Bi-Weekly Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Brief for East and Central Africa (Somalia, Mozambique, and DR-Congo): Tracking Islamic State Terrorists for the period of 1st September- 15th September 2024

Executive Summary

In East and Central Africa, between September 1st and 15th, 2024, the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliated groups continued to escalate violence and expand their operations in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Mozambique: Islamic State-Mozambique (ISM) increased its activities in the Cabo Delgado region, targeting both civilians and military forces. Notable incidents included attacks in Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia districts, with indications of possible expansion into neighboring Malawi. The recruitment of vulnerable youth in Malawi has raised concerns about regional security. ISM’s use of ambushes and hit-and-run tactics suggests adaptability, complicating efforts by Mozambican and Rwandan forces to stabilize the region.

DR Congo: Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) intensified its attacks in Ituri province. Civilians and military forces were targeted in multiple armed assaults, resulting in numerous casualties. The joint efforts between Congolese and Ugandan forces showed some success in neutralizing ISCAP members, but the insurgents’ ability to terrorize local populations remains a significant threat. The situation has led to growing calls for international intervention due to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in the region.

MOZAMBIQUE

• 11th Sep- Islamic State (IS) insiders reportedly referenced expansion into Malawi after national intelligence services uncovered youth recruitment.
• 10th Sep- ISM led an armed attack against civilians in Negure area of Muidumbe district.
• 05th Sep- a Mozambican military patrol was ambushed and attacked by ISM terrorist in Mocimboa da Praia.
• 04th Sep- ISM conducted an armed attacked against the civilian populace in Negure are in Muidumbe district.
• 01st Sep- several civilians were injured after ISM mounted an armed assault against the population in Chiure in Chiure district.
• 01st Sep- ISM terrorists led an armed assault against Mozambican Army troop in Bugi in Cabo Delgado.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

• 11TH Sep- ISCAP militants attacked several villages on the RN4 road near Biakato area IN Ituri province. The villages include Kombokombo, Badulingi and Bamedi.
• 10th Sep- ISCAP militants led an armed attack against civilians on the RN4 in Bandembesi, Ituri. At least three people were killed and several others injured.
• 07th Sep- ISCAP militants captured and execute two Christians in Idohu area in Ituri.
• 04th Sep- Joint efforts between Congolese and Ugandan troops left four ISCAP jihadists neutralized and 9 of their hostages freed, including two of Ugandan nationality.
• 04th Sep- ISCAP terrorists conducted an armed attack against civilians Near Biakato in Ntabiya region in Ituri province.
• 04th Sep- ISCAP terrorists led and armed assaults on civilians near Mamove are in Ituri province.
• 02nd Sep- ISAP militants led an armed assault on Congolese Military vehicle in Bandilika, Ituri Province. At least one civilian and one soldier were killed in the attack.
• 01st Sep- Joint efforts by FARDC supported by the Ugandan army (UPDF) destroyed one of the strongholds of ISCAP terrorists east of Makumo and Biakato, in the Babila-Babombi chiefdom, Mambasa territory, Ituri province. 3 jihadists killed, two computers, a grenade and an AK47 type weapon recovered by the army. It was revealed that these computers served these rebels in connecting to the ISCAP and EI (Individual Enterprise) networks.

ANALYSIS

Mozambique

Malawi’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) recently uncovered a youth recruitment scheme linked to insiders expanding their influence in the country, raising serious security concerns. This discovery comes amid growing regional instability, particularly as neighboring Mozambique grapples with the spread of Islamic State (IS)-aligned insurgents in its northern Cabo Delgado province. The possibility of this recruitment effort being connected to the Islamic State’s broader operations in Southern Africa cannot be overlooked.

