The Al-Qaeda affiliate militant group, Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (HSM) commonly known as Al-Shabaab continue to escalate attacks in East Africa, especially in Kenya and Somalia. Somalia has been fighting the Al-Shabaab jihadist insurgency for well over a decade and even with support from allies militarily, the jihadist group is not fully degraded.

Al-Shabaab’s deadly insurgency continues with no end in sight. The Islamist militant group consistently tries to keep up with local and regional military operations. The militant group has exploited a number of loopholes to step up attacks. Combined with dysfunction and division among their adversaries, the militants’ agility has enabled its operatives to embed themselves in Somali society. It also makes them hard and elusive to defeat.

In the month under review, the Islamist militant group has escalated attacks against military positions, government officials as well targeting on civilians. The surge in Al-Shabaab attacks has been noted especially in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu and localities in central and southern Somalia.

Notably, counterterrorism assets at Strategic Intelligence (S.I) have recorded at least 57 for Kenya and Somalia.  Somalia the home-base of Al-Shabaab has taken the largest share of these attacks. Attack patterns in Somalia remains almost the same, mostly occurring in central and southern Somalia. Most these attacks are notably repeat attacks, especially the ones targeted at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and military convoys.

Thus, threat posture continues to be skewed towards military operating bases and their patrols convoys besides military convoys on supply missions especially for Somalia. Most of the raids against the targets are notably ambushes and setting up of roadside IEDs with a number of repeat attacks being recorded. Assassination attempts on key officials also witnessed in Mogadishu and its environs as well as resumption of suicide operations.

Al-Shabaab has proven resilient, adjusting to counter-insurgency campaigns and entrenching itself deeper in parts of Somali society. Al-Shabaab militants still retains control over large swathes of rural Somalia and persistently mount attacks in urban centers a confirmation of the group’s resilient despite counter-operations on the group by coalition security operators and hurriedly claiming credit for the overly exaggerated operations for warfare purposes.

For Kenya, another key target of the Islamist Al-Shabaab, the militant group continue to stage low-scale attacks in an attempt to disrupt the calmness that has been witnessed for a number of months. The militant group is keen on disrupting the frontier counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) by emplacing IEDs on main roads and MSRs in an effort to target security assets on patrol missions.

 most wanted Al-Shabaab leaders & the group’s elusive intelligence chief, Mahad Karate ON THE RIGHT, who has $5 million bounty on his head

AS Recently Claimed Attacks: June 1^st – June 14^th

§  On June 1^st, Emerging reports in Mogadishu indicate that Major Salad Ishaq Yusuf, a senior Somali government official, escaped unhurt in an IED explosion in Daynile district, killing at least one of his bodyguards and wounding five others. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, few hours after the attack.

§  On June 1^st, Al-Shabaab claimed to have detonated an IED targeting a Somali National Army (SNA) convoy in Mogadishu. The IED killed one soldier, wounded one other, and wounded two civilians as per local sources.

§  On June 1^st, heavily armed Al-Shabaab militants claimed to have attacked an AMISOM and Somali government base in Barire area of Lower Shabelle, but no casualties were reported.

§  On June 2^nd, A car bomb exploded in the general vicinity of Daynile, Mogadishu, killing at least two police officers and wounding several others. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the targeted IED explosion through radio Andalus.

§  On June 2^nd, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for assassination of a Turkish Embassy staffer in Mogadishu. The staffer was also an electoral delegate.

§  On June 2^nd, Al-Shabaab claimed to have launched attacks against Kenyan security troops on the outskirts of Garissa town. Using light weapons, the militants claimed to have attacked Ura Madow camp and also ambushed the convoy was traveling from the military camp towards Bura, Tana River County.

§  On June 6^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a Kenyan police convoy and a lawmaker near Sangaliu, Garissa County, eastern Kenya. The targeted police convoy was traveling from Masalani, Tana River County, eastern Kenya, to Sangaliu, Garissa County. Local officials claimed the IED caused fatalities from the Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit.

§  On June 6^th, Al-Shabaab assassinated a Burundian African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldier in Balad, Middle Shabelle region, central Somalia.

§  On June 6^th, Al-Shabaab claims to have killed some Kenyan security officers, injured others following a roadside bomb attack on a police vehicle in Lamu county of Kenya.

§  On June 9^th, at least four Somali Soldiers have been injured after a vehicle they were travelling in was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED) outside the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the IED blast via its media.

§  On June 9^th, several explosions, believed to be mortar rounds, heard near Mogadishu airport amidst lockdown as the Somali capital hosted foreign delegations who attended the inauguration of new Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

§  On June 9^th, Al-Shabaab militants detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a US-trained Danab special forces convoy in Gululei, Bal’ad district, Middle Shabelle region, south-central Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed the IED killed fifteen soldiers. The convoy was traveling from Mogadishu to Jowhar.

§  On June 11^th, Deadly clashes between Puntland security forces and Al-Shabaab militants reported in Bossaso. Corresponding local sources reported that two people were killed in the clashes in Bossaso, northern Somalia, one of them a security officer and the other a civilian.

§  On June 11^th, Al-Shabaab militants took credit for detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting police officers in Badbaado internally displaced peoples camp, Dharkenley district, Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab claimed that the IED killed seven police officers at a police station while Local officials claimed the IED killed two police officers at a tea shop.

