click on the video below to watch
Tuesday, July 9, 2024
M23 concetrating reinforcements for the assault on Goma.Residents alert the DRC gorvenment of a planned attack on Goma
According to a resident of Rumangabo in the territory of Rutshuru on the Rutshuru-Goma road, several vehicles carrying M23 soldiers crossed Rubare last night towards Kibumba at the gate of the city of Goma.
“An attack on the city of Goma is being prepared,” warns this Congolese.
“This Monday, July 8, 2024 at 9:30 p.m., 5 FUSO brand vehicles and 2 JEEPs full of M23/RDF from Rutshuru center have just crossed here in Rumangabo in the direction of Kibumba,” he testified.
At the beginning of July, civil society in the Nyiragongo territory around the city of Goma, alerted of a plan by Rwanda to attack the city of Goma after the elections in Rwanda 🇷🇼 .
“We are alerting the Congolese authorities to Rwanda's plan to attack the city of Goma just after the current elections in Rwanda,” alerted Mambo Kawaya, from Nyiragongo civil society.
Monday, July 8, 2024
Rwandan soldiers identifieid by UN group of experts report ,implicated in the m23 war !
Watch the videos below on what Switzerland,UK and USA representatives said on the report.
conservative estimate of 3,000 to 4,000 RDF troops were deployed in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru and Masisi territories at the time of drafting.35 Many belonged to the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, the latter commanded by Major General Eugène Nkubito.
RDF Division, brigades and battalions, and RDF officers involved in operations in Petit Nord
• RDF troops and officers from the 2nd and 3rd RDF Divisions, RDF Special Forces, the Reserve force.Deployed RDF troops included members of the 201st, 301st, 405th and 509th Brigades.
RDF soldiers of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, 19th, 25th, 37th, 41st, 67th and 101st battalions were deployed until at least , RDF soldiers of the 11th, 17th, 31st, 39th and 83rd battalions were deployed.
RDF special forces were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Augustin Ryarasa Migabo, who reported to Major-General Ruki Karusisi (S/2023/431, para. 59; and S/2023/990, para. 30).36 Annex 30 provides additional information regarding RDF officers involved in planning.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Ruhunga (DID) was one of the instructors identified as providing command and leadership training to M23 cadres
RDF troops and officers from the 2nd and 3rd RDF Divisions, RDF Special Forces, the Reserve force (see below)RDF troops and officers from the 2nd and 3rd RDF Divisions, RDF Special Forces, the Reserve forcesorc
e (see above)
Extracts from the mapping report:
Kinshasa gorvenment was very clear at the UN security council meeting,"Nta na rimwe hazabaho ibiganiro mu gihe RDF itarava ku butaka bwacu".
(Watch the video below in a UN security council meeting)
Bintou Keita told the Security Council ,“There will be no military solution to this conflict, and that peace can only be restored through lasting political solutions. I therefore express my gratitude and full support for the continued mediation efforts led by Angolan President João Lourenço between the DRC and Rwanda within the framework of the Luanda process. These require the full support of the international community,”
DRC's representative on the Security Council returned to the salient points in response to Rwanda.He said"First of all we have 9 neighboring countries, the nationals are with us, they live there without problem, for what reasons would only the Rwandan speakers be attacked?
We authorized Rwanda to come to our soil to hunt down the FDLR, they carried out operations and they claimed that there was only a residual force left and which no longer constituted a threat.Today, they speak of a threat against their country.We only ask one thing, that he withdraws his military from our country.”
“Neither a military solution nor the fact of considering Rwanda as a scapegoat can constitute a lasting solution to this crisis”, lamented the representative of Rwanda to the UN.
The representative of the DRC to the UN, Zénon Mukongoy further calls on the UN Security Council to define a sanction regime for Rwanda , to sanction anyone involved in this aggression, to demand unconditional withdrawal Rwandan troops from the DRC under penalty of individual or collective sanctions.
On Uganda,The Congolese government says it is concerned by the United Nations report which attests that the Ugandan military (UPDF) supports the M23 rebellion in the war in North Kivu. “We will raise the issue on a diplomatic level,” declared the Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation .
