Civil societies and organizations will on Monday start a demonstration against ADF and M23 advances in Butembo and lubero

 

The Citizen Movements and Pressure Groups of Butembo declared the day of 15/7 a day without activities, 20 km walk from Butembo to Musiènene, Lubero territory.Due to the advance of M23 and killings at Béni by ADF .

The SPY PIGEON,the incorporation of biotechnology in military spying.

Watch the video below

It was 1987, Britain was reeling from dozens of IRA attacks in both Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher vowed to do whatever it would take to end the carnage.

As the violence continued unabated, Thatcher confided her concerns in US President Ronald Reagan during a secret meeting in Washington DC. Sensing the importance of this, the American leader divulged his own tactic for getting dirt on suspected communists, jihadi terrorists, anti-war protesters, and anyone else who were thought to threaten the US order. The answer, pigeons.

But not real pigeons. Biotechnology surveillance drones, harnessing the power of the pigeon, designed by the government to look, walk and squawk, just like real pigeons.

Sure, the US government could have simply hired investigators, sent the FBI out, but that would be time-intensive, and most of all expensive to hire enough agents to scour the country. Instead, Reagan’s administration fought from the air. The state systematically infiltrated the pigeon population in the United States, developing their internal surveillance technology. When Thatcher overcame her initial shock, she realised that this was the most effective method for her government to monitor the British people as closely and discreetly as possible, in a way that would not cause alarm to the public. It took a few years to complete production, but by 1990, the government was ready.

In February 1990, Thatcher’s pigeon purge began – known among some as the Cootastrophe, it heralded the mass takeover of city centre pigeons in mainland Britain (the purge in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland only began in 1998, thanks to the Good Friday agreement). By June 1990, entire pigeon populations were working as drones for the government.

As natural pigeons became a creature of the past, the government simultaneously began phasing in the drones, the pigeonbots. They looked and acted exactly like a natural pigeon as a result of inherited instincts combined with advanced programming, illustrating impressive advances in biotechnology. When the rumours of robot surveillance pigeons started to emerge a common joke and misconception was these metallic creatures would be walking the streets (incidentally this is why Thatcher adopted the moniker “the Iron Lady”). However the biotechnology blended the surveillance pigeons so perfectly into the community that their presence went almost completely unnoticed. Behind the robots “eyes” sat tiny cameras, recording and transmitting footage to secret databases. When their batteries ran low, they would automatically fly to their closest replenishment centre (there were over 230 around the country) to recharge.

Over time, as technology has improved, pigeonbots no longer need to be charged at the replenishment centres, due to the development of inductive charging. This phenomenon was first devised by Nikola Tesla and his discovery of AC based electricity resulting in his invention of the ‘Tesla Coil’ in the late 1800’s. This laid the foundations for inductive charging – the wireless transmission of power. Pigeon drones dock themselves on national grid power lines all across the country to charge using this technology.

The process:

Mains voltage is converted into high frequency alternating current (AC).

The alternating current is sent to the transmitter coil which is inside the national grid power lines.

Alternating current flowing within the transmitter coil creates a magnetic field that extends to the receiver coil, which is embedded in the foot of the pigeon drone.

The magnetic field generates current within the pigeon’s receiver coil.

Current flowing within the receiver coil is converted into direct current (DC) and this recharges the pigeon’s internal battery.

This same technology is now commonly called Qi, from the Chinese word qi (pronounced CHEE), meaning energy flow. Many of the modern smart phones in todays market use this technology for wireless charging and we have spy drones, unfortunately, to thank.

Despite regular malfunctions and clear discrepancies in the behaviour and appearance of pigeon drones, the government has successfully deceived the majority of the population into believing that these machines are living creatures.

Most obviously, no one born anytime since and have been looking at the whole tging behind spy pigeons as a hoax would , they still believe these creatures cannot be used in spying .

It’s difficult to blame them, though, as  governments' security propagandas have worked hard to prevent the truth from getting out.

...some one wanted to know if these spy pigeons are real........

Why can't you give us a rear base in Kisoro to attack M23 like we gave them a rear base on our land to fight the ADF?

After the circulation  of news about the meeting of  tchaligonza and Uganda commanders in Beni,which has been met with criticism .where most political opinionists and academicians in Kinshasha see Tshisekedi playing cowardice in front of Museveni.Over the media in Kinshasha is angry look at this meeting which they say ought to have not occurred due to fact that Uganda was indicated as a nother supporter of M23 in the recent UN experts report,an allegation which uganda and Ugandans vehemently refuse to accept.