§  On June 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed a brief attempted probe on ATMIS military base operated by the Kenyan troops in Hosingow, Lower Juba. No details on casualties were provided.

§  On June 12^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a direct attack on ATMIS-Ugandan operating base in Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle region of Somalia, but no casualties were reported.

§  On June 13^th, suspected Al-Shabaab assassins reportedly shot and killed a prominent elder outside his house in the morning in Mogadishu’s Bar-Ubah neighborhood. Warsame Ismail is said to have been approached by people armed with pistols, who fired several rounds at him before fleeing the scene.

§  On June 14^th, Al-Shabaab claimed the killing of two Burundian soldiers serving under ATMIS in the outskirt of Bala’d district in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region. Notably, claimed that they have used snipers, according to the affiliate accounts of the group.

Attacks from June 14^th – June 30^th

§  On June 15^th, Al-Shabaab militants raided a Kenyan African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) base in Kulbiyow, Badhadhe district, Lower Jubba region, southern Somalia. The brief probe was successfully repulsed and no casualties were reported.    

§  On June 16^th, Al-Shabaab militants claimed responsibility for an attempted ambush on a KDF election security convoy near Riba, Wajir County, northeastern Kenya. No casualties were reported.

§  On June 16^th, Al-Shabaab militants claimed to have raided a Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) base in Kiunga, Lamu County, eastern Kenya. No casualties were reported.

§  On June 17^th, Al-Shabaab, Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militia fighters and regional forces clashed in Badho village, Adado district, Galgudud region, central Somalia. Warring sides reported successes. The defending forces claimed to kill at least 67 al Shabaab militants, wound at least 33 more, and capture a suicide vehicle improvised explosive device (VBIED) and the driver and Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed 27 defending forces.

§  On June 19^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to briefly captured Rhamu, Mandera County, NEP and lectured locals.s

§  On June 20^th, Al-Shabaab terrorists stormed and overran El-Bur district hospital in Galgadud region and forcibly discharged all the patients including malnourished children and pregnant women to hospitalize 80 of their members who were wounded in Friday’s Bahdo fighting as per State Media.

§  On June 21^st, Al-Shabaab militants claimed to have detonated an improvised explosive device targeting a communications tower in Rhamu, Mandera County, NEP Kenya.

§  On June 22^nd, Civilian casualties were reported as a result of a roadside bomb attack on the outskirts of Kismayo, especially between the Bar area and the area known as Barbara. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility saying it targeted Somali government troops.

§  On June 23^rd, Al-Shabaab militants claimed responsibility for detonating an improvised explosive device targeting a Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces convoy in Mogadishu. No details on casualties were provided.

§  O June 23^rd, Al-Shabaab claimed to have shot and killed a Burundian soldier guarding a military base in general vicinity of Mahaday district of Middle Shabelle and wounded one other.

§  On June 24^th, Al-Shabaab militants stopped a bus heading to Mandera, Kenya from Nairobi and searched for non-locals on Friday. The militants also lectured passengers in Somali language for 2-hours.

§  On June 25^th, Al-Shabaab claimed an operation on SNA operated base in the general vicinity of Dharkenley district of Mogadishu where two soldiers of Federal Government were killed.

§  On June 25^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have targeted and killed a government official identified as Hussein Hassan Gurey in the general vicinity of Afgoye, Lower Shabelle region.

§  On June 27^th, Al-Shabaab militants raided three Jubbaland State security forces bases in Buda Dariq, Garaska and Sangaleer, Kismayo district, Lower Jubba region, southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed to kill at least eight soldiers in the attacks

§  On June 27^th, at least three SNA soldiers were killed and several others, including two journalists, wounded in a landmine blast in Qabno areas of the Mataban district in the Hiran region on Monday. The attack targeted convoy that carrying the governor of the Hiran region and army officials.

§  On June 27^th, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a direct gun attack on government troops in general vicinity of Daynunay village on the outskirts of Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia killing two soldiers.

§  On June 29^th, Al-Shabaab claimed to have conducted mortar shelling and direct attacks on SNA Defense post killing one government soldier in the general vicinity of Weydow, west of the Somalia capital Mogadishu.

§  On June 29^th, In the Lower Jubba region, the Islamist militant claimed to have launched a major offensive against ATMIS base operated by the Kenyan troops in Taabto area but no casualties were reported.

§  On June 30^th, reports from Middle Shabelle indicated that Al-Shabaab jihadist fighters blew up the house of a former minister in the self-proclaimed Hirshabelle administration in Jowhar town.

§  On June 30^th, Al-Shabaab fighters claimed responsibility for targeting the base of the Puntland forces in Galgala area of Bossaso. The fighters claimed to have fired several rounds of mortar shells causing casualties of five soldiers and damage of military property.

Assessments/Observations & Insights

Despite many years of sustained counterterrorism pressure, Somali forces supported by allied AMISOM partners and the U.S, the terrorist threat in East Africa is not degraded. Instead, Al-Shabaab has adopted guerilla tactics and managed to consolidate control of rural areas, while regularly conducting deadly attacks on Somali cities.

Notably the Al-Qaeda associated Al-Shabaab continue to position itself as an alternative authority in Somalia coming up with some interventions such as education, humanitarian interventions and latest being the construction of a hospital. Al-Shabaab claimed to have built and opened a new state of the art Hospital, which includes a Maternity Ward in the Al-Shabaab controlled town of Jilib in the Middle Jubba province of Somalia which will be open for the locals. These interventions are clever ways/strategies by the jihadist group to woo Somali masses to their side/fold.

