M23 denies withdrawing from bukavu

 The AFC/M23 denies a statement attributed to it concerning its alleged withdrawal from the city of Bukavu in South Kivu province. Its spokesperson, Lawrence Kanyuka, attributes this message to the Kinshasa regime against which they are fighting and believes it is a smokescreen intended to distract from the drone attack in Goma that killed a humanitarian worker. "The Kinshasa regime is spreading false information and the most blatant disinformation in an attempt to divert attention from the assassination of the UNICEF employee, perpetrated by its forces on March 11, 2026. This is an act of extreme gravity, which cannot be erased or concealed by repeated lies," he wrote on his Twitter account.

The Assassination of Ali Larijani — How Israel's Mossad Took Out Iran's Last Leader.

He was walking openly through the streets of Tyrron. No disguise, no armored convoy, no underground bunker, just a man in a suit marching with the crowds, surrounded by government loyalists, chanting slogans against Israel and the United States. It was March 13th, 2026, Iran's annual goods day rally. And somewhere above him, invisible, silent, and already transmitting his exact coordinates back to an Israeli intelligence operation center, a surveillance asset, had locked on.

Ali Larajani, the man who had become the Islamic Republic's most powerful figure even before Supreme Leader Kamani was killed. The man running what remained of Iran's entire security and strategic apparatus, the deacto leader of a regime at war. walking in the open on camera, filmed by his own government's media, and unknowingly handing Israel everything it needed.

3 days later, he was dead. What went wrong? What did Israeli intelligence know? And how did the most devastating targeted killing operation since Operation Epic Fury began end the deacto leadership of the Islamic Republic in a single night? 

 We cover the operations the world is still trying to understand. To grasp why Larajani's death sent shock waves far beyond the immediate military context, why Israel's defense minister said publicly that he had joined Kamani in the depths of hell. You have to start further back. Not with the air strike, not with the targeting operation, with the man himself, with what he had built, what he represented, and why the Islamic Republic had no obvious replacement for him the moment he was gone.

 Ali Ardashir Larajani entered the world on June 3rd, 1958 in Njaf, the Iraqi city that served for centuries as one of the most sacred sites in Shia Islam, home to the shrine of Imam Ali. His father was Grand Ayatollah Mesa Hashem Amolei, a religious authority of the highest rank in the Shia hierarchy. That combination of clerical prestige and political gravity would shape every turn of Laurani's career in the decades ahead and give the Lajani name a weight inside the Islamic Republic that few families could match.

His brothers Sade and Muhammad Javad occupied senior positions at the apex of Iran's judicial and diplomatic establishment for years, extending the family's reach into every corner of the system. and Ali was the most powerful of them all. His academic background was unusual for the world he entered. He earned a degree in computer science from Sharif University of Technology, Iran's most prestigious technical institution before completing graduate and doctoral studies in philosophy at the University of Tan. That combination gave him

something rare in a political class dominated by clerics and military men. intellectual credibility that translated across rooms. He could speak the language of strategic theory with the same precision he applied to everything else. After the revolution of 1979, he joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its formative years and served during the Iran Iraq war.

 8 years of catastrophic conflict that forged an entire generation of Iranian officials in shared ideology and shared sacrifice. The war gave him IRGC connections he would rely on for the rest of his career and the one credential the revolutionary system valued above almost everything else.

 He had been there when it cost something. His institutional rise came through media before it came through the security sector. From 1994 to 2004, he ran the Islamic Republic of Iran broadcasting, a decade at the helm of the state's entire information infrastructure, building networks, managing narratives, and mastering the machinery of political messaging inside the Islamic Republic.

 Then in 2005, President Ahmed Jad appointed him secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the body at the center of every consequential decision Iran makes about war, nuclear weapons, and foreign adversaries. He served in that role until 2007, accumulating institutional knowledge about Iran's most sensitive decision-making processes that no subsequent position would erase.