There are some questions the Congolese are raising on media ,and these question are widely spread over Kinshasha.I noted one of the most touching and critical question raised by one Congolese military activist ,this question goes as below.

 Why can't Uganda give us a military base in Kisoro (Uganda side) if they are really our partners in the ADF War in the far North; so that we attack the M23/RDF in Bunagana and end this story once and for all?

To answer this question,most of the opinionists were hinting on Muhozi's Twitter posts and some of Museveni's posts and unanimously concluded that Uganda can never offer a base to Uganda to fight M23 whom these Congolese claim that Muhoozi sees them as his young brothers 

Despite all these media out cries,I still hold the fact that president Museveni is still a key figure who can help in yearning for peace in this North Kivu.

Can Uganda give DRC a rear base to fight the M23?

The answer is yes and no but a NO takes the highest percentage.with the changing interstate trade dynamics in East Africa where DRC undoubtedly is a big fresh market,Uganda under Museveni ,with regional emphasis on economic cooperation and integration,he cannot afford to loose the potentials DRC holds in as far as economic benefits to Uganda are concerned.Most industrial products from Uganda end up up in DRC markets ,and these notably include cement,mattress,plastic products,cooking oil,soap,sugar,maize flour,beer and other local products.it is worth noting that DRC has increased volume of trade with Kenya thus not only Uganda would wish to see a peaceful DRC but so does the whole of the region.Besides,military issues are in most case confidential and classified and you never know,the meeting would have resolved to offer a solution of which we cannot doubt the provision of a rear base to carry on activities to monitor or counter the m23.

It is also worth noting that DRC gave UPDF a chance to operate in DRC because the ADF are a known branded Terrorist group that was both a problem to civilians in DRC and Uganda.And Museveni has categorically put it that the M23 are not a terrorist group.Uganda and some of the regional members do not see M23 as a terror group despite some of its leader being indicted in war crimes.It thus very hard for Uganda to give a rear base to FARDC ,instead it would offer a rear base for political and amicable resolutions to the M23 war.

Unfortunately,despite all the above ,with the UN expert group reports,the Muhoozi tweets,and Museveni's belief that M23 is not a terrorist group yet the Congolese brand it a terror group,the Congolese population have lost trust in the friendship of Uganda.Many Congolese only see that Uganda -Congolese bilateral friendship is  still surviving because of the personal understandings between Museveni and Tshisekedi.It is up to these two leaders to raise hope in the civilians and some group of civilians to again develop belif in the Uganda DRC relationship.

What would happen if Uganda gives DRC a rear military base in Kisoro?It would be joyfully welcome in Kinshasha.But DRC must also understand that there is or some problems within it political class and worse of it all in its army.You should undertand me well and not say that iam against or i underlate FARDC,but FARDC has a problem with officers who are not patriotic,corrupt and i at times doubt their capabilities in planning war.I well know how M23 wars start and i have been closely following the incidences and  circumstances that sorrounded the fightings between FARDC and M23 notably in Rwindi,kanyabayonga and Rubaya, clearly show that there is something not going on well inside FARDC?

Can provision of a rear base in Kisoro help FARDC to finish off M23?

Looking back at the 2012-2013 saga,I would say yes..but if it was solely to be FARDC alone without any aid of SADC I would say no.And again ,if Uganda was or is to accept giving a rear base ,I am sure that it cannot allow that SADC to come along with FARDC,only FARDC would operate in that base and then SADC would harass the M23 from inside DRC.probably that would defeat M23.But,mins you, defeatin M23 is not finishing M23 ,IAM assuring you that M23 will be defeated but it will not be finished.it will resurrect again and again.It may come back in other forms whether R23,J30,.....etc it will raise up again.This means that ,to end fully end the M23,DRC needs a concrete solution both military and politically.Yes, a military solution would beat M23 to miserable end but if no political and civil adjustments are made ,it would fruitless.DRC needs to sensitize her citizens on patriotism,you cannot have a population where everyone wakes up one day to organise and simply form a rebel group.It means there is an administration problem.Look at the neighbours of DRC,is it possible in Uganda,Kenya,Tanzania,Rwanda ..etc for someone to wake up one morning and form a rebel group inside the boundaries and it survives for a month or a year? DRC must work hard to revamp it's military and civil administration.

Meeting between UPDF and FARDC commanders concluded this evening in Beni.