Al-Shabaab claims credit of having built and opened a new state of the art Hospital, which includes a Maternity Ward in the Al-Shabaab controlled town of Jilib in the Middle Jubba province of Somalia.

Notably, an average of at least one or two attacks are recorded from across the regions of Somalia. Regions mostly targeted in frequent attacks include the capital and the ones in central and southern Somalia where the militant group maintains quite some control. As for Kenya, retaliatory and disruptive incidents linked to Al-Shabaab are also being reported along the volatile border prefectures with Somalia especially; Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu. CT assets in those prefectures continue to be alert, reporting few cases on attempted probes and enemy signatures.

Al-Kataib and Radio Andalus has continually over exaggerated on the number of operations it has conducted in East Africa as well as number of fatalities/casualties caused. Preferred attack types remain the use of IEDs, landmines and roadside bombs. Ambush raids are also gaining traction on the military targets. However, the Islamist militant group through its propaganda media channels. Recently Al-Shabaab propaganda media wing released a video showcasing its recent operations from across Somalia theaters, ranging from small scale to complex operations especially on military positions (Convoys and FOBs).

Conclusion

Continuous monitoring, surveillance and scouting encouraged several meters away from forward operating bases/police outpost for both Kenya and Somalia. Al-Shabaab ultimate goals is to stage attacks on FOBs and Defense Posts, as such counterterrorism assets advised to observe convoy discipline citing Al-Shabaab continuous IED contamination on Military Supply Routes (MSRs).

Counterterrorism assets especially for Kenya have been able to sustain robust counteroperations against the Islamist Al-Shabaab waging surprise attacks in prefectures bordering Somalia. However, counterterrorism operators urged to be alert, collaborate with locals to get the much-needed HUMINT in an attempt to thwart attacks in the future. Threat posture, remains skewed towards military operating bases and defense posts proximal to the border with Somalia, thus security troops/patrol teams are highly advised to maintain an offensive posture.

 

How to Secure Your Email From Common Hacking Threats

 

For organizations, email is the first line of defense from hacking, and it has to be protected the most. According to research, over three billion infected emails are sent daily — which means that it’s highly likely that you’ll receive an infected email in your inbox.

Namely, emails are highly targeted by cybercriminals. The main reason is that everyone has an email address, and it’s relatively easy to obtain a lot of them as well as send malicious links that contain a virus.

So, what can you do about it?

Start by strengthening your email security.

What is email security all about? Well, it’s about changing your password to a stronger one, but also having the tools that protect you against common cyberattacks.

Which cyberattacks should you learn to recognize and how to set up a strong password to protect your email?

Let’s find out.

Contents [show]

Recognize Obvious Phishing Attacks

Emails are the number one target of phishing attacks. Therefore, it’s important to recognize a phishing attack.

What all phishing attacks have in common is that they impersonate someone you trust. Cybercriminals don’t want you to second guess if an email is a scam, a legit offer, or a genuine concern.

For example, common scams include the impersonation of banks and notifying you that your account has been hacked.

To protect that same account, they might request to click on a certain link that connects data or even your PIN — even though a bank would never ask you to disclose it over an email.

Lately, there has been an increased number of attacks that include the impersonation of medical institutions due to COVID-19. Hackers send infected files with information about the latest measures concerning coronavirus.

Medical and financial scams include emails that are sent to a lot of people. Avoid clicking on any links or opening attachments, even if you get an email that looks like it’s from your bank or official medical institution.

The goals of phishing emails are different. Some might ask you to transfer money and others might pretend to help you and urge you to click on a certain link or install attachments that contain malware.

Some clues that you received a phishing email are:

Sense of urgency — scammers put pressure on you to react as soon as possible

Grammatical errors — scam emails are known to have a lot of grammatical errors

Generic greeting — email filters can recognize certain templates that hackers use, and it’s common for them to start with a greeting such as “Dear valued member” or even “Dear customer”

Use Trustworthy Anti-Malware

Reliable antivirus installed on all of your devices is a must. Scamming via email is frequently accompanied by a link to a website that is infected with malware or an attachment containing a virus looking to get installed on your computer.

Therefore, even if you don’t transfer money upon their request, cybercriminals might find another way to get into your bank account. They could monitor your activity using the remote access they gained after you installed malware on your device.

Antivirus software from a trustworthy company can detect viruses on your device and mitigate them before hackers cause any damage or get access to your sensitive information and demand ransom.

Set up a Strong Password

To be impenetrable, your password must contain at least 8 or 13 characters. It also has to consist of a unique combination of both uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and special symbols.

Avoid using any of your personal information when choosing your password. Numbers such as anniversaries or birthdays are easier to trace back to you – especially on social media.

What’s more, avoid having any words from a dictionary in your password. Hackers can use the dictionary to crack your credentials.

When was the last time you changed your passwords? Has it been over six months or even longer? If not, it’s time to change it.

Also, do you use your password for more than one account?

If that’s the case, it means that hackers can hack into your email and use the same password to get into all the other sites and services that you sign up with using the same credentials.

