Decisions on the the burial of general kahimbi creates a divide between family members,KIVU and FARDC

General Major's funeral, Delphin Kahimbi Kasagwe divided the biological family, as well as friends and acquaintances. Indeed, on 7 May 2020, FARDC Deputy Chief of Staff had received limited biological family members to inform them of the decisions of the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of the Administration and Logistics.
The General Staff of FARDC, for reasons of respect for his memory and tribute to this illustrious leader of war, finally seized the family in the following words: " In view of the coronavirus pandemic and instructions of his Excellency Mr. President of the Republic, the Chief of Staff General informs the family of the decision to bury the late General Kahimbi Kasagwe Delphin in Kinshasa, leaving her to organize later his funeral in Kiniezire, her native village, located in the territory of Kalehe in South Kivu province ".
This great and historic territory, it is remembered, includes several communities and tribes, namely the Bashi, Banande, Bahunde, Batembo, bahutu,batwa and Batutsi. As an eloquent proof of this socio-political reality, all of these communities are gathered in a Asbl called the "Agreement of the nationals of the of Territory" currently chaired by a local socio-political authority
Still according to reports of the press conference held yesterday Tuesday, May 2020, 12 in the municipality of Kintambo, the project to bury the late Delphin Kahimbi Kasagwe in Kinshasa according to the decisions of the General Staff of the FARDC, violating the rules of their ancient customs and traditions. For some, why not wait until the end of this pandemic and then hold a grand funeral in honor of this worthy son of the country? Doesn't this rush to carry out the funeral of General Major Delphin Kahimbi Kasagwe risk of causing and creating unspeakable hot tubs in the local communities of Kalehe territory and its surroundings in the form of a posthumous settlement of accounts?
So this is the dispute between the FARDC General Staff and the nationals of this large territory located geographically between the two provinces of South and North Kivu.
However, it is felt that, taking into account the concerns expressed by nationals of these two provinces over the current health situation, they still hope to hold their son's funeral when the time comes. Reason why the body is still kept since February 28th, the day of death, until today in Kinshasa at the level of the hospital of the Cinquantenaire hospital, waiting for its transfer to Kalehe and more precisely to the native village at level of the village of Kiniezire.
It is noted that while waiting for this funeral, in a correspondence dated May 8 from the biological family of the deceased, family and some friends claim to have already built a mausoleum in Kiniezire for the funeral of the late general-Major Delphin Kahimbi for organize a family funeral worthy of the name of the famous general-major and war lightning.