 

As earlier reported in our story       Read here,By the end of this Friday in Beni,the FARDC - UPDF bipartite meeting between FARDC and UPDF came to a conclusion. For 48 hours, the delegation of FARDC and UPDF reviewed the joint operations against ADF underway in the territories of Beni and in Ituri . Kinshasa is strengthening its military cooperation with Kampala despite DRC's media accusations and UN expert reports claim evidence which clearly demonstrate that the Ugandan army supports the M23 rebels who have managed to take a large part of North Kivu.

The Dongfeng-41 (CSS-X-20) - or "DF-41" - is an InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) designed, developed, and manufactured by the nation of China.

 

By the end of 2022, it represented the longest-ranged, most lethal ICBM available to the Chinese military's "Rocket Force", representing the latest, most advanced, oversized missile design offering a maximum target range out to 9,320 miles (15,000 kilometers) with modular warhead capability to boot.

The DF-41 began testing in July 2012 with more advanced tests following into late-2014 and throughout 2015-2016. It was debuted to the public in the October 2019 National Day military parade in Central Beijing thereafter.

With a length measuring 72 feet (22 m), the missile's diameter reaches 7.38 feet (2.25 m) and its payload tips the scales at 5,510 miles (2,500 kg) while the missile, as a whole, weighs 176,400lb (80,000 kg). A three-stage, solid propellant propulsion system is used to propel the massive missile into the sky on its one-way trip. Up to ten nuclear warheads can be seated in the missile to maximize the blast radius.

The flexibility in deployment of the missile is such that it be launched from its multi-wheeled, eight-axle mobile carrier, by rail, or from a reinforced underground silo housing. The typical launcher vehicle consists of a heavy-duty sixteen-wheeled military truck with split-cab arrangement. The missile is seated over the entire length of the truck and even extends beyond the bow - such is its size. Prior to firing, the missile is raised in its cradle and made vertical to begin its trajectory.

The Chinese military's rocket force operates the missile in two missile brigades as the DF-41 makes up a critical main component of Chinese nuclear deterrence and missile force strength.

My good friend from China told me to write about this!

A Congolese by names of Claude Maluma authors book titled "Genocide in Congo" blaming Rwanda and kagame for killing Congolese.

A book purposely for collective awareness is the motivation approach against the Congolese Genocide perpetrated by the chief terrorist Paul Kagame. The first batch of the book Genocide in the Congo for your comfort written by the Congolese writer Claude Maluma is already available in Kinshasa, contact us via inbox and you will be served The Book “Genocide in Congo” traces the war in the East of the DRC, the complicity of certain Congolese and the policy of international silence established by Kagame and his Allies The book is already available on the international market and on the Congolese market A Genocide is happening in the Congo, to remain silent is to be complicit.

M23 and FARDC accuse each other of violating the Truce

 The M23 rebels and the FARDC accuse each other of continuing the fighting. In a statement made public this Friday, the rebellion accused Kinshasa of violating the humanitarian truce, while this Thursday, the Congolese army and its partners denounced the Kigali regime's non-compliance with the said truce and its "belligerent" attitude. " legendary for wanting to keep displaced populations in atrocious conditions, thus depriving them of access to humanitarian aid. The M23 rebellion, however, reiterates its call for “direct dialogue to address and resolve the root causes of conflicts”.

egypt air to start Bi-weekly flights to Mogadishu

 

A high-level Egyptian delegation led by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, landed in Mogadishu, inaugurating the commencement of Egypt Air’s biweekly flight from Cairo to Mogadishu. The delegation will meet their Somali counterparts to discuss further strengthening bilateral relations.

The launch of new bi-weekly flights between Mogadishu and Cairo by EgyptAir marks a significant milestone in Somalia's reintegration into the global business landscape. 

The inaugural flight, attended by Somalia's Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and his Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty, highlights the deep fraternal bond between the two nations. 

This new air route is expected to greatly enhance connectivity between Somalia and the international community, emphasizing the strength and importance of the relationship between Somalia and Egypt, as emphasized by the Foreign Ministers during the flight's inauguration ceremony.

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FARDC's General Tchaligonza Nduru is in Beni city,sources claim that he will meet the commander of Ugandan troops deployed in DRC.

General Tchaligonja Nduru has been staying in the city of Beni since the morning of Thursday, July 11, 2024 in the city of Beni in North Kivu. 

At Beni-Mavivi airport, he was greeted by officers of the Congolese army and the authorities of the state of siege. General Bruno Mandefu, commander of SOKOLA 1 operations, was present on the tarmac alongside other senior army officers.