Secure Your Corporate Email

Companies need more complex measures to protect their networks and corporate emails. Having stronger tools that protect your system against the latest cyberattacks, basic employee training about cybersecurity, and employing zero trust is a good start.

Your tools should be able to scan for and mitigate phishing attacks and other likely attacks that target email. They should block installing of the attachments and access to sites that are suspicious, but also remove threats that are already on your computer.

Employee training is an efficient way to combat some possible flaws in security.

Not all of your employees are tech-savvy, and some of them might cause a vulnerability in your system. They might click on an infected link within the body of the email or download an attachment from an unknown sender.

However, your employees are not cybersecurity experts, and it’s not solely their responsibility to protect your network.

Employ zero trust by limiting access to certain parts of your systems, and use cybersecurity tools that continually scan for unwanted access.

Email is a Goldmine of Information for Hackers — Protect it

The information that you have on your email is precious, and it has to be protected — even if you firmly believe that you have nothing or already share a lot about yourself on your social media.

Emails can contain information about your bank account, private information about you, your family, your clients, and more.

For better email security, you can start by replacing your password with a more secure one and have tools that remove malware in case you click accidentally click on a malicious link.

Best Windows 10 Hidden Features

 

   

News

1.God Mode

If you have always wanted to take full control of your computer’s operating system then God Mode will definitely impress you. With this shortcut, you will get access to a master version of the Control Panel that has extended settings.

To enable it, create a new folder with the name,

GodMode.{ED7BA470-8E54-465E-825C-99712043E01C}

Once again only use this hidden feature on Windows 10 if you are a power user or an IT professional. Using God Mode you can also customize the Windows OS as per your liking.

2. Doom’s Dedicated Port

Next on the list, we have game-related Windows Easter Eggs. If you were born in the 90s then you might know that Doom95 was one of the first mainstream first-person shooters available for the Windows platform.

When the game got released for Windows it used port 666. Well, this is a reference to the Number of the Beast. To this day, even in Windows 10 port 666 is the only port reserved for doom.

To check out this gaming Windows 10 easter egg head on to C:WindowsSystem32driversetc and open the file “services” in Notepad.

3. Make Phone Calls

Yes, you read that right!

Windows OS comes with a built-in phone dialer. If you have a telephone device or a modem connected to your computer then you can make and receive phone calls.

To do so, simply run the executable file by pressing Windows + R. Next you have to type dialer.exe and press enter. If everything goes well, the dialer program will launch.

If you don’t have a telephone device connected then a warning will pop up.

4. Secret Start Menu

Secret Start Menu is a hidden Windows 10 feature that’s right in front of you every day but you never really notice. To activate this menu simply right-click on the start menu button.

Once activated a textual jump menu will pop up and here you will see a number of familiar destinations, like Apps and Features, Search, and Run. If you have used older versions of Windows like Windows 7/Vista/XP then you might be aware of this textual start menu.

It definitely comes in handy when you want to do something really quickly.

5. Star Wars CMD Movie

Next, upon this list, we have one of the coolest command prompt Easter Eggs namely Star Wars CMD code. Before using this cool easter egg please ensure that Telnet is enabled on your computer.

If it’s not enabled, open the start search bar and type “telnet”. Next click on “Turn Windows Features on or off from the results”. You have to now locate the Telnet Client entry. Once located check the box and press OK.

Next to have fun with this easter egg open the command prompt and type

telnet towel.blinkenlights.nl

Now sit back, relax, grab a drink and enjoy star wars in ASCII characters. In addition to Windows 10, you can use this code on all Operating Systems that support Telnet and has a terminal or command line.

6. Show Desktop Button

Using an almost hidden button in Windows 10 you can instantly jump back to the desktop no matter how many programs you have open. If your taskbar is located at the bottom of the screen then you can locate this button in the bottom-right corner.

Can’t locate it yet? Well, it’s right after the time and the notifications button. Simply press this small transparent sliver button and you will be on your desktop.

Want to get back to work? Simply press it again and all your open windows will be back where you left them. This small button eliminates the need to minimize every open program just to go back to the desktop.

7. Unusable Names

For developing a newer version of Windows, Microsoft relies heavily on the previous versions so they don’t have to do everything from the ground up.

Due to this reason, you can’t use the following names for your folders,

CON

AUX

PRN

LPT# (# is a number)

COM#

NUL

CLOCK$

Windows reserves these names for device names. As a result, only Windows can use these names. Using these names will simply pop up an error.

8. SlideTo Shut Down

Next on the list of interesting Windows 10 Easter Eggs, we have the SlideToShutDown EXE file. As the name suggests using this EXE you can instantly shut down your Windows computer.

The EXE is located in the folder C:WindowsSystem32. If you want to use this EXE simply create its shortcut on your desktop and double-click the shortcut to shut down your PC.

Alternatively, on a Windows 10 laptop enable the Tablet mode and press the power button for 3 to 5 seconds to launch SlideToShutDown.

9. Windows 3.1 Explorer from 1992

Ever wondered what the File Explorer in Windows 3.1 looked like? Well, thanks to an easter egg present in Windows 10 you go can go back in time and experience a little trace of File Explorer from 1992.

To check out this easter egg search for the program ODBC Data Source. Once located open it and press the add button. Now select Windows Access Driver and press finish. Lastly under Database, hit Select.

Ta-da, you’re now looking at a slice of Windows history. In excitement, please don’t change any settings in ODBC Data Source.