The dangers of simboxing and call masking in Uganda

Let's us firts understand fully how it goes:
SIM Boxing is a process of creating an artificial middle man with a device that alternates call rates. A SIM Box fraud is a practice whereby SIM boxes are installed with multiple prepaid SIM cards. This enables the fraudsters to bring calls through VolP (through internet) and terminate international calls through local phone numbers in the respective country, just to make it appear as a local call, by initiating the call through local SIM installed in the SIM box.
 SIM box fraudsters mainly use the prepaid SIM, the ownership and address of which is hard to know whereas post-paid SIM are easily traceable because of address verification at the time of connection. The affected stakeholders are the mobile operators, the legal international carriers, and the government.
There are two major players involved in this activity: (1) the fraudsters inside the terminating country; and (2) the illegitimate international carriers from across the border. The fraudster could be a SIM box operator, a local loop operator or a national carrier license holder. The SIM box fraudster basically sets up everything-the SIM boxes, the connectivity, the manpower, and fresh suppliers of SIMs. The local loop operators, bringing in illegal traffic, may use their switches in place of a SIM box. This makes it look like a local call using their own numbering series to terminate the traffic onto mobile operators. The national carrier may bring in illegal traffic, change the ‘A’ number to fake local loop number for each call and terminate the same onto mobile operators on their national trunks instead of international trunks.
Let me explain simplified first the basics of a GSM network and the billing process. I will cut some steps in the process, otherwise it will be too difficult to understand.
If a customer X of company like MTN Uganda calls a friend Y who has a subscription at MTN the flow goes like this.
Cellphone X transmits to the nearest antenna or BTS (Base Transmitter Station,omulingoti) of MTN. The BTS passes the call through the central computer or switch of MTN, where the receiving party is recognized as being a customer of MTN as well, and then the switch sends the call to the BTS where customer Y has made contact and then that BTS send the call to the cellphone of Y. So only the beginning and the end of the call are radio signals (mobile), the in between steps the signal is passed though fixed lines be it glassfiber or such. Customer X will get billed for the call. Since all the traffic is on the network of MTN, they don’t have to pay anyone. This is called an on-net call, where the calls are made between customers of the same network.
Next situation:
If a customer X of MTN calls a friend Y who has a subscription at AIRTEL the flow goes like this.
Cellphone X transmits to the nearest BTS of MTN. The BTS passes the call through the switch of MTN, where the receiving party is recognized as being a customer of AIRTEL. Switch of MTN connects the call to the Switch of AIRTEL, that forward the call to the BTS of AIRTEL where customer of AIRTEL made contact and then radio signals the call to the handset of the customer of AIRTEL. Customer of MTN still gets billed for the call. As you can see, now half of the call (the start) is on the network of MTN and the other half ( the termination) of the call makes use of AIRTEL’s network. So AIRTEL sends  MTN a bill for making use of their network, which they have to maintain. This bill is called termination fee, which every operator has to pay for off-net calls.
To bypass that termination fee, one fraudster can have a simbox to terminate off-net traffic on the radio network of a company. Only switch to switch traffic is charged for termination fee. With a simbox you can convert fixed line calls to mobile calls, using that box and activated simcards. The trick is that companies offer buy off bundles for on-net traffic, say for € 5 a month you can call as much as you want to customers of the same network. Or they have really low on-net tarrifs like 5 cent per minute. They can do that since there are no cost involved for that company since as we saw in the example there are no costs for that company, as long as the calls are started and ended by their own customers.
So the fraudster get some simcards with a tariff of 5 cent per on-net call each for MTN network. He puts them in the simbox and then starts to advertise. Normally when another company want to terminate a call to a customer of MTN they have to pay let’s say 15 cent per minute to MTN. (Not the actual price, but for making it easy to understand) But they only have to pay that when traffic is connected through the switches. The fraudster then can approach MTN and tells them that he is able to terminate all their traffic towards customers of MTN, but for only 10 cent per minute. AIRTEL agrees because that tariff is 5 cent per minute less than if they handover the traffic directly to the switch of MTN. They now send their traffic to the simbox of the fraudster that converts the traffic to mobile calls, just as if it was a giant handset with multiple simcards in it. Since the fraudster only has to pay the subscription fee and a tariff of 5 cents per minute while receiving 10 cent per minute he is making a profit of 5 cent per minute, per sim. He off course pays his bill right away because he wants his simcards open. Since the traffic is huge 5 cent per minute per sim means he earns  $72 each day per sim. So if he has 10 sims, he is earning $ 720 a day just by having that simbox active.
MTN then have a customer that has a monthly bill of let’s say $ 20.000. At first they are happy with such customer that pays his bills every month. But instead of gaining $ 20K, they lose $40K each month, because if all that traffic was presented at their switch they would have billed AIRTEL $60K for those calls.


 SIM box fraudsters mainly use the prepaid SIM, the ownership and address of which is hard to know whereas post-paid SIM are easily traceable because of address verification at the time of connection. The affected stakeholders are the mobile operators, the legal international carriers, and the government.
There are two major players involved in this activity: (1) the fraudsters inside the terminating country; and (2) the illegitimate international carriers from across the border. The fraudster could be a SIM box operator, a local loop operator or a national carrier license holder. The SIM box fraudster basically sets up everything-the SIM boxes, the connectivity, the manpower, and fresh suppliers of SIMs. The local loop operators, bringing in illegal traffic, may use their switches in place of a SIM box. This makes it look like a local call using their own numbering series to terminate the traffic onto mobile operators. The national carrier may bring in illegal traffic, change the ‘A’ number to fake local loop number for each call and terminate the same onto mobile operators on their national trunks instead of international trunks.
The perpetrators of these telecoms infractions have ulterior motives in tampering with international calls and disguising such calls as local calls because of the profit they hope to make from the price differential between international and local call termination rates.