The Islamic State in Mozambique (ISIS-M) has been actively recruiting vulnerable youth, leveraging poverty, unemployment, and disillusionment to expand its ranks. As the insurgency in Mozambique continues to destabilize the region, it is likely that IS operatives are seeking to expand beyond Mozambique’s borders into neighboring countries like Malawi. The recruitment of Malawian youth could be part of a wider strategy to establish a foothold and bolster militant forces in the region.These recruitment networks, often masked by community groups or social media campaigns, target young people who are struggling with economic hardships, making them easy prey for extremist ideologies. The discovery of this scheme by the NIS suggests that Malawi, like Mozambique, could become a new target for IS expansion, further exacerbating regional insecurity.

Insurgent activity in Mocímboa da Praia signals a renewed threat in areas thought to be stabilized by Rwandan forces, revealing difficulties in fully securing the region. Islamic State-linked fighters are employing both violence and media propaganda, using attacks to project strength and maintain influence. Targeting key infrastructure like the N380 highway disrupts military and civilian movements, indicating a strategy to weaken government control. Despite recent successes, Rwandan forces remain vulnerable to insurgent ambushes, showing gaps in intelligence and operational awareness. The insurgents’ use of hit-and-run tactics and IEDs highlights their adaptability in avoiding direct confrontations. Rising violence has forced the reduction of UN operations, intensifying the already dire humanitarian crisis in the region.

The increased attacks by ISCAP (Islamic State Central Africa Province) in North Kivu and Ituri highlight the growing threat of extremist violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Over the last two months, the group’s brutal tactics, including mass killings, arson, and property destruction, have terrorized civilian populations, with the toll exceeding 500 deaths. This surge of violence, despite the state of siege, exposes the limited capacity of the Congolese government and its military forces to counter ISCAP’s insurgency effectively. Human rights organizations have asked for these regions to be declared disaster areas underscores the severity of the humanitarian crisis, while their appeal to the international community to act against what they term a “genocide” points to growing frustrations over perceived international neglect and the failure of peacekeeping initiatives. The local demands for tax relief and stronger military action reflect the community’s desperation for both immediate and long-term solutions to this enduring conflict.

INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION

In Mozambique, the Islamic State-Mozambique (ISM) has expanded its activities beyond its traditional strongholds in Cabo Delgado, targeting both civilians and military forces. Notable incidents include repeated attacks in Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia districts, with a strategic shift towards destabilizing neighboring Malawi through youth recruitment. This suggests a broader, more regional approach by ISM, aimed at reinforcing its influence and operational capacity across borders. The group’s use of ambushes and IEDs indicates a sophisticated understanding of local dynamics and a deliberate effort to challenge stabilization efforts by Mozambican and Rwandan forces. The intensifying violence has led to a reduction in UN operations, worsening the humanitarian crisis and disrupting key infrastructure.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) has intensified its brutal campaign in Ituri province. The group’s recent attacks, including mass killings and assaults on civilians and military personnel, highlight the severity of the insurgency and the challenges facing Congolese and Ugandan forces. Despite some successes in neutralizing ISCAP members and disrupting their operations, the group’s ability to execute coordinated and lethal attacks reveals significant gaps in counter-insurgency efforts. The ongoing violence has led to severe humanitarian conditions, with calls from human rights organizations for international intervention and disaster area declarations. The local population’s demand for stronger military action and relief measures reflects the urgent need for a comprehensive response to the escalating crisis.

Overall, the period underscores the critical need for enhanced regional and international strategies to counter IS-affiliated groups and address the deepening humanitarian crises in Mozambique and the DRC

Rwandan army shoots another DRC soldier

 Rwanda, the RDF, Kigali's army, continues its provocation, even near the tourist city of Goma, one of the largest in the east of the country. Despite calls for a ceasefire, the Rwandan army continues to display its excessive ambitions.

A soldier of the Armed Forces of the DRC was killed on the night of Tuesday to Wednesday, September 18, 2024 by Rwandan soldiers near border pillar 12, in the village of Buswaga, located in the Buvira group, in the Bukumu chiefdom, in the Nyiragongo territory, north of Goma. According to civil society sources, there was concern on both sides after the incident.