VDP-Wazalendo Front Grand-Nord fighters launch an offensive against the ADF

VDP-Wazalendo Front Grand-Nord fighters launch an offensive against the ADF in the forested areas of the Beni, Lubero, and Mambasa territories. They launched an offensive in the locality of Ilota, where they are continuing their operations. These operations are being conducted under the command of Kambale Riguen, alias PKM. Officials assure that the actions will continue until the targeted armed groups and their allies are neutralized. 

ADF intensifies terror attacks on Mambasa

The increasing number of attacks by ADF rebels on the Kisangani axis and around the Okapi Wildlife Reserve (RFO) in Ituri raises serious concerns.

According to several sources, these fighters are believed to have moved from Bapere (Lubero, North Kivu) to Babesua in Mambasa territory, where a recent attack has killed at least 19.

According to intelligence collections from civilians ,this terror progression is believed to extend towards Mambasa-Center, with a possible aim to lay grand attacks on the Walese-Karo zone on the Mambasa-Isiro axis.

These moves come in the context of increased military pressure from the FARDC and the UPDF against some ADF strongholds in the region.

The local population calls on the UPDF and FARDC to take the matter seriously before other scores of innocent civilians are killed by the terrorists. 

A provincial work shop to end ADF terror!

 

A workshop to validate the provincial plan for the prevention and fight against the ADF, terrorism, and violent extremism was held this Monday, March 16, 2026, in Beni.

Bringing together security and traditional authorities, MONUSCO, and civil society representatives, this meeting aims to provide the province with a strategic framework to end the violence.

The resolutions will be submitted to the provincial authorities for adoption.

How Mossad Jammed Every Phone Near Khamenei's Compound 3 Minutes Before the Strike

Every intelligence agency in the world spent decades trying to get a single confirmed sighting of Ali Kam in motion. Not a photo, not a statement, a confirmed realtime location. In 4 years, one analyst in a windowless room outside Tel Aviv did it. Not with satellites, not with spies, with traffic cameras. That's not the surprising part.

The surprising part is that he almost got the whole operation shut down before it ever reached the kill phase. His name, for the purposes of this account, is Alain. He's not a field operative. He has never run an asset, never crossed a border undercover, never sat in a car outside a target building.

He is an analyst, unit 82000, Israel's signals intelligence directorate, and his entire professional life has been built around one skill, finding behavioral patterns in data that other people dismiss as noise. In 2022, his supervisor gave him an assignment that sounded at the time almost administrative.

Map the traffic camera network in central tan. Identify coverage gaps. Flag any infrastructure that could be compromised remotely without triggering Iranian cyber security protocols. Elon assumed it was a contingency project, something that would sit in a folder for years and never get used. He was wrong about that.

 and the consequences of being wrong in both directions would follow him for the next four years. To understand what Thrron's traffic cameras had to do with killing the Supreme Leader, you have to understand one thing about how Kam moved through the world. He didn't move like a head of state. He moved like a man who had survived assassination attempts since the early 1980s.

 The kind of survival that rewires how a person inhabits space. No fixed schedule, no announced movements. A compound on Pastor Street that from the outside looked like three unremarkable government buildings on a busy urban block. His protection detail was chosen from the IRGC's most disciplined personnel.

 They rotated in patterns designed to resist surveillance. They carried no personally registered devices by late 2025. They communicated on hardened walkie-talkies. On paper, they were close to invisible, but they drove cars and they parked those cars the same way, in the same geometry every time a meeting of real consequence was about to begin.

 Elon found that pattern. It took him 14 months. By mid 2024, the Israeli traffic camera network inside Thyron was comprehensive enough that unit 82000 could reconstruct the movement of any vehicle within the inner ring of the city in near real time. The footage wasn't just observed. It was stored, indexed, and run through AI assisted analysis tools that Elon's team had spent 2 years calibrating.

 What they were looking for was not a face. It was a configuration. A specific combination of vehicles arriving at Pastor Street, parking in a particular geometric arrangement, front vehicle offset left, rear vehicle perpendicular at the secondary gate, two flanking units at specific distances had historically correlated with a high value meeting inside the compound in 94% of observed cases.