Effects of SIM Box Fraud
Subscriber Identification Modules (SIM) box fraud is a set up where fraudsters team up with international entities,and local operators (I highly anticipate that simcardboxing in Uganda is made possible as a result of teaming with local network operators especially a connivance with their dubious employee to route international calls through the internet, using voice over internet protocol (VOIP) and terminate those calls through a local phone number in Uganda to make it appear as if the call is local.
This allows the box operator to bypass international rates to fraudulently undercut the prices charged by Mobile Network Operators (MNO) and evade the surtax charged by the government. This act denies telecommunications and government from benefiting from international phone calls. Besides loss of revenue, SIM Box operators cause degradation of call quality which prevents them from meeting service level agreements for mobile hubbing traffic. Uganda, in recent years, made attempt to detect and track SIM Box fraudsters.
Another effect is on our social media accounts,that is Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, emails,...etc,whereby 2FA and other verification messages are carried to local phone numbers.
I believe the tracking and detection activities only deter fraudsters, but it does not eradicate the problem. Administrative and technical controls must be implemented in Uganda to thwart SIM Box operations.
Strategies must be implemented to include Geo-location solution which will expose the location of the equipment and their operators for confiscation and prosecution. The network operators must be  mandated to block all SIM card identified to be involved in SIM Box fraud activities, but these operators mostly do not block this fraud SIMs in real time or near time.
 I believe these mechanisms cannot prevent SIM Box operations in Uganda because they can only detect or track fraud activities. The solution must not be just tracking, blocking SIM cards and arresting the culprit. Both administrative and technical measures must be put in place to stop the act or make it less attractive.
The only plan that could probably stop or prevent SIM Box fraud in Uganda is to create an environment where the criminal will feel uncomfortable to operate. Since it is practically impossible and economically unwise to reduce the call rate for the international traffic penetration, government must implement measures to either reduce the crime rate or eradicate it entirely.
The sale of pre- paid SIM cards contributes to operation of SIM Box activities.I recommend that Uganda Communication Commission (UCC) put measures in place to reduce the sale of pre-paid SIM cards by Ugandan mobile telecommunication companies. UCC must sanction any network operator whose SIM is used for perpetrating crime without proper profiling.
UCC  must speed up the ironing out of SIM registration irregularities which are still in existence. Additionally, network operators need to implement an intelligent software or hardware system that can detect and report multiple name registration for onwards investigations.
UCC must task the communication policy implementers and other security organs  to provide enhanced bypassed traffic detection and location-aware system. This system has the capability to identify fraudulent VoIP calls (in real-time) and provides the GPS coordinates for the exact location of the SIM Box. The proposed intelligent solution could be software or hardware device programmed to intelligently detect cases in real-time and then enforce immediate blocking of the SIMs detected.
Real-time information of any suspicious or potentially fraudulent activity can be instantly identified and brought under control so that financial losses are avoided. Further, there must be automation of fraud detection process, implementation of organizational standards, customized policies, rules, and thresholds (with fraud management system) which is built around UCC’s specific needs and operational requirement.Government must ensure that the law enforcement agencies,UCC, Network operators and police collaborate to effect an arrest of the perpetrators in near real time. These measures, when implemented appropriately, have the ability of providing a lasting solution to the SIM Box fraud in Uganda and other persistent communication related crimes.
CALL MASKING
Call masking/refilling is a practice in which callers hide their true numbers when making calls, especially international calls, in order to evade international call rates. A masked call happens when an international call coming into a country is concealed and presented as a local call in order to avoid payment of the correct international termination rate (ITR). For instance, if a number is masked as a local call, the rogue network operator pays Local Termination Rate (LTR) instead of the approved  ITR.
 call masking has the following repercussions:
1. It is powered by Voice APIs, a coding platform where a developer can set up phone number proxies to keep parties from knowing each other’s phone numbers during a call.
2. It uses a short-lived phone number for each party.This allows the caller to communicate seamlessly during a specified time period, with no room for the recipient to speak.
3. It is one of the many platforms terrorists use to communicate in an anonymous manner.
4. It is used to disguise as a family, especially for fraudulent motives.
5. It is a method used to evade the international call rates.
6. Call masking amounts to revenue loss for licensed local telecom operators from international calls since they are being disguised as local calls.

General Muhima Dieudonné accused by three local communities of co-operation with the armed armed group.

General Muhima Dieudonné of Congolese Loyalists based in Minembwe is accused by the Vira, Nyindu and Fuliro communities of being in complicity with the Gumino armed group of the Banyamulenge community to carry out joint operations against them, on the grounds of attacking the Mai Group - Mai Yakutumba neutralized two years ago, reports a joint statement from these three communities dated April 25
These charges came after the death of three Banyamulenge in the exchange of shots between them and the Bafuleru on April 20th in Lulenge. These clashes were due to the introduction of the Banyamulenge into the fields of Bafuliro in Lulenge, who accused them of wanting to steal their yams.
To dispel, the Banyamulenge Community accused the Mai-Mai Yakutumba of being at the base of their three dead with a view to having the intervention of the Loyalists, led by General Muhima Dieudonné.
On Wednesday, April 22, the population of Musika Lulenge woke up in a rain of bullets, having killed 10 dead, all children, and 18 houses burned on the grounds that he was chasing the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, yet neutralized two years ago by the Democratic Republic of the DRC.
" The presence of General Muhima Dieudonné of the Loyalists here in the Fizi remains a source of insecurity and the worsening of conflicts. He does not participate in the pacification of the territory of Fizu, he always lights fire for the benefit of those who will kill him. Sometimes the Banyamulenge accuse him, sometimes the other local communities. There's still a two-edged knife left. He is worthless. He sometimes abuse his authority in some cases. Its elements under control also bother people in some lands. Finally, those who should bring together and protect the people, are those who split them to enrich themselves in the blood of others said a resident under anonymity.
The three communities have signed this grunts to the Congolese government, call for its intervention to avoid another wave of violence during this period of the of-19. pandemic.
It should be noted that the territory of Fizi has been the epicenter of inter-differences conflicts for years between Banyamulenge, Vira, Fuliro, and the, despite several attempts at reconciliation by local civil society organizations.

Conversation between the judge and vital Kamerhe during the opening of the trial at the prison on this ended Monday in Makala.