10. Xbox Game Bar

Xbox Game Bar has to be one of the best feature introduced with Windows 10. With the Xbox Game Bar, you get access to many nifty gaming tools like a resource monitor, one-click gameplay recording, Xbox Social, Spotify playback controls, and many more.

To trigger the game bar simply use the keyboard shortcut Windows+G. Based on your preference you can even select the widgets that you want to be displayed and hide the ones that you don’t like.

In addition to games, the Xbox Game Bar can also be used with normal software and programs.

Phishing domains are spreading Windows 11 installers loaded with Vidar infostealer.

 

According to the cybersecurity firm Zscaler ThreatLabz, threat actors are trying to install info stealing malware on users’ devices through newly registered domains. Zscaler explained that these spoofed domains were first observed in April 2022 and created to distribute “malicious ISO files” (a PE32 binary) disguised as legit MS Windows 11 OS installers.

These malicious files deliver Vidar infostealer on the device. Some of the fake domains registered on 20 April include ms-win11com, win11-servcom, win11installcom, and ms-teams-appnet.

It is worth noting that Vidar malware was previously used in attacks against YouTubers and in a VPN scam in which a fake VPN website was discovered delivering password-stealing malware.

What is Vidar malware?

It is notorious info stealing malware that can perform spying on users. Its primary job is to steal sensitive user data such as operating system information, online accounts credentials, browser history, financial or banking data, and cryptocurrency wallet login details. It is generally distributed via the Fallout exploit kit.

How is Vidar Infostealer Distributed?

Vidar malware is delivered through phishing and attacker-controlled social media networks. ZScaler researchers noted that the Vidar malware variants extract the C2 configuration from these social media channels on the Mastodon networkwo cases examined by Zscaler, attackers created new user accounts and saved C2 server addresses in the profile section on Mastodon and Telegram channels. The same C2 was stored in the Channel Description tab. This helps attackers implant malware on vulnerable devices as these catch C2 configuration from the channels.

According to Zscaler’s blog post, those behind this campaign leverage backdoored versions of legitimate software like Adobe Photoshop and Microsoft Teams to distribute Vidar malware. Though the fake sites appear to be the central download portal, it is the ISO file that does the damage as it hides the malware payload and Themida.

This ISO file contains an unusually large-sized executable (more than 300MB) to avoid detection from anti-viruses. This file is signed with an expired certificate from Avast, and all binaries have been signed by a certificate featuring the same serial number.

Researchers believe that the certificate could be a part of the leaked data when Avast was targeted in October 2019. The ISO files, pretending to be Win 11 installers, also have a GitHub repository that stores the backdoored versions of Adobe Photoshop and other software.

The best strategy to mitigate Vidar malware’s threat is downloading software from official websites and avoiding using cracked or free versions, as these are potential lures for exploitation.

“The threat actors distributing Vidar malware have demonstrated their ability to social engineer victims into installing Vidar stealer using themes related to the latest popular software applications. As always, users should be cautious when downloading software applications from the Internet.”

Who are the rightful owners of Rutshuru?..An extract from a conversation by one Congolese to a known news website

 What about Congolese Hutu? For several months, North Kivu, epicenter of ethnic conflicts and base of many wars that have bloodied the DRC for more than two decades, has started to burn again. With relentless fervor. It all started, in November 2015, with the Buleusa massacre, hitherto a peaceful city in the north of Walikale territory, in the Ikobo groupement, when Nande attacked the Hutu, killing several of them and setting fire to their houses, pushing the survivors to flee to Miriki, to take refuge in a camp for the displaced. The number of Hutu victims is not known to date, but sources speak of more than a hundred people killed. It is in Miriki that, in January 2016, 18 Nande people will be killed. Sources blamed the FDLR, which strongly denied. For many Nande, these Rwandan militiamen wanted to avenge their Congolese Hutu cousins. This region is scoured by foreign militias: as much as there are FDLR, Rwandan Hutus, there are also the ADF-NALU, Ugandan Nande known for their numerous massacres in Beni territory. Some political leaders took the opportunity to blow sulfur on the flames in order to increase their intensity tenfold. In Congolese society where street speeches reign supreme, as on the web, now in turmoil, the nagging question comes back: but, above all, are there Hutus, or even – those who go with them – Congolese Tutsis of origin? This is a reflection of a neutral and impartial observer, a journalist who has spent many years investigating the conflicts of the East, both among ordinary citizens, actors and witnesses of history, and in Belgium , a former colonizer of the Congo, in order to better understand the conflicts in the east of the country and in the countries of the region, and to propose solutions to the problems that are tearing the social fabric apart.