The information is confirmed by the spokesman for the army in North Kivu. Accordingly ,Lieutenant-Colonel Ndjike Kaiko Guillaume promises to give the position of the FARDC in the coming hours.

However, an independent source points out that a significant portion of the Congolese army has been reinforced in the Nyiragongo territory.

Author,Charles Onana accused of denying Tutsi genocide

 

According to the news outlet, Monde Afrique, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, the Survie-France association, the Human Rights League, the Rwandan Community of France , the Collective of Civil Parties, have filed a complaint, with constitution of civil party, against the political scientist and writer Charles Onana accused of "denial of the crime of genocide of Tutsi ".

There has been heated debates over all forms of media from Kigali on the authors publication.Many citing that his books are meant to denial the Tutsi genocide.

The trial will take place before the criminal court of Paris on October 7, 8, 10 and 11. The complaint targets the resounding book by published in 2019 by Éditions de l'Artilleur entitled Rwanda, la vérité sur l'opération Turquoise , a work prefaced by Colonel Luc Marchal, commander of the blue helmets of the UN in 1994 in Rwanda .

Colonel Marchal, who was in charge of security in the town of Kigali in 1994 and who experienced Rwanda's descent into hell first-hand, will be at the court to defend Mr. Onana Charles.

The situation from the 4th ministerial meeting on Rwanda and DRC conflict

The 4th ministerial meeting between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, under the mediation of the Republic of Angola. 

⏹️The ministers of RDC- Rwanda have been informed of the results of the meeting between the Facilitation and the delegation of AFC/M23, devoted mainly to their adherence to the cease-fire in force since August 4, 2024. 
⏹️ The meeting reviewed and approved the minutes of the ministerial session of August 20 and 21, 2024, and also reviewed the report of the intelligence experts meeting of August 29 and 30, 2024 in Rubavu, Rwanda, the emphasis on the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces/the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda.

NYIRAGONGO: VIOLENT Clashes between the FARDC and the M23 rebels in the PNVI on September 14

 

Violent clashes broke out on Saturday, September 14 in the afternoon between the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the rebels of the M23 group in the depth of the National Park of Volcanoes (PNVi), along the 'axe Kanyabuki. According to the Civil Society of Nyiragongo Territory, which alerted on the situation, the M23-AFC rebels tried to penetrate a position of the government forces. "The forces of M23, who are used to these attempts, were quickly repelled and are now pursued without repetition. Ils n'osent plus s'aventurer davantage", declared a representative of the Civil Society.

The Civil Society also called on the population to support the FARDC as well as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP), who, according to it, are giving their blood for the defense of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. "We urge the population to continue to support the armed forces and the VDP in this crucial struggle for peace and security," she added. The Civil Society also requested the continuation of the offensive against the M23 rebels. These fightings occur a week after similar violent confrontations in the region, illustrating the persistence of the security crisis in the east of the DRC.

As Rwanda demands the expulsion of FDLR from DRC,the leaders of FDLR and FLN are rumoured to be holding a meeting in Burundi

According to whispers from Bujumbura,There are rumours around the city that the rebel leaders ,Lt Gen Hamada Habimana who is considered to be the supreme commander of the FLN forces, Gen Ntawunguka Pacifique who is the head of the FDLR army, Brig Gen Antoine Hakizimana who is the head of the FLN army and Col Honore Hategekimana Theophile also from the FLN are holding a grand meeting in Burundi.Meanwhile ,the DRC is demamding Rwanda to first withdraw its army from DRC soil for it to also respond to Rwandan demand of chasing a way the FDLR.Rwanda has declined to behave to the demands of DRC.

Hanwha Defence, a major South Korean defense contractor, and an army infantry division have begun testing a new six-wheeled, 2-ton Multi-Purpose Unmanned Ground Vehicle (M-UGV).