This letter above shows there is still more Vital kamerhe must answer.

Judge: how did you intervene in the implementation of this program? Director of Cabinet or any other quality? What role did you play in delivering this program?
Kamerhe: I am cabinet director of the head of state. We have to run the program of the head of state, which is already a new situation and usually the program is the prime minister. By what we had a prime minister from an assembly that had just been swept away by a new assembly and we didn't have a prime minister and the president of the republic should cross arms for 7 months and do nothing? So I intervened on behalf of the President of the Republic to get this work done and that we can meet the urgent needs of the Congolese people in the education, health, roads and even free education at home then many know that free is part of the 100 day program. We choose what seems to create confusion and move on.
Judge: Thank you and the court asked the question, how did you intervene?
Kamerhe: Director of Cabinet of the Head of State.
Judge: and that's it?
Kamerhe: yes that's all
Judge: another question, do you know Mr. Samih Jammal who is on your right?
Kamerhe: I'm going to know him in what title? all economic operators, all providers have gone to the commission, they got validated there.
Judge: have you never met him?
Kamerhe: I've met a lot of people in my life. How do you want me to remember thousands of people we met during the election campaign.
Judge: as far as you're concerned, you have no idea?
Kamerhe: I say no
Judge: and the accused Muhima, do you know him?
Kamerhe: you know that Muhima I know him by name, it was today that I discovered the face and was amazed by what I asked everyone, is Jeannot already there. Because our administration of ours, the one I led to the president of the republic, it is no longer the administration to receive the agents in the offices it is the notes on the documents. The customs clearance documents I wrote to the accountant in transfer quickly at Mr. Muhima in charge of logistics to speed up the process. This annotation is here, I don't need to see it. I don't touch the money, I don't transfer for Jeannot, everyone does their job. And me this is the notebook I look at, is it the containers of Mbuji-Mayi have arrived, yes, part. The containers of Kinshasa? Yes, all the containers have arrived, from Kananga? No because we didn't pay, is it in Lobito, South Kivu? No by what we didn't pay, is it in Dar Es Salaam of Matadi? No by what the government hasn't paid yet, it's in Istanbul. What do you want us to say again?
Attorney: Mr. President asked you the question, he answered twice but not the same. He replied that he intervened as a cabinet manager and supervisor and I did not alone, we were with others and coordination. But in the end, he intervened to stress that he intervened as a cabinet manager. I would like the Clerk, if he can repeat, so that the Clerk would note not only that he intervened as a cabinet director but a supervisor as well.
Judge: can you specify.
Kamerhe: it's tendentious, it's tendentious, that's how I didn't want lawyers to come say I'm not going to answer. Then all these little traps left and right...
Judge: can you specify in relation to this?
Kamerhe: is one inconsistent with the other? I'm not saying I'm a supervisor, we were a monitoring team, 9 in total. The document, it's here, read it. There was Mr. vital Kamerhe, director of cabinet, he had Mr. Kolongele, deputy director of cabinet, there was Mr. Yav Minister of Finance, there was the governor of the central bank, the minister of budget of the time, there was had the of representative... all of that.
Judge: you were 9 in total?
Kamerhe: 9 in total, in addition to this 9, there was coordination. What's amazing here.
Judge: who was coordinating?
Kamerhe: it's Monsi vouseur Nicolas Kazadi, traveling ambassador of the head of state.
Judge: thank you, please sit down.

Main ways to block mobile phone attacks

With mobile attacks on the rise this year, we wanted to push the importance of ensuring you are doing everything possible to keep yourself from becoming another victim of mobile attacks; be just as careful on your mobile as you would on your desktop!
So, here are the TOP 20 ways to block mobile attacks...
WIFI:
- Don't allow your device to auto-join unfamiliar networks.
- Always turn off WiFi when you aren't using it or don't need it.
- Never send sensitive information over WiFi unless you're absolutely sure it's a secure network.
APPS:
- Only us apps available in your device's official store - NEVER download from a browser.
- Be wary of apps from unkown developers or those with limited/bad reviews.
- Keep them updated to ensure they have the latest security.
- If they're no longer supported by your store, just delete!
- Don't grant administrator, or excessive privileges to apps unless you truly trust them.
BROWSER:
- Watch out for ads, giveaways and contests that seem too good to be true. Often these lead to phishing sites that appear to be legit.
- Pay close attention to URLs. These are harder to verify on mobile screens but its worth the effort.
- Never save your login information when you're using a web browser.
BLUETOOTH:
- Disable automatic Bluetooth pairing.
- Always turn it off when you don't need it.
SMISHING (PHISHING VIA SMS):
- Don't trust messages that attempt to get you to reveal any personal information.I know alot of you have always received fake messages on mobile money or local phone numbers that send you 2FA codes for your emails,social media accounts.
- Beware of similar tactics in platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, etc.
- Treat messages the same way you would treat email, always think before you click!
VISHING (VOICE PHISHING):
- Do not respond to telephone or email requests for personal financial information especially mobile money. If you are concerned, call the financial institution directly using the phone number that appears on the back of your credit card or on your monthly statement.
- Never click on a link in an unsolicited commercial email.
- Speak only with live people when providing account information, and only when you initiate the call.
- Install software that can tell you whether you are on a secure or fake website.
SOCIAL MEDIA
On your social media accounts,always let your phone number and emails associated be only viewed by you!!!

