While Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 rebels signed a Qatari-brokered ceasefire in Doha in July 2025—an agreement the Congolese army coalition never honored—Angola unveiled a separate initiative on February 9, supposedly aimed at de-escalating tensions in eastern DRC. Yet the rebels were neither consulted nor invited, raising immediate doubts about the proposal’s neutrality and intent.
It did not take long to discern that Angola’s proposal was a calculated strategy designed to grant the Congolese national army (FARDC) and its coalition partners a tactical advantage over AFC/M23, while discreetly expanding Angola’s own military footprint in eastern DRC.
On February 24, there was arrival of approximately 100 Angolan soldiers at Kalemie Airport on February 18 and their subsequent deployment to Baraka and Fizi in South Kivu Province to reinforce coalition offensives led by FARDC. On February 24 and 26, an Angolan Air Force Hercules C-130 aircraft transported additional special forces to Kalemie, reinforcing units already stationed at the airport.
According to Intelligence sources inside FARDC ,reports alerted that Angola was expected to deploy a full battalion, including special forces and drone operators operating from Kalemie Airport, alongside approximately 20 Blackwater mercenaries.
Beyond ground deployments, Angolan Sukhoi Su-30 and Su-25 fighter jets have reportedly been permanently stationed in Kalemie to support operations against AFC/M23 and MRD-Twirwaneho, a Banyamulenge self-defense group, in the high and middle plateaus of Fizi Territory.
Publicly, Angola maintained that it would not engage militarily, projecting neutrality during its tenure as African Union chair. However, President Félix Tshisekedi’s two visits to Luanda within three days in January raised questions about that posture. President João Lourenço’s call for a ceasefire now appears to have been a manoeuvre that bought time while legitimizing direct support for Tshisekedi’s government.
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