 

This vehicle, which can carry up to 500 kilograms (1,102 pounds) of cargo and travel over 100 kilometers (62.1 miles) on a single charge, was first unveiled in July 2021.

The M-UGV, also known as the intelligence UGV (I-UGV), can be controlled remotely or operate autonomously. Its roles include surveillance, logistics transport, casualty evacuation, and combat support. The vehicle features airless tires and a low profile, ideal for its reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It is equipped with a Remote-Controlled Weapon System (RCWS) that uses artificial intelligence to detect and return fire in the direction of incoming gunfire.

The field demonstration, which began on October 8, will test various functions such as remote control, GPS-based autonomous driving, and the RCWS. If communication with the control tower is lost, the I-UGV will attempt to reconnect; if unsuccessful, it will return to its starting location independently.

ADF receiving reinforcements and their freqjuentattacks have led to massive displacements in Lubero

 

According to HUMINT(human intelligence) reports the ADF threat pushes entire villages to empty of their inhabitants in Lubero and since Wednesday September 11, 2024, several localities in the Bapakombe group, located in the Bapere sector, in Lubero territory (North Kivu), have been deserted by their populations. This massive displacement is observed in particular in the villages of Bilulu, Lubumbashi, Mabilima, Loya, Hoho and Makumo, which are also located on the border of the territory of Mambasa, in Ituri.

This wave of displacement follows a new attack by rebels from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which occurred in the village of Bukoka, located just two hours' walk from the territorial limit between Lubero and Mambasa. Fearing for their safety, civilians fled towards Kambau, the capital of the Bapakombe grouping. This town, already marked by bloody massacres perpetrated by the same terrorists, nevertheless represents their last refuge.

The provincial deputy and former customary chief of the Bapere sector, Mwami Bongombi Faïsi Enock, sounded the alarm. According to him, the ADF rebels appear to be receiving reinforcements from their fighters who have been operating since June 12, 2024 in this area. Even more worrying, he claims that these terrorist groups circulate freely in the region and go so far as to organize football matches with their hostages in the village of Bododhea, under the helpless gaze of the security forces.

Mwami Bongombi strongly calls on the national authorities to take urgent measures to restore security in this region.

Victims of Kony's insurgence demand repatriation of 60 Congolese from Gulu refugee transit camp

  The association of victims of the atrocities of the Kony Lord's resistance army (LRA) and the civil society of the Congolese people are pleading for the repatriation of sixty (60) Congolese stranded in the neighboring Republic of Uganda.

They made this known in a declaration read this Thursday, September 12, 2024, before the administrator of the territory of Dungu in the province of Haut-Uele

According to them, these compatriots who were kidnapped during the massacres called "Christmas" by LRA rebels in the provinces of Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele, in the former Orientale in 2008, live in inhumane conditions. in the Gulu transit site in Uganda, while they await repatriation to the DRC.

Akotama Moïse, secretary of this association who affirms that the contract of the NGO which took care of the repatriation of these Congolese is nearing its end, asks the government to invest in the return of these Congolese and that compensation be made for these victims.

“Based on the information in our possession, the NGO Action for Rural Promotion which led this LRA DDRR process from the CAR to Uganda with funding from PAX, whose contract will end on September 25, 2024, wants to leave Uganda without having repatriated our brothers and sisters to the country and this NGO and its partners want to force our brothers to stay in Uganda without their consent", according to their statement.

Recall that in July 2023, the Central African and Ugandan governments, with the support of MINUSCA, voluntarily repatriated around sixty ex-LRA combatants and their families to the city of Entebbe in Uganda. These families had lived in the CAR for around ten years..