Mathematical postulate In the conflicts of Kivu, the tendency is often very strong to question the nationality of the adversary, if by misfortune the latter is a speaker of Kinyarwanda. Admittedly, in their last reaction, the leaders of Kyaghanda, the Nande mutual, insisted on the fact that they had never denied the existence of the Congolese Hutu, but it is nonetheless true that many other Congolese think the opposite. The speech of denial of the Hutu and Tutsi as components of the Congolese nation is not the fact of the Congolese originating from distant provinces of the center and the West, long abused by a speech of exclusion coming from the eastern hills of the country , but it has its roots in seemingly respectable people. The case, to cite some of the most recent examples, of Mukumbulhe Kahindo, who introduces himself as "Head of the College of Bami (customary chiefs) Nande", and who, in a letter sent on November 20, 2016 to the Minister of Decentralization, with extension to all that the country counts as authorities, denies the Hutu Congolese citizenship and requires the attachment of their entities to the Nande chiefdoms. But these kinds of assertions are also made by intellectuals, like my friend Léonard Kambere Muhindo, who published two books on the subject (“After the Banyamulenge, Here are the Banyabwisha in the Kivus. The Ethnic Map of Congo Belgian in 1959", Editions YIRA, Kinshasa, and "Look at the Conflicts of Nationalities in the Congo; Case of the Hutu, Tutsi (Banyamulenge)", 1st Part, Legal Aspect, Ed. YIRA, Kinshasa, 1998).

Rehashed a thousand times, on TV as in the streets, on news sites or those of online debates, this rhetoric is now posed as a mathematical postulate that needs no demonstration. "There is neither Hutu nor Congolese Tutsi", repeat in chorus many Congolese on the web, at the risk of blowing up social networks. But what is it exactly? First, according to their history, there are two categories of Hutu in the DRC: the natives of Rutshuru and the descendants of the "transplanted" of Masisi. THE NATIVES OF RUTSHURU From the outset, it is important to emphasize that the eastern borders of the Congo were defined, not in 1885 as some say, but rather by the convention of May 14, 1910, a convention that finally came into force from June 14, 1911. It should be noted that European explorers arrived quite late in this region of Kivu. The least you can do is ask them the question of who they found on the spot in the territories they visited, and their written testimonies will edify us. Evidences First evidence: in the same way that the province of central Kongo today was part of the former Kongo kingdom, today divided between Angola, the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville, the former Rwanda saw its territory divided between the Belgian Congo (Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Goma), the British colony of Uganda (Bufumbira, in present-day Kigezi district), and the German protectorate of Rwanda (present-day Rwanda). As proof, many testimonies attest to the fact that the local chiefs of this part of the Congo (not only the Banyarwanda, but even certain Hunde chiefs) paid tribute to the king of Rwanda. Quoting DUBUISSON (DUBUISSON, J., 1935: 62-64), Professor Joseph Nzabandora points out that, “in 1911, the date of the materialization in North Kivu of the borders of the Congo with Rwanda and Uganda in accordance with the tripartite agreements ( Germany, England, Belgium) from Brussels on May 10, 1910, the Catholic missionaries of Rugari were still witnesses of the caravans which transported the tributes to Rwanda. These tributes were made up of a wide variety of products, including various provisions, masses and iron ore, new and worn hoes, spears, knives, bracelets made of raffia vegetable fibers (amatega or ibikaka), honey , ivory tusks, small and large cattle, symbolically loaded wild animal skins, etc. They were transported to Nyanza (Butare) in Rwanda via Bufumbira (south-west Uganda) where found the King's steward". This fact is also reported by E. Hubert, who worked in the 1930s and 1940s for Virunga National Park. He writes, to this effect, that the payment of tribute was extended to the Hunde clan communities located west of Bwisha, that is to say west of the Volcanoes region and south of Lake Edward. Indeed, the information collected in June 1937 from the customary chief Komakoma, "born around 1890 and a descendant of the former Wahunde chiefs", showed that "the populations who occupied the plain south of Lake Edward and the upper valley of the Rwindi during the creation of the Albert National Park owed tribute to the King of Rwanda until the World War of 1914" (HUBERT, E., "The fauna of the large mammals of the plain of Rwindi-Rutshuru (Lac Edouard). Its evolution since its total protection, Exploration of the Albert National Park”, Institute of National Parks of the Belgian Congo, Brussels, 1947.).

Nothing to be ashamed of :

