Why was FARDC miserably beaten by M23 in Bunagana,Goma,Bukavu and Uvira?Is it solely because of the so called traitors?

 

The most valuable thing OSINT(open source Intelligence )has given me is these exchanges with people from both the political and academic worlds, with whom discussions sometimes turn into genuine learning experiences has enabled to make a thorough analysis on the FARDC miserable performance on field.

I usually spend over 30 minutes in a particularly enriching conversation with a military experts and former members of the Congolese Armed Forces  and currently working in the arms industry in the West ,and I got a variety of insights into FARDC miserable defeats in Bunagana,Goma,Bukavu and Uvira.

Felix Tshilombo thinks he has been betrayed, but that is not the sole case. Congolese generals have no idea about 21st-century warfare, which is a combination of several factors: drones, jamming and electronic countermeasures, guided and smart munitions, and new infantry combat tactics (favoring the use of light and mobile units at the platoon level, as this facilitates infiltration and flanking maneuvers). Unfortunately, in this war, you're facing the FARDC, which still uses heavy, unwieldy units at the battalion, regiment, and brigade levels. Many have become generals without any training, so they struggle to understand the realities of 21st-century warfare.

The acquisition of military equipment is the FARDC's Achilles' heel. These sensitive tasks are entrusted to people with no military experience or knowledge, generally close to the President of the Republic (Kao Mandungu, Jacques Tshibanda, Pastor Shekinah, etc.). They created shell companies, approved by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo), to purchase weapons and military equipment. In their work, they almost entirely disregarded the expertise of the FARDC's Logistics Directorate (G4) and that of the Ministry of Defense's Logistics Directorate. The result: overbilling, unsuitable equipment, and often outdated equipment (such as the expired Serbian-made bulletproof vests that caused numerous deaths among the FARDC during the Battle of Goma).

The AFC/M23 took its time launching the offensive in the Ruzizi Plain. They first needed a critical mass of troops, which would allow them to equalize with and surpass the forces of the coalition formed around the FARDC. They also needed to acquire "Filoguider" fiber optic FPV kamikaze drones (which are invulnerable to the drone jammers the FARDC acquired in India). These kamikaze drones destroyed the various logistics convoys leaving Uvira to resupply Luvungi with ammunition, fuel, and food. Once the FARDC logistics were neutralized, the battle of Luvungi was lost.

Another thing: spare parts were needed to get all the T-55 and T-59 tanks, Batt UMG armored personnel carriers, M53/59 Praga armored personnel carriers, BMP-1 armored vehicles, as well as the 105mm, 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm artillery pieces, mortars of various calibers (60mm, 81mm, 82mm, and 120mm), and especially the formidable long-range Bastion 122mm (Ukrainian) and RM-70 (Czech) multiple rocket launchers, recovered mainly in Goma. As you know, 40% of the FARDC's heavy equipment was stationed in Goma and Bukavu. The rebellion that inherited this powerful arsenal should get it fully operational again, with spare parts and experts. According to my information, Ethiopian engineers discreetly refurbished this arsenal. Honestly, with all the heavy weapons and ammunition recovered in Goma, Mubambiro, and Bukavu, the AFC/M23 can continue its fight for several more years, even without support from Rwanda and or the Kinshasha's elites' claimed support from Uganda.

Everything had been carefully planned before the Uvira offensive:

(1) The new troops had completed their training (7,500 men from Rumangabo, 9,700 more from Chanzu, 8,000 from Mubambiro, and 6,000 trained in Rwindi, for a total of approximately 30,000 trained troops in 2025 alone).

(2) Air assets: the offensive using Filoguider FPV drones and Baba Yaga bomber drones (which can fire 82mm and 60mm shells) had been acquired in sufficient numbers. (3) Armored vehicles, heavy tanks, and heavy artillery, now fully operational to maximize firepower.

(4) Deployment of the anti-aircraft system to neutralize and weaken the FARDC air force. Once these four prerequisites were met, the fall of Uvira was inevitable. The US has information about all of this. That's why they are working to stop the AFC/M23 in its tracks, because they know perfectly well that the movement could go too far if everything hinges on tthe military front.

The M23 now has drone units within its battalions, as is the case with the modernised RDF and the UPDF armies. They are equipped with smart, guided missiles, the famous Israeli Soltam. These are effective in counter-battery fire. Thanks to these guided missiles, they managed to neutralize the FARDC's heavy artillery during the Battle of Kamanyola. Another factor contributing to theM23 superiority is the anti-aircraft batteries installed in the highlands, as well as the jamming devices and electronic countermeasures that neutralize the high, low, and medium frequency communications of the army (FARDC), which unfortunately has a limited number of encrypted radios. This jamming system significantly reduces the effectiveness DRC air force.

NB:Many have been asking me why I usually put my writings mostly on M23 and Not AFC,my answer is that ,it is not a mistake,because I know well that M23 is the architect of this war.The M23 officers are the real owners( in all ways) of this struggle.AFC is just like a pair of socks one puts on his feet as he puts on his shoes.I do not believe and Trust the AFC for they are just a bunch of opportunists.

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