Rwanda's Mi-17 and Mi-35M multirole combat helicopter

Mi35

Mi17

Two Mi-17 transport helicopters and two Mi-35M attack helicopters belonging to the Rwandan Air Force were seen flying over Amahoro Stadium in the capital Kigali on Sunday 11 August for the inauguration of President Paul Kagame, who was sworn in for his fourth term. They were subsequently seen on at least one other occassion.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) arms transfers database, Rwanda ordered four Mi-35Ms in 2019. These were spotted at Rostvertol in 2021 and delivered in 2022. Rwanda previously acquired six Mi-17s from Russia in 2014/2015.

Compared to the earlier Mi-24, the upgraded Mi-35M is far more capable. It features several improvements over its predecessors, such as new avionics with multifunction colour displays, more powerful Klimov VK-2500 turboshaft engines developing 2 200 shp, fibreglass main rotor blades, main rotor head with elastomeric joints, a new swashplate and X-type tail rotor. The Mi-35M’s fuselage has shortened stub wings and fixed landing gear. The helicopter’s sighting system has a thermal imager, TV camera and laser rangefinder and designator.

According to Russian Helicopters, weapons include Ataka-V or Shturm-V ant-tank missiles and Igla-V air-to-air missiles, 80 or 122 mm rockets and a GSh-231 23-mm twin-barrel cannon. In addition to weapons, the Mi-35M can carry up to eight personnel in its cabin or cargo weighing 1 500 kg while up to 2 400 kg can be carried on an external sling.

The helicopter’s self-protection suite includes a radar warning receiver, chaff & flare dispenser, infrared jammer and engine exhaust suppressor.

The new acquisitions bring the Rwandan military’s rotary wing fleet to 24 Mi-17s, seven Mi-24s and four Mi-35s. The Rwandan government also flies a single A109 and a single AW139 helicopter as well as a G550 business jet.

Some of Rwanda’s Mi-17s have been deployed with the United Nations in South Sudan (one crashed there in March 2019).

The only other aircraft in the Rwandan Air Force’s fleet are Cessna 208 Grand Caravan fixed wing aircraft – two were acquired from the United States in 2021. These were supplied through grand aid funding, with the US government providing 14 Grand Caravan EX aircraft to several countries in Africa, including Tunisia and Djibouti. ATI Engineering in 2020 was contracted to convert the two Grand Caravans for the Rwanda Defence Force under the US military’s African Partnership Flight initiative. They were fitted with secure HF and UHF radios, Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) interior and exterior lighting, and a reconfigurable multi-mission interior featuring two ambulatory medical stretcher kits, 11 passenger seats, eight collapsible utility seats and a removable rollerball cargo floor.

Other relatively recent acquisitions by Rwanda, according to SIPRI, include three SH-1 122mm self-propelled guns from China (2018), 50 Red Arrow-9 anti-tank missiles from China in 2017/18, two RM-70 122 mm self-propelled guns from Slovakia (2019), 76 Cobra APCs from Turkey (2012-2017), and 53 Cobra 2 APCs from Turkey in 2021.

The Mi-35M Attack helicopter is operated by multiple countries including Russia, Nigeria, Mali, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan.

Mi-35M is a multi-role combat helicopter manufactured by Rostvertol, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters. It is an export variant of Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.

Primarily designed for attack and military transport missions, the helicopter offers a superior flight performance and manoeuvrability compared to its predecessor.

The production of Mi-35M started in 2005. The aircraft integrates modern, high-precision weaponry for destroying ground-based armoured targets and providing air support for ground missions. It can be modified as an attack, ground assault, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) or transport platform.

Mi-35M is one of the modern combat helicopters in the Russian Air Force inventory. It is also operated by the armed forces of many countries including Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Mali.

The helicopter was displayed at the Army-2021 international military and technical forum in Moscow, Russia, in August 2021.

MI-35M features

Based on the Mi-24 Hind, Mi-35M military helicopter incorporates several improvements, including shortened stub wings, a new rotor system, modern avionics, upgraded turboshaft engines and a hydraulic system. The cockpit and vital components of the helicopter are heavily armoured.