There is a report too that special forces unit from chad will soon be deployed in eastern DRC to fight the rebels of the M23 , several security sources in the region report.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania J.Makamba issues a press release on the meeting held at Zanzibar
“The ministers recognized that my viable path towards lasting peace and security in Eastern DRC is through a political process and recommended the convening of a summit of heads of state of the EAC in order to revive the political aspect of the Nairobi process led by the EAC in coordination with the Luanda process”
Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Review for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of June 1st – July 1st, 2024: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa
Monthly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Review for East Africa (Kenya & Somalia) Shabaab Al-Mujahideen in Period of June 1st – June 30th, 2024: Tracking and Monitoring Al-Shabaab’s Activity in East Africa
Executive Summary
The month of June 2024 has witnessed a significant increase in terrorist activities in both Kenya and Somalia, with Al-Shabaab being the primary perpetrator. The group’s operations have demonstrated both a sustained threat and a disturbing level of sophistication and coordination.
In Kenya, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the killing of four non-Muslim Kenyans in Bogyar village, near Dadaab in Garissa County on June 11. This incident underscores the continued vulnerability of Kenya’s northeastern regions, where the militants frequently target local populations and security forces.
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab’s activities have been even more pronounced. On June 15, the militants ambushed and killed Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Nur Mad-Dheere in the suburbs of Baidoa, destroying two armed vehicles. This followed a mortar attack on an Ethiopian military base at Baidoa airport on June 14, which resulted in the deaths of six Ethiopian soldiers. These incidents highlight the persistent insecurity in strategic locations like Baidoa.
Al-Shabaab’s tactics have varied widely, including ambushes, mortar attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). On June 13, an IED targeted a police vehicle in Mogadishu’s Kaaraan district, causing several casualties. The use of IEDs remains a common tactic aimed at both military and civilian targets to instill fear and disrupt local governance and security operations.
The group has also targeted Ethiopian military convoys. On June 13, fighting was reported in Maguudo village, southeast of Baidoa, where Al-Shabaab fighters attacked an Ethiopian military convoy, damaging two armed vehicles. This pattern of attacking military convoys and bases indicates the group’s strategy of weakening both Somali and allied forces, such as those from Ethiopia, which are crucial for maintaining regional stability.
In a stark demonstration of their growing capabilities, Al-Shabaab released a propaganda video featuring hundreds of new recruits parading with seized Somali army weapons in southern Somalia. This showcases their sophisticated propaganda and training efforts, underscoring the persistent and evolving threat they pose in the region, challenging both local and international security efforts.
Preferred weapons of Al-Shabaab include firearms, mortars, and IEDs. The overrun of a military base in Ceel Dheer town, Galgaduud region on June 8, where over 50 government soldiers were killed, illustrates the militants’ capability and readiness to engage in large-scale assaults. They captured numerous armed vehicles, including those donated by Turkey, demonstrating their ability to seize and repurpose military hardware to bolster their operations.
Below are the terrorism events from June 1st to June 30th, indicating a sustained and multifaceted threat from Al-Shabaab across Somalia and into northeastern Kenya. Key regions such as Baidoa, Mogadishu, and the border areas near Dadaab remain highly vulnerable to terrorist activities. The variety of attack methods and the frequent targeting of military and police forces highlight the militants’ adaptability and ongoing challenge to regional security.
Somalia: ATMIS handed over Abdalle Birolle Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Jubaland State.
Terrorism Events: June 1st – June 30th
June 30, 2024: A Somali military officer and two of his guards were injured after a bomb explosion targeted their car in Mogadishu’s Kaxda district.
June 30, 2024: At least four civilians and three govt soldiers were killed in a vehicle-borne explosive suicide bombing targeting an ATMIS military camp near central Beledweyne.The attack occurred just two hours after ATMIS handed over the base to Somali forces. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.
June 26, 2024: Heavy fighting was reported in Cali Candhoole in the Galgadud region. Somali Government forces say they have killed many militants, while Al-Shabaab claims it has killed many government soldiers.
June 24, 2024: Al-Shabāab al-Mujāhideen Terrorists group attempted to overrun El-Ram ASTU Camp in NER Kenya. Militants used RPG,PKM and AK 47 assault rifles in the coordinated attack. Threat was neutralized.