Is this really Why Virunga National Park guards were killed

In the middle of the forest, the large chalets at the Mikeno lodge are the most luxurious accommodation in Virunga National Park in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the evening, you can sip champagne at the corner of the fireplace. In the day, You meet orphaned primates, raised by park guards, and meet mountain gorillas in their natural environment. Virunga Park is one of the few on earth to house this iconic species in critical danger of extinction.
On the morning of April 24th, the lodge was empty of any visitor. Pandemic again coronavirus forces, tourism has been at a stop for several weeks. But it was another plague that was going to hit.
Around 11 p. m weapons of war suddenly rent the calm of the forest. A few hundred meters from the chalets, three vehicles, including two of the park guards, had fallen into an ambush in Mahura. The 30 minutes of exchange of shots leave a terrible record: twelve park guards, their driver, and four civilians are killed. The Congolese Nature Conservation Institute (ICCN) had never suffered such a heavy attack in Virunga Park.
Yet his guards are used to adversity. From Mount Rwenzori, which frequently serves as a refuge for the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, an Islamist Rebellion of Ugandan origin), to the Nyiragongo volcano, which overlooks the city of Goma, the 7 km2 of Virunga National Park serve regularly from battlefield to armed groups, road to their smuggling routes or resources for their looting.
This adversity justifies an arms race in the 2010 s, including the creation of a "Quick Reaction Force" (QRF, or Rapid Reaction Force) of the ICCN, a paramilitary and sometimes offensive unit composed of 270 park elite guards. In doing so, and as noble as their mission to preserve nature, park guards have become, in fact, an actor caught in the conflicts of Kivu. The Kivu Security Barometer (KST) has thus identified 28 clashes involving of guards since the beginning of its survey in 2017. This is probably only part of the total.
The guards can co-operate with the Congolese army in attacks that can cause security civilians, as against the May-Mai mazembe, on May 23, 2019. " The park is quite correct that the guards are not not legitimate targets under international humanitarian law, but the specific status of QRF and the character of their operations places them in a grey area ", says Christoph Vogel, a researcher at the University of Ghent (Belgium) and former member of the Group United Nations experts on the DRC.
On the other hand, a long and complex conflict is against some local communities as to the boundaries of the park. The latter occupied a quarter of the territories of Beni, Lubero, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru and deprived some farmers from access to land they used to grow. This conflict is particularly intense in the of area, although the recently authorized harvest from April 27 to July 26 to better deal with the shortage caused by the pandemic.
So the of guards have no enemies. Especially the QRF, the most feared of its units, who was decimated during the attack. However, park authorities were able to publish several very detailed news releases on the circumstances of the attack.
The first one claims that it was actually the civil vehicle that was the target of this ambush. According to our reports, it was a white Toyota Prado TX that was attacked with a weapon of war (RPG rocket launcher and heavy heavy machine gun). According to the statement, the attackers are no other than the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda - abacunguzi fighting forces (FDLR-Foca). More specifically, it would be about sixty fighters from the Maccabé group, formerly known as the Deep Research and Action Commandos (Crap), an elite FDLR unit.
The of guards, who were passing through to their headquarters in Rumangabo, would have been nothing but security victims of the ambush and in turn were targeted only because they were trying to rescue civilians. This first version was slightly modified in the second statement, which only states that a "civil vehicle was near that had already been targeted by the attackers before the arrival of the guards".
So why would FDLR attack a civil vehicle with a weapon of war? Several sources, diplomatic, university and ICCN, have told the KST the scenario. According to the latter, FDLR reportedly received information that Colonel FARDC Claude Rusimbi, the deputy commander in charge of operations and intelligence of 3409 erégiment, was to take this route between Goma and Rutshuru that morning. It is possible that FDLR took park guards for his escort.
FDLR had reason to personally blame Rusimbi. On 13 April, one of their main strongholds located in Kazahoro, a few kilometers from the place of the attack, had indeed become the target of a massive Congolese army offensive. According to several sources, both military and diplomatic, members of the Special Forces of the Rwandan army (RDF) were secretly participating in this assault. Colonel Claude Rusimbi is just one of the Congolese officers responsible for coordination with their Rwandan colleagues, according to several military and university sources. According to a member of his entourage, this Colonel knew he was targeted by FDLR.
Whether or not targeted reprisals against Rusimbi, FDLR's responsibility seems highly likely. It is compatible with the known weapons and organization of this armed group, as well as the area where this group is carrying out its attacks.
The attack on Virunga Park guards (red star) is in an area where FDLR-Foca strikes regularly (other colors: incidents in which they have been involved, since June 2017)
In addition to the ICCN, which holds FDLR responsible for the ambush, Rwandan President Paul Kagame also accused this armed group at a press conference on 27 April (37th minute).
FDLR also had specific reasons to address the. These rebels regularly suspect park guards to collaborate with the Rwandan army to track them down. In addition, according to several reports by UN experts for the DRC, one of their main sources of financing is trade and taxation of "makala", charcoal obtained in particular by illegally burning trees inside the park. This puts them, in fact, in conflict with the ICCN, and especially its QRF.
FDLR, however, put forward another theory: they believe the Rwandan army would be responsible for the attack. But this scenario seems convoluted: the ICCN reportedly lied, mistakenly accused FDLR, in order to demonize them to justify the presence of RDF on Congolese soil. Such conspiracy, involving several different actors, seems difficult to implement.
" The FDLR statement was completely out of the reality of the facts, also says a good expert of the group. It has only been published to respond to the Rwandan authorities in the media war they are fighting ".
" FDLR members privately recognize being responsible for this attack says Christoph Vogel. According to them, this was a "mistake" and they claim that their target was Rusimbi"