The helicopter has an overall length of 21.6m, wingspan of 6.5m, and height of 6.5m. Its take-off weight in ferry configuration is 12,000kg. It can carry eight troops or a payload of 2,400kg.

Mi-35M military helicopter cockpit and avionics

The glass cockpit of the Mi-35M accommodates two pilots in tandem configuration. The night vision goggle (NVG)-compatible cockpit integrates multi-functional displays (MFDs), redundant flight controls, and state-of-the-art avionics.

The helicopter is equipped with an OPS-24N surveillance-and-sighting station, a television channel, a GPS-guided navigation system, and an optional non-Russian radio station.

Hind E armament

The chin-mounted turret can be installed with the twin-barrel GSh-23V 23mm cannon with 450 to 470 rounds of ammunition. The gun can fire 3,400 to 3,600 rounds a minute. The stub wings can carry a range of weapon systems, including anti-tank missiles, rocket pods/gun pods or fuel tanks.

The military helicopter can be armed with up to eight 9М114 or 9M120 Ataka-V SACLOS radio-guided anti-tank missiles, up to 80 ‘S-8’ 80mm unguided rockets, and 20 ‘S-13’ type 122mm unguided aircraft rockets.

Countermeasures of Mi-35M

The countermeasures suite of Mi-35M includes a radar warning receiver, a laser range finder and a location finder, chaff and flare launch system, infrared (IR) jamming system, and engine-exhaust IR suppressor.

Mi-35M helicopter engines and performance

The military helicopter is powered by two ТVЗ-117VМА or VK-2500 engines. Each engine develops a maximum power output of 2,200hp. The engines are designed to support high-altitude missions.

The helicopter can fly at a maximum speed of 305km/h. Its operational altitude is 5,400m. The helicopter has a normal range of 460km and can reach a maximum distance of 1,000km with full fuel load.

It can be deployed in combat missions in different geographies with high-temperature and high-altitude environments and features round-the-clock combat capabilities for conducting missions during day and night. It is also capable of operating from unprepared and poorly equipped airfields.

Mi-35M orders and deliveries

In 2005, Venezuela signed two contracts with Rosoboronexport for eight Mi-35M helicopters. The helicopters that were delivered to Venezuela were fitted with VK-2500 engines for high-altitude operations.

The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) signed a $150m contract with Rosoboronexport for 12 Mi-35M helicopters in November 2008. The helicopters were manufactured by Rostvertol at its facility in Rostov-on-Don. The first three helicopters were delivered in December 2009.

The Brazilian Air Force started operating three Mi-35M helicopters in April 2010. The helicopters in FAB service are referred to as AH-2 Sabre. Nine helicopters were delivered by August 2012. The final helicopter was delivered in December 2014.

However, in February 2022, the Brazilian Air Force withdrew the entire fleet of Mi-35M from operations, citing high operating costs, inconvenient logistics and inadequate manufacturer support.

Azerbaijan signed a contract with Rosoboronexport for the delivery of 24 Mi-35M helicopters in September 2010. By 2012, 12 helicopters were delivered and the rest were delivered in November 2013.

The Iraqi Ministry of Defence received the first delivery of four Mi-35M helicopters in November 2013. Four helicopters were delivered in July 2014 and the rest were delivered in October 2014.

Nigeria ordered 12 Mi-35M combat helicopters in 2015. The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) received two helicopters in December 2016, while two more helicopters were delivered in April 2018. Nigeria ordered additional 12 helicopters in October 2019.

Pakistan signed an agreement to purchase four Mi-35M helicopters from Russia in 2015. The helicopters were delivered in 2018.

Rosoboronexport signed a contract with Kazakhstan for the supply of four helicopters in January 2017. Kazakhstan ordered four additional Mi-35M helicopters in May 2018. It received a batch of four helicopters in June 2020.

The Republic of Mali received two helicopters from Rosoboronexport in October 2017.