 Elon called this the third lock, not because there were only three confirmation signals in the operation, but because the parking pattern was the third and final piece of a sequence he had trained himself to read. He had never told anyone the name. It was his. In November 2024, the pattern appeared. All indicators aligned.

 The confidence threshold crossed. The brief went up the chain. Potential high-v value meeting. Pastor Street 90% confidence. Israeli intelligence briefed their American counterparts. CIA analysts in Langley ran it against their own signals. They found nothing. No corroborating human intelligence. No electronic activity that matched. No chatter.

 The meeting never happened. Somewhere in Common's protection architecture, something had shifted. a vehicle swap, a deliberate pattern disruption, or a routine change that no algorithm had accounted for. No one could explain it with certainty. But after November 2024, the CIA imposed a new condition on any joint action.

How a Mossad Spy Exposed an Iranian Wiretap Hidden Inside Israeli Embassies"

 

In the spring of 2003, a man who worked for MSAD walked into a building he had entered dozens [music] of times before. He carried a briefcase, wore a suit, and had clearance that would pass any check at any door. He was not being followed. He was not under suspicion. And yet, by the time he left that building, he had set in motion one of the most consequential counter intelligence operations in Israeli history.

 What he found inside was not a weapon, not a file, and not a person. It was silence. A very specific kind of silence that should not have existed. And that silence told him that somewhere inside the walls of an Israeli embassy, Iran was listening. To understand what happened in 2003, you need to understand what Israeli embassies are and what they are not. They are not simply offices.

They are not just buildings where diplomats file paperwork and attend receptions. Israeli embassies are, in the language of intelligence work, hard targets. They are among the most surveiled, most carefully constructed, and most operationally sensitive pieces of infrastructure that the Israeli state operates anywhere on the planet outside of Israel itself. Yeah.

 Every room in an Israeli embassy is built with counter intelligence in mind. The walls are reinforced. The communications equipment is encrypted. The personnel who work there are vetted to a degree that most governments would consider excessive. And the physical structure of the buildings themselves is designed to make penetration difficult in a way that goes beyond locks and guards.

 Israeli embassies are supposed to be places where secrets stay secrets. That is the premise on which they operate. If that is the assumption that every diplomat, every intelligence officer attached to those buildings and every government that interacts with them is working from. Which is why what a mid-level MOSAD technical officer named Ron Gedor discovered in the spring of 2003 was so deeply unsettling.

 Not because it was dramatic, not because it involved gunfire or dead drops or any of the things that people associate with espionage. It was unsettling because it was quiet. Because the thing he found was almost invisible. And because once he found it, the implications spread outward in every direction like cracks in glass, touching operations, personnel, and relationships that had nothing obvious to do with a single anomaly in a single building.

 Ran Gedor was not a field operative in the traditional sense. He did not run agents or he did not conduct surveillance on foreign targets or participate in the kind of operations that produce written histories and documentary films. His work was technical. He was one of a small group of specialists whose job was to verify the integrity of Israeli secure communications infrastructure.

 A category of work that Mossad took seriously to a degree that most outsiders never fully appreciated. His team conducted regular sweeps of embassy facilities. Al not because they expected to find something, but because the discipline of looking was itself the point. You sweep because the moment you stop sweeping is the moment someone else starts using the silence you leave behind.

 In March of 2003, Guedor's team was scheduled for a routine assessment of a European embassy facility. The specific country has never been officially named, and the details that have emerged over the years come from a combination of retired Israeli intelligence figures speaking on background, German and French investigative journalists who spent years tracing the threads and a 2012 book written by a former Shinbet analyst who was involved in the secondary investigation.

None of these sources agree on every detail, but the core of what happened is consistent across all of them. And it begins with a frequency anomaly that Gedor's equipment detected in a room that was supposed to be completely clean. The room in question was the communications annex. Every Israeli embassy has one.

 It is a room that handles encrypted traffic, secure phone lines, and the kind of document transfer that cannot go through conventional channels. It is swept more often than any other space in the building. It is built to a specific electronic penetration almost theoretically impossible. And yet, when Gedor's team ran their standard spectral analysis, they found a signal.