June 24, 2024: Two mini passenger buses traveling near Gololey village, close to Balcad town, were hit by a landmine claimed by Al-Shabaab, resulting in at least 5 civilian deaths and dozens of injuries.
June 23, 2024: Al-Shabaab armed assault on Ethiopian and Burundian forces military bases, killing many, in Dinsoor City, Bay State, and Mahaday, Central Shabelle, Somalia.
June 23, 2024: Al-Shabaab targets government forces with an improvised explosive device (IED), killing 2 and injuring 1, in Jalouli, Balad City, Mogadishu, Somalia.
June 22, 2024: Al-Shabaab raids government military gathering, killing two and seizing their weapons, in Masagaway District, Galgaduud Region, Central Somalia.
June 22, 2024: An IED explosion targeting a military vehicle was reported in the Suuqa Xoolaha neighborhood of Mogadishu’s Heliwaa district. According to sources, at least two civilians were injured in the incident.
June 21, 2024: Al-Shabaab ambushes government military patrol and barracks near the Kenyan border, in Kamboni, Badhaadhe District, Lower Juba, Somalia.
June 21, 2024: Al-Shabaab kills three and injures two Burundian forces with an improvised explosive device (IED), in Jalouli, Balad City, Mogadishu, Somalia.
June 20, 2024: An IED blast reported between Golooley and Balcad in the Middle Shabelle region, targeting Burundian soldiers under ATMIS. Unknown number of casualties were reported.
June 19, 2024: Al-Shabaab double tap armed assault and IED attacks on Ethiopian, Kenyan, and government forces military bases, in Wajid, the Bouralo Area, and the outskirts of Kamboni, Bakool, Lower Shabelle, and Lower Juba, Southern Somalia.
June 18, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters reportedly took brief control of Ruunirgod in Middle Shabelle after government forces withdrew. No casualties were report from this incident.
June 19, 2024: Al-Shabaab targeted government forces headquarters with an IED, causing multiple deaths and injuries among official ranks, in Beled Hawo, Gedo Region, Southwest Somalia.
June 15, 2024: Al-Shabaab ambushes government forces, destroying 4 convoys and killing many, in Jalouli, Balad City, Mogadishu, Somalia.
June 15, 2024: Al-Shabaab targets two military vehicles carrying high-ranking government officials, killing a general, commander, mayor, and dozens of officers with an IED, in Berdale, Bay State, Southwest Somalia.
June 15, 2024: Al-Shabaab killed multiple Kenyan forces while targeting a military base with an IED, between the cities of Mandera and Beled Hawo, bordering Somalia and Kenya.
June 15, 2024: Al-Shabaab killed Ethiopian forces while targeting a military base with an IED, in Hadar City, Bakool State, Southwestern Somalia.
June 15, 2024: Al-Shabaab killed multiple Burundian forces while raiding a military base, in Balad City, Mogadishu, Somalia.
June 15, 2024: Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Nur Mad-Dheere, the experienced Commander of the 8th Battalion, 60th Division of the Somali National Army, was killed in an Al-Shabaab ambush in the suburbs of Baidoa. The militants claimed responsibility, stating they killed the colonel and burned two armed vehicles. This occurred shortly after he was interviewed by Somali National TV (SNTV).
June 14, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants launched a daytime attack on the Ethiopian soldiers’ base at the Baidoa airport. The assault resulted in the death of 6 Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) soldiers and left 7 others wounded.
June 13, 2024: Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for firing mortars at an ENDF base in Hudur, resulting in reported casualties.
June 13, 2024: Heavily armed Al-Shabaab militants were reported in all major villages surrounding the Diinsoor district. It remains unclear whether the fighters intend to besiege the town or launch a major assault. Diinsoor is approximately 110 kilometers southwest of Baidoa.
June 13, 2024: Fighting broke out in Maguudo village when Al-Shabaab fighters targeted an Ethiopian military convoy heading to Baidoa. Two Ethiopian armed vehicles were damaged in the attack. Maguudo village is located about 56 kilometers southeast of Baidoa.