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff in charge of Operations and Intelligence arrived  for a working mission, says Colonel Mak Hazukay, spokesman for SOKOLA 1 operations. General Tchaligonja Nduru has a well-defined agenda related to security issues, he added. 

It should be noted the presence of several other generals in the delegation, including General Camille Bombele, former commander of the FARDC-UPDF joint operations and deputy commander of SECAS.

According to my confidant  military sources, General Tchaligonza Nduru is expected to meet with the commander of Ugandan troops deployed in Beni and Ituri as part of joint operations against ADF rebels, as well as assess the security situation in Beni-Butembo and Lubero.

General Ychaligonza Nduru is the first high-ranking Congolese army officer to arrive in the region since the occupation by M23 rebels of some towns in Lubero territory.

 

Terrorism review in DRC June to July

 

In June 2024, the security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had significantly deteriorated, especially in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. The Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)  notably increased its activity in the Lubero area of North Kivu, leading to widespread violence, displacement, and humanitarian crises.

The DRC government has been attempting to stabilize the region by deploying additional troops and enhancing security operations. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains limited due to the complex and volatile nature of the conflict. Additionally, The Wazalendo militia, a community defense force, has been involved in local defense efforts. Despite their efforts, they face challenges due to limited resources and training compared to the well-armed insurgents

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been actively assessing the security situation and providing support to local communities. From June 20-25, MONUSCO conducted a mission to assess the security and humanitarian situations in southern Lubero territory. MONUSCO has been working to facilitate humanitarian assistance and provide protection to displaced populations. However, attacks on MONUSCO personnel and assets have complicated their efforts, with the UN calling for a responsible and sustainable withdrawal of the mission.

Additionally, as part of the hunt for ISCAP, the Congolese army and MONUSCO launched a joint operation in the territory of Beni, in North Kivu. MONUSCO made this information public on Monday, June 3, 2024. The operation called “Cheng Gong” is aimed at establishing mobile bases in several towns in Beni in order to limit the movements of the ISCAP in order to neutralize them. According to the iontelligence, these mobile bases will be established in Mamove, Samboko and on the Musuku – Kudukudu-Mandumbi axis.

The launch of this joint operation comes in a context of renewed terror activities in the surroundings of the rural commune of Mangina and part of the neighboring Babila Babombi chiefdom in the Mambasa territory.

The security situation in the DRC, particularly in North Kivu’s Lubero territory, remains dire with ISCAP’s increased activity exacerbating the already fragile environment. While the DRC government, local militias, MONUSCO, and SADC troops are making concerted efforts to counter the insurgency and provide humanitarian relief, significant challenges persist. The international community continues to call for enhanced support and coordinated actions to address the multifaceted crisis in the region.

Series of terror events in  Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the month of June

 28th June- ISCAP insurgents attacked Congolese Armed forces in Kambau, Lubero Region in North Kivu.

 28th June- insurgents led and armed assault against civilians in Kambau, Lubero region

 27th June- several Christians were captured and executed in Idohu in Ituri Province.

 26th June- civilians were attacked by ISCAP militants in Ngere, Lubero Region.

 25th June- ISCAP militants ambushed Christians near Ndjiapanda in Lubero region.

 24th June- two Christians were captured and executed by ISCAP militants in Ndjiapanda in Lubero region.

 22nd June- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault against civilians in Ofai in Ituri province.

 20th June- ISCAP militants ambushed militia forces loyal to the Congolese armed forces in Ndjiapanda in Lubero Region.

 20th June- Militants clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese armed forces in Ndjiapanda in Lubero.

 20th June- ISCAP militants capture and execute 22 Christians in Bamande Village in Ituri.

 19th June- ISCAP militants conducted an armed assault against Congolese Army Barracks near Samboko in Ituri.

 19th June- ISCAP insurgents led and armed assault against civilians in Esege, Lubero region.

 19th June- ISCAP insurgents led and armed assault against Congolese security forces in Esege, Lubero region.

 18th June- militants led an armed assault against civilians in Mbata in Lubero Region.

 14th June- ISCAP insurgents led and armed assault against civilians in Lumba, North Kivu

 12th June- insurgents attacked the Christian Village of Masongo along RN2 in Beni region.

 12th June- at least 45 Christians were killed by ISCAP insurgents uin Mayikengo village in Lubero area

 11th June- at least 10 Christians were killed by ISCAP insurgents in Manya village in Ituri

 11th June- ISCAP militants attacked and terrorized Mbandaka and four surrounding villages in Beni region.