At least 20 people presented as alleged authors of insecurity in the city of Beni in North Kivu, have fallen into the net of the Congolese national police, announced on Sunday, May 10.

At least 20 people presented as alleged authors of insecurity in the city of Beni in North Kivu, have fallen into the net of the Congolese national police, announced on Sunday, May 10,, Murara, responsible for the cell of police communication in the vile of Beni.
These people, among whom we have been identified uncontrolled military, are accused of being responsible for the recent insecurity in some areas of the city of Beni.
According to the communication officer of the police station in the city of Beni, this operation launched since last Thursday, is the result of the alert but also the good collaboration between police and the population. During this closure that was carried out in the municipality of I, precisely in the Vingazi cell, 23 people fell into the police net. Two weapons have also been recovered.
In addition to these men, there are other people arrested Saturday, May 9 in the evening. They are suspected of being responsible for the assassination of a 20-year-old girl last Friday in the Muloku cell in the municipality of Bungulu. Police are asking the people to continue with this frank collaboration to ensure security is a reality in the city of Beni.
" This is a very strong signal. And we still continue to call on the people to remain very vigilant and denounce. Because the city of Beni seems to be like a prey of insecurity. The population must always continue to collaborate and denounce in a timely fashion. May the marriage between civilians and law enforcement continue until the elimination of insecurity in the city of Beni ", recommend Nasson Murara.
He adds that these persons will be transferred to the competent court.

Researchers have released the latest statistics on worldwide malware infection

Cybercriminals are taking full advantage of lockdown amid Corona virus period. At least this is what the new figures have revealed. Researchers have released the latest statistics on worldwide malware infection

trends during the last 30 days, and the results are quite alarming especially for educational institutions and the business sector.

According to Atlas VPN, the firm behind compiling these trends, in the past 30 days, about 404 million malware worldwide infections have been identified. This suggests cybercriminals carried out at least 10 million infections per day. Surprisingly, over 64% of the attacks were targeted against educational institutions. 

It is noted that the rate of daily infections in April kept fluctuating between 10 to 16 million cases per day, such as, on 1stApril 2020, there were roughly 12 million infections registered globally while the rate dropped significantly on April 5 with 10 million daily infections, the company’s blog post said. The rate peaked again reaching the highest number of infections on 16 April with 16 million infections registered in a day.

According to Kaspersky’S Cyberthreat map, Central Asia remained the prime target of local cyberattacks with 32% infected devices identified in Tajikistan and 31% in Uzbekistan while 27% of devices used Kaspersky antivirus solutions were exposed to malware in China.

On the other hand, Microsoft claims to have identified 6.5 million malware infections targeting different industries. After the education sector, business and professional services were targeted the most with 623,000 incidents of cyberattacks or 9% infection rate. The retail and consumer goods sector came in third claiming 8% of total incidents or 540,000 cases. 

The financial and insurance services sector received 5% of the global malware infections and Microsoft identified around 330,000 cases in this domain of service. Healthcare was the fifth most targeted sector receiving 4% of worldwide malware attacks or 270,000 infections.

The aerospace and automobile industry received 3% or 200,000 malicious attacks; chemicals, oils, gas, and mining sectors receive nearly 3% of worldwide cyberattacks with 194,000 cases. Transportation and hospitality services sector was exposed to 162,000 malware attacks, which means about 2.5% of devices receiving malware attacks globally.

The number of malware attacks is expected to rise during the exam period. Hence, if schools are planning on holding exams remotely, they should prepare and get experienced IT specialists to check the systems to prevent sensitive information from being stolen, warned Atlas VPN’s Anton P.