June 13, 2024: An IED blast targeted a police vehicle in the Jamhuuriya neighborhood of Mogadishu’s Kaaraan district, resulting in vehicle damage and several casualties.
June 13, 2024: Al-Shabaab targeted military bases of Ugandan and government forces, killing several, in Merca, Lower Shabelle, and near Jazeera and Lantboro Districts, Banaadir, Somalia.
June 13, 2024: Al-Shabaab raided government forces military base, in Wajid City, Bakool Region, Southwest Somalia.
June 12, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters targeted a Ugandan military convoy with a roadside IED, near the K60 Area in Lower Shabelle Region, Southwest State, Somalia.
June 11, 2024: Al-Shabaab claimed it killed 4 non-Muslim Kenyans in Bogyar village, near Dadaab, Garissa County.
June 11, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants ambushed government militia forces, killing 4 with several others injured, in Kamboni, Badhaadhe District, Somalia.
June 11, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants raided government militia military checkpoint, in Berdaale City, Bay, Southwestern Somalia.
June 11, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Kenyan troop carrier with an IED, killing 4 and injuring others, in Kiunga, Lamu District of Coast County, Kenya.
June 10, 4: Al-Shabaab claimed to have executed four people for spying on behalf of the Somali government and the US intelligence services, Kurtunwaaray, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
June 8, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants overran a military base in Ceel Dheer town, Galgaduud region, killing over 50 government soldiers and capturing numerous armed vehicles, including those donated by Turkey. Most of the base’s military commanders were reported killed.
June 7, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somalian military checkpoint with an IED, in Bardiri City, Gedo, Southwestern Somalia.
June 6, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants armed assault on two Somalian military bases, in Janale and Odikili, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
June 6, 2024: An explosion occurred in the Caanoole area of Mogadishu’s Wadajir district, injuring several people.
June 5, 2024: Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for killing 20 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) soldiers, including 4 foreigners, and capturing one Kenyan soldier during a raid on a military base in the Beledamin district, Middle Shabelle region. The group’s media wing stated that an explosives-laden vehicle (VBIED) rammed into the military camp during the assault.
June 4, 2024: Al-Shabaab targeted a military convoy of Ugandan forces with an IED, killing two, in the Elasha area of Mogadishu, Somalia.
June 4, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed government forces, killing many, in Berdale District, Bay Region, Southwestern Somalia.
June 3, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants targeted a military vehicle with an IED, killing many government soldiers, near Janale, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
June 2, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters attacked a Somali National Army (SNA) base, killing 6 government soldiers, in the Awdhegle area, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
June 2, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants claimed to have killed several Ethiopian forces and captured their weapons during an attack on a military base in the Rab Dhuure area, Bakool region, Southwest State, Somalia.
June 2, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed government forces, killing 6 soldiers and injuring 4 others, in Baidoa City, Bay Region, Somalia.
June 2, 2024: Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali military vehicle with an IED, killing 7 soldiers and injuring 5 others, in Janale District, Lower Shabelle, Somalia.
June 1, 2024: Al-Shabaab fighters targeted government forces and officials with an IED, killing a deputy mayor and injuring 2 soldiers, in Kamboni, Badhaadhe District, Lower Juba, Somalia.
June 1, 2024: Al-Shabaab ambushed a military convoy, killing 7 government soldiers, and wounding many others, near Bardera Town, Gedo, Southwestern Somalia.
The frequency and severity of these incidents indicate that Al-Shabaab remains a potent and adaptive threat in the region, capable of inflicting significant casualties and disrupting military and civilian activities. The persistent attacks on military convoys, bases, and checkpoints suggest a concerted effort to undermine regional security forces and assert control over strategic areas.
Additional Information:
Propaganda and Recruitment: Al-Shabaab’s release of a propaganda video featuring hundreds of new recruits parading with seized Somali army weapons in southern Somalia indicates a sophisticated recruitment and training program. This showcases their ability to attract and indoctrinate new members, bolstering their ranks and operational capacity.
Weapons and Tactics: The variety of weapons and tactics employed by Al-Shabaab, including firearms, mortars, IEDs, and VBIEDs, demonstrates their adaptability and resourcefulness. The capture of advanced military hardware from government forces further enhances their operational capabilities.