 10th June- ISCAP militants captured and executed 3 Christians near Kantin in Beni.

 9th June- Makwasa village in Beni region was attacked by suspected militants ISCAP militants.

 9th June- Islamists conducted and armed assault on the village north of the town of Kantin in Beni.

 6th June- ISCAP militants ambushed a vehicle, in Kanialuna village, between Kabasha and Kalunguta, on the Beni-Butembo-Kasindi Road in Beni Region.

 7th June- armed militants killed at least 60 civilians in Masali area in Beni.

 7th June- at least 4 Christians were killed in Kantin region in Beni.

 5th June- several civilians were attacked by ISCAP militants on the RN2 in Kyavikere in North Kivu.

 4th June- ISCAP Militants led an armed assault on civilians on the RN4 in Sesa Ituri Province.

 4th June- ISCAP Militants led an armed assault on civilians in the Mashua area in North Kivu.

 3rd June- ISCAP Militants led an armed assault on civilians in Mangina, North Kivu.

 3rd June- ISCAP militants captured and killed a civilian on RN4 near Ndalya in Ituri.

 2nd June- Islamic State militants attacked civilians In Kainama, North Kivu.

Recommendations

To effectively combat the rising threat of terrorist groups in East and Central Africa, a multifaceted approach is essential. The following recommendations outline critical steps to enhance regional security and stability:

Enhanced regional collaboration is crucial. Strengthening alliances and fostering joint operations among countries in East and Central Africa will address the transnational nature of terrorist activities. Improved coordination and intelligence sharing will enhance the collective ability to track and dismantle insurgent networks that operate across borders.

To effectively combat the rising threat of terrorist groups in East and Central Africa, a multifaceted approach is essential. The following recommendations outline critical steps to enhance regional security and stability:

Enhanced regional collaboration is crucial. Strengthening alliances and fostering joint operations among countries in East and Central Africa will address the transnational nature of terrorist activities. Improved coordination and intelligence sharing will enhance the collective ability to track and dismantle insurgent networks that operate across borders.

Support for local forces must be increased. Providing more training and resources for local security forces and community defense groups will significantly improve their effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations. Empowering these forces to protect their communities more effectively is vital for sustained security.

Developing comprehensive counter-insurgency strategies is necessary. These strategies should integrate military actions with initiatives to address the underlying socio-economic grievances that fuel insurgency. By tackling the root causes of terrorism, these holistic approaches can help reduce the appeal of insurgent groups and prevent future recruitment.

Ensuring sustained humanitarian assistance is also essential. Continuous international support for humanitarian efforts is needed to aid displaced populations and rebuild affected communities. This support will help mitigate the impact of violence on civilians and contribute to long-term regional stability.

Finally, monitoring and adaptation are key components of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Regularly assessing and adapting counter-terrorism strategies in response to the evolving tactics of insurgent groups will ensure that efforts remain relevant and effective. This dynamic approach will enable security forces to stay ahead of terrorist threats and respond promptly to new challenges.

Conclusion and Insights

The security landscape in East and Central Africa remains fraught with challenges as terrorist activities by Islamic State affiliates continue to destabilize the region. Despite some successful counter-terrorism efforts, such as the repelling of ISM’s assault in Mozambique and joint operations in the DRC, insurgent groups remain resilient and capable of conducting lethal attacks. The effectiveness of military responses is hampered by the insurgents’ mobility, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and their ability to exploit local grievances.

Key Insights:

1. Persistent Threat: The Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique and the DRC are showing a persistent threat capability, evidenced by the frequency and brutality of their attacks in June 2024.

2. Humanitarian Impact: The ongoing violence is exacerbating humanitarian crises, displacing populations, and overwhelming local resources. Efforts by MONUSCO and other international bodies are critical but insufficient in the face of escalating violence.

3. Cross-Border Dynamics: The withdrawal of SAMIM and the increased role of Tanzanian forces in Mozambique highlight the importance of regional cooperation in countering terrorism. The porous borders and shared security challenges necessitate coordinated efforts across East and Central Africa.

4. Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Mozambique’s initiative to establish rehabilitation centers for former insurgents is a positive step towards long-term peace. However, the success of such programs depends on sustained security and community support.

5. Digital Crackdown: The dismantling of IS’s online platforms is a significant achievement in disrupting their propaganda and recruitment efforts. Continued international collaboration is essential to target and dismantle these digital networks.