People have long assumed that autocrats and dictators have an advantage in waging war. Today, as the novel coronavirus sweeps across the globe, there is some speculation that autocracies have an edge in fighting that war, too. Autocrats can potentially enforce shelter-in-place orders more effectively and use their surveillance abilities to better engage in contact tracing.
These concerns are without foundation. Contrary to popular beliefs, democracies are more effective in responding to various crises. Political science research found that democracies are more likely than autocracies to win their wars. From 1816 to 1987, democracies won about 76 percent of their wars, while nondemocracies won about 46 percent of their wars. Even more striking, democracies rarely lose when they start wars, winning 93 percent of the time.
What is true of wars against armies is also true of a campaign against disease. Past studies have found that citizens in democracies are healthier than citizens living under tyranny and that democracies suffer lower mortality rates than dictatorships in epidemics. Analyses of responses to the current pandemic have already found that once the tenth coronavirus case was reported, democracies were faster than dictatorships to close schools. There is good reason to think that the attributes that make democracies perform better in wars—especially accountable leaders and superior information flows—make them more effective in fighting the coronavirus as well.
WINNING THE BATTLE
According to  our team's research, we found that democracies win wars in part because of the reelection anxiety of their leaders. Democratically elected leaders are motivated to avoid waging losing wars because they know that unpopular policies often lead to their removal from office: U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, for example, both took steps to limit troop involvement in Syria for this reason. True, sometimes elected leaders start or escalate wars that turn out poorly, as did President Lyndon B. Johnson in Vietnam and President George W. Bush in Iraq. But the eventual decline of these leaders’ political fortunes serves as an enduring recommendation for caution to their successors.
As a result, elected leaders start ill-conceived wars less often than other leaders. Dictators do not have such reelection anxieties, and they are more confident that they can repress popular opposition in order to stay in office. They are thus more likely to start risky wars they might not win. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, for instance, was able to crush domestic opposition after his disastrous 1980 invasion of Iran and 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Elected leaders start ill-conceived wars less often than other leaders.
Superior information flows also help democracies win wars. Democratic leaders make better choices about wars because independent news media facilitate open debate, exposing bad ideas and promoting good ones. This environment of open debate also increases the likelihood that democratic leaders will inherit and choose qualified advisers and military officers—even sometimes rivals—who in turn provide better advice. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, prudently deferred attacking Pakistan in 1971 until she had a very promising (and ultimately successful) military plan and the weather was favorable. And U.S. President George H. W. Bush held extensive debates among his advisers in 1990 planning for war against Iraq, which produced one of the
most decisive victories in military history.
Dictators are more opposed to open discussion because they fear internal political threats. They are more likely to appoint and promote yes men, who are unmotivated to provide their leaders with the unvarnished truth and/or unqualified to provide insightful advice. Arab attacks by Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq on Israel in 1948, 1969, and 1973 all ended in defeat. The poorly conceived
Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 is a perfect example of a pyrrhic victory, leaving more than 100,000 Soviet dead and only a few scraps of Finnish tundra to show for it. And although Americans bemoan the long war in Afghanistan, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan turned out far worse for Moscow, with perhaps 15,000 dead and absolutely no gains.
WAR ON DISEASE
The same characteristics that help democracies win wars can help them tackle challenges such as the pandemic. Democratic leaders who mishandle a pandemic can expect to be at greater risk of being tossed out of office and are thus more likely to take effective action.
Dictators are more likely to survive botched crisis responses and therefore do not face pressure to reform their strategies. This can have a devastating effect during health crises. In the current outbreak, Iran has suffered an estimated 900,000 cases of the virus because the Iranian government has made such poor policy choices. But the government’s botched coronavirus response will not threaten the regime because Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has substantial tools at his disposal to repress threats to his power. Similarly, should the coronavirus crisis stimulate unrest in China, President Xi Jinping will tighten his control even further.
The strict controls dictatorships have over information flows have also impeded their response to the pandemic. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin has censored information about the virus, even arresting or intimidating individuals who speak out about it: Russian police assaulted and arrested
one doctor who posted videos describing authorities concealing the severity of the pandemic. China, the first country to confront COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus, squelched information about the source and characteristics of the virus: the regime arrested doctors in Wuhan in late December for sounding the alarm, allowed a banquet of 40,000 families in Wuhan to occur in early February, refused help from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, hampered distribution of data on how the virus spreads among those infected who show no symptoms, and underreported the number of cases by a factor of four. Although the Chinese government reports success in combating the virus, doubts about China’s progress persist, given the country’s lack of transparency. These patterns are not new; China’s heavy clampdown on information
substantially interfered with its efforts to battle the SARS outbreak in 2002–3.
Open societies have generated a flood of important information about the virus.
Open information flows in democracies, by comparison, have helped fight the outbreak. Democracies such as the United States and Germany have created policy laboratories that have helped to explore innovative approaches. But more important, open societies have generated a flood of important information about the virus, advancing public understanding and helping policymakers and citizens develop and distribute protective measures. And open channels of information have identified and exposed fake news, conspiracy theories, and quack cures, limiting their domination of public discourse on the coronavirus.
Unlike wars, however, information sharing during a pandemic is not limited to the individual liberal societies coming up with winning policy ideas. Rather, scientists, doctors, policymakers, and journalists around the globe have embraced the liberal norm of sharing ideas and information, creating an open and expansive community of knowledge. Chinese scientists substantially advanced progress toward testing, vaccine, and cure development after publishing the complete
genome sequence of the coronavirus in January (although their Shanghai lab was subsequently shut down by Chinese government authorities). Meanwhile, hundreds if not thousands of other research labs around the world are racing to perfect tests, vaccines, and cures, rapidly publishing and sharing scientific papers. The health company Kinsa publishes data from its Web-linked home thermometers to forecast novel coronavirus clusters accurately and rapidly. And Google helps distribute information on social distancing, possible new symptoms, and other important developments.
Several democracies have made substantial progress in avoiding or containing outbreaks, including South Korea, Taiwan, Germany,
Australia and New Zealand , Denmark, and Israel. The United States’ response to the coronavirus, however, has seemingly challenged the notion that democracies are better at fighting pandemics. President Trump has come under severe criticism for his handling of the crisis, downplaying early warnings of potential death tolls and moving slowly to initiate widespread testing. Despite his early performance, however, Trump’s response to the virus illustrates how democracies excel in containing disease: recognizing that the outcomes of the November elections will turn on his handling of the pandemic, Trump has begun to take the crisis more seriously, imposing travel restrictions, supporting massive economic relief, and using the Defense Production Act to boost the manufacture of testing materials. Unlike dictators, who can squelch opposition, democratically elected leaders such as Trump are pressured to respond to criticism, which ultimately can yield more effective containment measures.
KILL THE VIRUS, NOT DEMOCRACY
No one can predict with certainty the course of this pandemic. But our research on democracy and war suggests that there are critical actions both policymakers and individuals should take to fight the virus. Voters should continue to hold their elected leaders’ feet to the fire to motivate them to fight the virus as effectively as possible and to respond flexibly to changing conditions. Democracies should nurture information flows inside and outside of government to spur open debate about the best path forward.
As in wartime, the looming challenge for democracies will be expanding the power of the state without undermining democracy itself. South Korea, for instance, stifled the coronavirus by collecting widespread personal information about patients and informing individuals who came into contact with victims. The U.S. government may need to direct mass production of critical goods such as ventilators and control prices to prevent gouging. This can be a difficult balance—witness, for example, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s power grab in Hungary or the Israeli government’s concerning expansion of data collection powers. But democracies have managed this balance before, winning wars without destroying freedom, and it can do the same in fighting the novel coronavirus. As in wars, democracy will be a source of strength in fighting the virus, not a source of weakness.