International Implications: Al-Shabaab’s targeting of foreign military bases, particularly those of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Ethiopian forces, highlights the group’s intent to challenge international efforts to stabilize the region. The death of foreign soldiers and the capture of military equipment have broader implications for regional security and international counter-terrorism efforts.
The SADC Military Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM): Evaluating its Impact and Legacy
On July 15, 2021, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed a military mission in Mozambique, known as SAMIM, to combat the Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado province. The mission has since concluded with the handing over ceremony taking place on July 4th. The departure of the regional force means that Mozambican security forces is taking full responsibility for maintaining security.
Background of the Intervention
The insurgency in Cabo Delgado, led by the group known as Al-Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ) and affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS), began to escalate in late 2019. By mid-2021, the violence had displaced over 850,000 civilians and halted a $60 billion liquefied natural gas project led by TotalEnergies, ENI, and Exxon (Southern African Development Community. SADC member states, concerned about the potential for regional destabilization and the spread of extremism, pressured Mozambique to accept a military intervention.
SAMIM was deployed with 2,210 troops from South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia, and Angola. The mission aimed to neutralize the extremists, assist Mozambican forces in operations, and provide training and advisory support.
Successes and Challenges
The SADC military mission had three primary strategic objectives:
Neutralizing the extremists.
Assisting the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces in planning and executing operations.
Training and advising Mozambican forces.
Success:
Neutralizing Extremist Forces: SAMIM was instrumental in reducing the operational capabilities of the insurgent group Ansar al-Sunna (ASWJ), affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS). The combined force, consisting of 2,210 troops from South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia, and Angola, managed to dismantle several insurgent bases and disrupt their operations in Cabo Delgado. This significantly diminished the insurgents’ ability to control territory and launch large-scale attacks.
Facilitating the Return of Displaced Persons: One of SAMIM’s notable achievements was the improvement in the security situation, which allowed for the return of 570,000 internally displaced persons by August 2023. The mission’s efforts in securing key areas and restoring a semblance of normalcy enabled many civilians to go back to their homes, contributing to the stabilization of the region.
Supporting Mozambican Forces: SAMIM provided critical support to the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FADM) by assisting in planning and executing operations. This support helped improve the operational effectiveness of the FADM, albeit with some limitations. The mission also aimed to train and advise the Mozambican forces, although this aspect faced significant challenges.
However, the mission faced several challenges:
1. Insufficient Resources and Funding
One of the most significant challenges faced by SAMIM was the lack of adequate resources and funding. The force was under-resourced, never reaching the initially recommended strength of 2,900 troops. The mission operated with just 2,210 troops and lacked essential air, naval, and ground assets. This shortfall in manpower and equipment severely limited the mission’s operational capabilities and effectiveness.
2.Coordination and Communication Issues
Coordination with other forces, particularly the Rwandan contingent and the Mozambican military, was problematic. Differences in communication equipment, language barriers, and varying operational procedures hindered effective joint operations. These coordination issues often resulted in disjointed efforts and reduced the overall impact of the mission.
3.Intelligence Shortcomings
Intelligence gathering and sharing were major weak points for SAMIM. The mission struggled with insufficient and often inaccurate intelligence, which compromised the safety and effectiveness of operations. Additionally, there were frequent leaks of operational information to the extremists, further endangering both troops and civilians.
4. Training and Development Limitations
SAMIM faced significant difficulties in fulfilling its mandate to train and advise the Mozambican forces. Identifying the specific training needs of the FADM proved challenging, and the limited development and humanitarian efforts hindered the mission’s ability to sustain long-term progress. The lack of a comprehensive development strategy further complicated the stabilization efforts.
5.Political and Internal Challenges
The Mozambican government’s delayed and inconsistent response to the insurgency, coupled with internal political struggles within the ruling Frelimo party, added layers of complexity to SAMIM’s mission. Factional battles and the fallout from the 2013-2014 Tuna bonds corruption scandal impeded cohesive support and collaboration with the mission. Some reports even suggested that certain factions within Frelimo had, at times, supported the insurgents, further complicating the situation.