There is nothing to be ashamed of as long as the diplomatic genius of Leopold II has won territories for our country. Moreover, this does not give any right to the current Republic of Rwanda on any part of the Congolese territory, in accordance with the principle of intangibility of borders inherited from colonization adopted by the African Union during the independence of African countries. However, gaining territories implies having also gained the populations that live there. Especially since the Nande, a sub-group of the Bayira people, are themselves from present-day Uganda, a country where some of the members of their ethnic group, the Bakonjo, live in the districts of Kasese kabarole and Bundibugyo. Many of their brothers are known in Uganda: Defense Minister Crispus Walter Kiyonga; the former Chief of Staff of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF, the Ugandan army), General James Kazini; MPs Joseph Matte Sibalinghana, Jams Mbahimba and Yokasi Bwambale Bihande; or the talented artist David Bwambale. Second evidence: the identity of the populations found on the spot leaves no room for doubt. Father SMULDERS, Superior of the Mission Tongres Sainte Marie de Rugari, testified in 1911 about the group of Rugari, one of the seven current groups of the territory of Rutshuru: “The populations contain Watutsi and Wahutu. The Watutsi, that is to say the Nobles, are in the minority and do not play the great political role that they play in Rwanda. They are shepherds and owners of cattle. I know two who have 100 to 150 head of cattle (…). The Wahutu also have a few cows that they have the Watutsi take to pasture. They are by no means slaves of the latter and do not pay them tribute. They are content to provide them with food in exchange for milk and butter because the Mututsi do not cultivate”. He also testified for the Gisigari group: “The Kisigale where we have fixed our residence is located in the region of the volcanoes which border it to the North-East and South-East. It touches the Lutari (lava plain) and reaches the Kibumba in the southwest. Politically the country is governed by Lulenga who himself is only a deputy of Ntamohanga, medalist Head of State living in the North-East. The country is very beautiful because of the crops that cover all the hills. To the north as well as to the east and west, the cultivated lands extend to the lava, not a single inch of land which does not claim its owner. The surroundings of Mikeno (extinct volcano) serve as pastures for herds”. (SMULDERS, "Report on the foundation of the Tongres Sainte Marie missionary station in Kivu addressed to His Grandeur Mgr. ROELENS, Apostolic Vicar of Upper Congo. Copy sent to D.G. E. KERVYN by Father O. ULRIX by letter dated Antwerp November 20, 1911". File M.601: Religious Missions. African Archives of Brussels. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium.). Lieutenant A. SPILTOIR, Chief of the Rutshuru Sector, detailed the fundamental identity characteristic of the inhabitants of Bwisha in January 1908 by writing the following: “In a study on the manners of the Bahutu (report of August 1907), I said that the territory is divided, from the political point of view, into chiefdoms, sub-chiefdoms, etc. This information was correct, but the main thing was missing. The country is actually divided into "clans" (mulyango in native) and this division is the only important one. A clan can constitute a large chiefdom. There can also be several clans in a chiefdom. This division into clans is the only one to consider for the different points of view, and it is the one, and the only one, that should be taken into account in the delimitation of indigenous lands as in the impositions.for the natives having always been grouped in this way, it would be a great blow to their customs to act otherwise. In the previous report I said that all property belongs to the Chief. It is a mistake. In reality, the goods belong to the whole clan” (SPILTOIR, A. “Investigation of customs in execution of the decree of June 3, 1906: Territory of Ruzizi-Kivu, Zone of Rutshuru – Beni, Sector of Rutshuru, Race Muhutu, the January 10, 1908". File A.I. (1370). African Archives of Brussels. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium). Dense population After three years of investigation (1904-1906) on the mores of the inhabitants of the Busanza and Jomba groups, located further north in the region of the volcanoes, Lieutenant G.VERVLOET wrote: “…the population (…) is much denser among the Bahutu immediately surrounding the volcanoes. While the latter are more directly under the (political) influence of the Watuzi, they are grouped into fairly large villages. The fields extend very far along the sides of the mountains (…). Beans, peas and castor are stored in large cylindrical baskets 1m50 high by 70 to 80 cm wide, sorghum and unshelled finger millet stored in larger granaries and finally sweet potatoes (VERVLOET, G., "At the sources of the Nile. In the region of volcanoes, Lake Albert-Edouard and Ruwenzori. Rutshuru-Beni area, Belgian Congo", in Bulletin of the Royal Belgian Geographical Society, vol. 34, n °4, 1910, pp. 119). Shortly after, Commander BASTIAN, first Commissioner of the Rusizi-Kivu Territory, pleaded for Belgium to do everything possible to keep this area which risked going, not to Rwanda as many people say out of ignorance. , but to neighboring Uganda. He thus testified on April 23, 1911 that “this region is very populated by former subjects of the Sultan of Rwanda and at their head is Chief Tchicilongo. Cattle are in this region very abundant and cared for by the Watuzi, while the Wahutu dependent on them engage in intensive agriculture on the slopes and at the base of the mountains. In short, a very rich country which it seems to me advantageous to seek to preserve" (Commander BASTIAN, "Letter to the Minister of the Colonies dated Mtoto ya Mongo on April 23, 1911. File AE 346 (281): Settlement of borders with the United Kingdom". African Archives of Brussels. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium).Natives without question It is clear that the Hutu and Tutsi are indeed the natives of Bwisha, in Rutshuru territory. All the testimonies above do indeed describe an indigenous people, with its well-integrated social organization with clans including both Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (as was, moreover, the case throughout pre-colonial Rwanda) , its production process and its economic complementarity, its various leaders, some Hutu and other Tutsi, etc. At the end of the territorial reform of 1920, all the traditional chiefdoms mentioned above were united in the great chiefdom of Bwisha under the leadership of Mwami Daniel NDEZE RUGABO II, a Hutu who governed all his subjects in unity and brotherhood until his death in 1980. This great chiefdom is still led to this day by his direct descendants. This being the case, and although this is of no importance to attest to their autochthony, one can, nevertheless, just for reasons of general culture, ask the question of whether, before their installation in this region, their ancestors came from Rwanda. Here again, the historical truth will surprise more than one. Indeed, it is rather Rwandans, those of the North-West region, in Muti, who were from the current Rutshuru. Pole Institute teaches us that “the lineage formed by the Bakora locates its origin in Gikore in the Ndorwa region located on the border between Rwanda and Uganda, northeast of the Virunga volcanoes. Some families of this lineage emigrated from Gikore to Bwito in Rusthuru, therefore to North Kivu. From there they then populated the localities located in the North-West of Rwanda on the northern shores of Lake Kivu: Muti near the crater of Bunyogwe, Lumbati and Kanama” (Pole Institute, Cross-reviews n°12, “murderous identities, facing to the challenges posed by our psychological and ideological walls”, Goma, 2004). But it is the oldest testimonies of one of the best connoisseurs of the region which confirms it: the members of this lineage "dispersed throughout the region of the volcanoes had also taken the habit of meeting annually, at a day fixed in advance, in Muti. We contributed to the purchase of five or six goats, one of which was offered as a sacrifice to the ancestors of the clan at the meeting place. The others were taken to Bwito in the Belgian Congo and had their throats cut in the Balihira village from where those who came to settle in Bugoyi in the North-West of Rwanda had left” (PAGES, A., “Un kingdom hamite au center of Africa”, Royal Belgian Colonial Institute (I.R.C.B.), Brussels, 1933. P. 668). So, Rwandans come to adore the place of departure of their ancestors in the Congo. So, Rwandans have their historical origin in the Congo and not the other way around!