Earlier this year, Pavel Sozinov, general designer at the Russian defence concern Almaz-Antey, touted the S-500 as a missile system that is capable of intercepting targets located hundreds of kilometres above the Earth.
The Russian Armed Forces may get the first advanced S-500 missile systems next year, the country’s Deputy Defence Minister Alexei Krivoruchko has said in an interview with the magazine Natsionalnaya Oborona (National Defence).
According to him, the conclusion of a state contract for S-500s is scheduled for 2021, with wide-scale deliveries expected in subsequent years.
Krivoruchko also referred to a stage of the S-500-related preliminary tests, with "the material part currently at the training ground”.
The statement echoes that of Vladimir Dolbenkov, director-general of the Design Bureau for Special Machine-Building (part of Almaz-Antey), who said in late March that tests for certain elements of “the next-generation Triumfator-M mobile air defence system S-500”, including its launcher, “[…] were being completed”.

RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY
Russian S-400 Triumph missile system
This followed Almaz-Antey general designer Pavel Sozinov touting the S-500 as an air defence system that will be able to intercept targets “in the upper atmosphere”, hundreds of kilometres above the Earth.
He stressed that according to its specifications, the S-500 exceeds all similar missile systems that have been created or are being designed in developed countries.
Sozinov said that the Russian missile system comprises a large number of various target detection and interception tools as well as ground-to-air guided missiles. "This is a system that accomplishes a wide range of tasks for both air defence and missile defence purposes”, he emphasised.
The S-500 Prometey, also known as 55R6M "Triumfator-M", is a Russian surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile system designed to replace the S-400.
With the S-500's specifications still officially classified, media reports have claimed that the system is capable of destroying targets up to 600 kilometres (372 miles) away.
It reportedly can track and simultaneously strike up to 10 ballistic targets moving at speeds of up to 7 kilometres (4 miles) per second (about Mach 20). The system is also capable of hitting various aerodynamic targets, including aircraft and helicopters, as well as cruise missiles.