance its ideology and maintain dominance over communities. The capture and subsequent killing of Christians along the RN4 in Banko, as well as mass abductions in Mabisio, reveal how these acts are part of a broader campaign to instill fear and subjugate the population. These actions not only send a chilling message to locals but also act as tools for extorting ransoms and asserting control over both civilian and military forces.
Operation Shujaa, launched on November 30, 2021, is a joint military initiative by the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and Uganda (UPDF) to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a group responsible for mass killings in eastern DRC and attacks in Uganda. While the operation has had successes, including dismantling ADF bases and eliminating major strongholds, it has not achieved its main goal of fully neutralizing the ADF. Challenges include logistical issues, poor coordination between the military forces, and mixed results according to reports from the Congo Study Group (CSG) and Ebuteli.
The state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri was extended on November 22, 2024, after being in place since May 2021 due to M23 insurgencies supported by Rwanda. Prime Minister Judith Suminwa and other officials are assessing the measure’s effectiveness amid ongoing violence and the M23’s efforts to seize territories. Critics, including civil society groups and some provincial deputies, argue that the state of siege has failed to restore security.
Separately, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held an extraordinary summit in Harare, deciding to extend the mandate of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) for another year to support stabilization efforts in the east. SAMIDRC, supported by MONUSCO and strengthened by UN Resolution 2746, aims to address the escalating violence. The summit highlighted the need for better coordination in regional peace initiatives and condemned violations of the August 2024 ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda.
President Félix Tshisekedi acknowledged SADC’s support, stressing the importance of unifying regional and international peace strategies. Despite these efforts, challenges persist in achieving lasting peace and security in the region.
Mozambique
Following Mozambique’s general elections, allegations surfaced linking security measures during the elections to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Rumors emerged that Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops were deployed to Maputo to suppress demonstrations. Claims suggested RDF troops were in Mozambican military uniforms and implicated external actors, including the EU, in supporting repression. These rumors were denied by the RDF, the EU, and President Filipe Nyusi, with no evidence substantiating RDF involvement outside Cabo Delgado. However, the allegations sparked public backlash, including demands for Rwandan forces’ withdrawal from Mozambique, highlighting the fragility of Mozambique’s political environment and the impact of disinformation.
This post-election period underscores how Mozambique’s volatile political environment and the spread of disinformation can distort perceptions of security dynamics. While elections may have amplified scrutiny of external actors like the RDF and EU, there is limited evidence to support claims of their involvement in suppressing domestic unrest. Furthermore, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado appears to be shaped more by military operations than by election-related redeployments, challenging claims of a causal link between elections and ISM activity. The episode highlights the need for careful analysis of data to separate fact from politically charged narratives.
In November, the resurgence and dispersal of Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) forces from their stronghold in Macomia district signal an evolving tactical approach that exacerbates the already fragile security landscape in Cabo Delgado and adjacent provinces. The group’s ability to extend its operations into southern districts like Ancuabe, Chiúre, and even as far south as Eráti in Nampula province reflects a concerning capacity to exploit operational gaps and overstretched security forces.
ISM’s recent attacks on civilians, local militias, and infrastructure reveal a calculated dual strategy designed to amplify their impact and destabilize the region. First, their southward movement signifies a deliberate effort to expand their target area. By carrying out attacks in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts, and even making an unprecedented incursion into Nampula province, ISM not only instills widespread fear but also directly undermines the Mozambican government’s narrative of successfully containing the insurgency. This geographical shift stretches the already strained security forces, challenging their ability to maintain stability across multiple fronts.
Second, ISM appears to be employing diversionary tactics in response to military offensives in Macomia. By dispersing their attacks and targeting new areas, the insurgents likely aim to dilute the concentration of state and allied forces, forcing them to divide their resources and attention. This approach not only complicates counter-insurgency efforts but also demonstrates ISM’s adaptability in the face of increased military pressure.
Challenges for State and Allied Forces: The operational effectiveness of FADM and the RDF remains hindered by logistical issues, as highlighted by the retreat from Quiterajo due to a lack of supplies. These gaps provide ISM with critical opportunities to regroup and exploit unguarded regions. Additionally, the re-emergence of the Naparama militia complicates the security dynamics. While their presence might initially seem like a bolster to local defenses, their mistrust of state forces, as seen in the detention of Mozambican soldiers, indicates potential discord and undermines coordinated efforts.
CONCLUSION
To counter ISM’s adaptive insurgency and expanding threat, Mozambique must prioritize improved coordination among the FADM, RDF, and local militias, ensuring unified and effective operations. Addressing logistical shortcomings in contested zones is critical to sustaining military efforts and preventing tactical setbacks. Proactive measures in Nampula, including intelligence-led operations and community engagement, can help prevent further southward expansion. Additionally, protecting civilians and supporting displaced populations must remain central to counter-insurgency efforts to undermine ISM’s influence. A recalibrated strategy, bolstered by regional cooperation, is essential to restoring stability and addressing the underlying vulnerabilities ISM exploits.
IS-Somalia’s growth and increased influx of foreign fighters highlight its rising threat as both a regional and global extremist entity. Its strategic positioning in northern Puntland and growing organizational capabilities demand immediate and coordinated counterterrorism actions. Regional governments, alongside international partners, should intensify intelligence-sharing, disrupt recruitment and financing networks, and target IS-Somalia’s strongholds, particularly in the Cal Miskaad mountains, to curtail its expansion and mitigate its influence.
ISCAP’s strategic objectives are evident in its sustained campaigns to capture territory, attack military outposts, and target economically significant sites like goldmines. This pursuit of dominance reflects the group’s long-term ambition to entrench itself as an unchallenged power within the region. The continuation of such violence presents significant challenges to regional stability and complicates peacekeeping and development initiatives. The overarching impact of ISCAP’s activities, therefore, is not just the immediate loss of life and displacement but also the broader erosion of peace and security, threatening both local communities and wider regional progress.
The ongoing violence in eastern DRC, driven by militant groups like ISCAP and the M23 coalition, has intensified instability, undermining security and governance. Despite Operation Shujaa and regional support through SAMIDRC, significant challenges persist, including poor coordination between security forces, logistical issues, and the continuous threat posed by insurgent groups targeting civilians and disrupting local economies. The extension of the state of siege has yet to yield comprehensive peace.
To address the deep-rooted insecurity in North Kivu and Ituri, a multi-faceted approach is essential. This should include strengthening military coordination between the FARDC and UPDF, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and securing better logistical support. Regional and international partnerships, such as MONUSCO and SAMIDRC, should be reinforced, focusing on both security and community resilience. Simultaneously, increased humanitarian assistance and dialogue with affected communities can help mitigate civilian suffering and build trust in government efforts. Prioritizing regional collaboration and addressing underlying grievances, including economic and political concerns, are crucial for lasting peace.
......Let us help our countries to fight terrorism........