THE TRANSPLANTS OF MASISI Already, before colonization, the wars of conquest of the Rwandan sovereign Rabugiri had left clusters of his subjects on the territory of Masisi. One of the first explorers of the region, Dr. Richard KANDT, a German explorer who had visited this place in 1899, writes the following: “Here several Watussi visited us, they are kind and simple men but not as handsome or as elegant than those of Urundi and Rwanda, it shows that they have to work. Indeed, here, they are not the sovereigns of the country, but live in isolated villages as cattle breeders next to the first inhabitants who are farmers. (…) In the East, the Watussi live in large numbers as kings and lords (…). In the west, they live isolated or in greater numbers, as in Kischari, but in any case, not as sovereigns” (KANDT, R., “Kaput Nil”, T1, Berlin, 1921, p. 199). Status of Congolese citizens Then, in order to develop the fertile territory of Masisi on the one hand, and to decongest the overpopulated Rwanda on the other hand, the Belgian colonial authority decided to transfer the Rwandan populations to the Congo. It is within this framework that the Banyarwanda Immigration Mission (MIB) was created in 1934 (Congo Fraternité et Paix, “Le Manifeste de la paix en RD Congo”, Kinshasa, 2002). In 1938, the colonial power set up the commission n°128/T.F.R.1 of November 02, which appointed Mr. Etienne Declerk, Deputy Public Prosecutor at the Court of First Instance in Bukavu, as Delegate in charge of negotiating an ACT OF TRANSFER, for the benefit of the Colony, of the rights that the Bahunde customary authorities possessed on a plot of 349.1 km2. Mr. Declerk served as counsel for the Bahunde chiefs. Negotiations were completed in 1939, and on November 13 of that year, the “Indigenous Rights Cession Act” was signed between the colony represented by Mr. Amédée Van Cleemput, Assistant to the Territory Administrator of Masisi, and Bahunde customary authorities represented by Mr. Declerk and Bahunde Grand Chief, Mr. André Kalinda. The price of the territory thus ceded was 35,000 F at the time (Kabuya Lumuna Sando, “Conflits à l’Est du Zaïre”, Kinshasa, 1997, P.P 80-81). From 1930 to 1954, Belgium transferred to Masisi thousands of Banyarwanda Hutus, mostly Hutu, but also Tutsi, who today represent more than 80% of the population of this territory. By carrying out this transfer, Belgium, colonial guardianship of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi, granted the new arrivals the status of citizens of the Belgian Congo. Despite several uproars, the DRC has recognized their Congolese nationality, in accordance with nationality law when there is a succession of states. This reality has been observed many times throughout history. For example: the one and a half million South African Indians are the descendants of Indian “indentured labourers” brought from India by the British colonial power to another British colony, South Africa. No mentally balanced South African would ever dare to question their membership in the Rainbow Nation.

CIA in history

 

M23 claims that FARDC is using militia groups

 The administration

of the Rebel Movement of March 23 informs the public that despite the denunciation and condemnation by the Head of State His Excellency Félix Antoine TSHISEKEDI TSHILOMBO of the alliances maintained by the FARDC with the armed groups, new meetings have took place between the FARDC and the Armed Groups extended to the administrative authorities of Rutshuru territory and the first members of the Armed Groups trained by the FARDC were deployed on the front line this Wednesday, May 18. These are: 01. 60 combatants from the NYATURA-ABAZUNGU Armed Group trained at MPATI, dressed in FARDC uniforms, loaded into Government Army trucks in BURUNGU and taken to Rutshuru territory where they were deployed in BIRUMA; 02. FDLR combatants belonging to Col. RURINDA were dumped in a battalion of the 22nd Brigade led by Colonel MUSHENGEZI and in the 3411th regiment deployed in RUMANGABO led by Colonel OMARI AMURI Léonard and assisted by Colonel TOKOLONGA BENDET Salomon in charge of Operations and Intelligence. It is to this regiment that Major General CHIRIMWAMI entrusted the mission of recruiting the FDLR; 03. FDLR and MAI-MAI combatants recruited in particular in KIRAMA, KAUMIRO and KINYAMUYAGA in the locality of KIBIRIZI were mixed with FARDC units; 04. 120 combatants from the APCLS and NYATURA-DOMI armed groups were also sent to the front line and incorporated into the Government Army; 05. On May 16, 2022, Col. BALINGENE NYOMO Guillaume in charge of operations and intelligence of the 3408 RGT chairs a meeting with Lieutenant-Colonel HABYAKARE, FDLR commander of the CRAP unit (Commando Action and Protection) in BIRUMA in the presence of the Deputy Administrator of Rutshuru Territory, Commissioner DIMUNDU KIASI Blaise.