Lessons Learned
Several lessons can be drawn from the SAMIM mission:
Host Nation Cooperation: The success of an intervention force hinges on the full backing and cooperation of the host nation. The Mozambican government’s inconsistent support and internal political issues, including factional battles within Frelimo and the fallout from the 2013-2014 Tuna bonds corruption scandal, impeded the mission.
Understanding Local Dynamics: The Mozambican government’s slow response to the insurgency and its opposition to regional involvement raise questions about its priorities. The cleavages from the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo, along with local grievances against the state, have not been adequately addressed.
Holistic Approach Needed: Effective stabilization requires a combination of military, socioeconomic, and political interventions to address the underlying causes of conflict.
Future Prospects
Insurgent activities have resurged since the second half of 2023, highlighting unresolved issues that led to the conflict. The SADC mission, though impactful, was limited in scope and duration. The Mozambican government and its security forces have shown only limited improvement in their capacity to maintain security independently.
As SAMIM withdraws, Mozambique continues to receive support from Tanzania and Rwanda. Tanzanian President Filipe Nyusi emphasized the importance of cooperation in combating terrorism, and Rwanda has reinforced its contingent in Cabo Delgado. The future stability of the region will depend on the Mozambican government’s ability to address the root causes of the insurgency and effectively coordinate with its regional partners.
In conclusion, the SAMIM mission in Mozambique demonstrates the complexities of regional military interventions and the necessity of comprehensive strategies that involve political, economic, and social dimensions to achieve lasting peace and stability. The end of SAMIM’s mission in Mozambique marks a critical juncture for Cabo Delgado. While the mission achieved notable successes, significant challenges remain. The future stability of the region hinges on the Mozambican government’s ability to implement effective security measures and address underlying socio-economic issues. Continued international and regional support will be essential in ensuring that Mozambique does not revert to a state of instability and conflict.
M23 rebels burn the cantonment site of ex-combatants of Kasando in Lubero territory.
According to Kambale Kinyali Yuston, head of the P-DRRCS branch in Butembo-Lubero, the M23 rebels set fire to 7 tents offered by MONUSCO as well as plank houses which were erected there to accommodate the militiamen who surrendered to the FARDC in the framework of the P-DDRCS.
At the entrance to the M23 in Kirumba, was already occupied by the FARDC after the 287 ex-combatants who were supervised there were deployed in the areas intended for the community works of the project.
"Yes, the Kasando site was burned, but there were no more ex-combatants. They are all in the reintegration process, financed by the coherence fund of the United Nations Stabilization Support Unit, executing agency HEKS HEPER", specified Clovis Munihire, provincial coordinator of PDDRC-S in North Kivu
Sunday, July 7, 2024
FRIVAO (. Fund for Reparation and Compensation for Victims of Uganda's Armed Activities) seeks accreditation of the accounts of the victims of the war in kisangani
The Special Fund for Reparation and Compensation for Victims of Uganda's Armed Activities in the DRC (FRIVAO) announced, Saturday July 6 in Kisangani, the accreditation of the accounts of the first wave of victims in the process of their compensation. But the secretary rapporteur of FRIVAO, Mimy Mopunga, regrets the fact that certain people who accompanied the victims seek to interfere in matters that do not directly concern them. He asks them to let eligible victims receive their compensation in complete peace of mind: “They of course supported the victims for 23 years so that they were compensated. Now we must give victims time to calmly receive their compensation. There is no reason to exist, to still create mass movements, demands.” As for “supposed victims” who feel wronged, she recommends that they contact FRIVAO. “The decree says that we must only pay the real victims. We still open a door for those who think their file was wrongly rejected. They just have to lodge the appeal, their file is there, it’s not in front of the OPJ, it’s in front of the FRIVAO agents…”. The FRIVAO also asks victims summoned either by the bank or by its services to come forward in order to provide certain useful information relating to their files. Audit carried out Furthermore, the Minister of State, Minister of Justice and Minister of Justice, Constant Mutamba, suspended the debit movements of the FRIVAO account opened in the Rawbank books. According to the ministry's press release dated Saturday July 6, this decision remains in force, pending the final audit carried out by the IGF on the activities of FRIVAO.
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