Russia and Uzbekistan signed a contract for the delivery of 12 Mi-35M helicopters in March 2018. Uzbekistan received the first helicopter in 2021.

Belarus signed a contract for four Mi-35M helicopters at the Army-2020 international military and technical forum in Russia in August 2020.

The Mi-35M Attack helicopter is operated by multiple countries including Russia, Nigeria, Mali, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan and Rwanda now.

Over view and specifications!

Mi-35M is a multi-role combat helicopter manufactured by Rostvertol, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters. It is an export variant of Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.

Primarily designed for attack and military transport missions, the helicopter offers a superior flight performance and manoeuvrability compared to its predecessor.

Mi-35M is one of the modern combat helicopters in the Russian Air Force inventory. It is also operated by the armed forces of many countries including Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Mali.

The helicopter was displayed at the Army-2021 international military and technical forum in Moscow, Russia, in August 2021.

MI-35M features

Based on the Mi-24 Hind, Mi-35M military helicopter incorporates several improvements, including shortened stub wings, a new rotor system, modern avionics, upgraded turboshaft engines and a hydraulic system. The cockpit and vital components of the helicopter are heavily armoured.

The helicopter has an overall length of 21.6m, wingspan of 6.5m, and height of 6.5m. Its take-off weight in ferry configuration is 12,000kg. It can carry eight troops or a payload of 2,400kg.

Mi-35M military helicopter cockpit and avionics

The glass cockpit of the Mi-35M accommodates two pilots in tandem configuration. The night vision goggle (NVG)-compatible cockpit integrates multi-functional displays (MFDs), redundant flight controls, and state-of-the-art avionics.

The helicopter is equipped with an OPS-24N surveillance-and-sighting station, a television channel, a GPS-guided navigation system, and an optional non-Russian radio station.

Hind E armament

The chin-mounted turret can be installed with the twin-barrel GSh-23V 23mm cannon with 450 to 470 rounds of ammunition. The gun can fire 3,400 to 3,600 rounds a minute. The stub wings can carry a range of weapon systems, including anti-tank missiles, rocket pods/gun pods or fuel tanks.

The military helicopter can be armed with up to eight 9М114 or 9M120 Ataka-V SACLOS radio-guided anti-tank missiles, up to 80 ‘S-8’ 80mm unguided rockets, and 20 ‘S-13’ type 122mm unguided aircraft rockets.

Countermeasures of Mi-35M

The countermeasures suite of Mi-35M includes a radar warning receiver, a laser range finder and a location finder, chaff and flare launch system, infrared (IR) jamming system, and engine-exhaust IR suppressor.

Mi-35M helicopter engines and performance

The military helicopter is powered by two ТVЗ-117VМА or VK-2500 engines. Each engine develops a maximum power output of 2,200hp. The engines are designed to support high-altitude missions.

The helicopter can fly at a maximum speed of 305km/h. Its operational altitude is 5,400m. The helicopter has a normal range of 460km and can reach a maximum distance of 1,000km with full fuel load.

It can be deployed in combat missions in different geographies with high-temperature and high-altitude environments and features round-the-clock combat capabilities for conducting missions during day and night. It is also capable of operating from unprepared and poorly equipped airfields.

Mi-35M orders and deliveries

In 2005, Venezuela signed two contracts with Rosoboronexport for eight Mi-35M helicopters. The helicopters that were delivered to Venezuela were fitted with VK-2500 engines for high-altitude operations.

The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) signed a $150m contract with Rosoboronexport for 12 Mi-35M helicopters in November 2008. The helicopters were manufactured by Rostvertol at its facility in Rostov-on-Don. The first three helicopters were delivered in December 2009.

The Brazilian Air Force started operating three Mi-35M helicopters in April 2010. The helicopters in FAB service are referred to as AH-2 Sabre. Nine helicopters were delivered by August 2012. The final helicopter was delivered in December 2014.

However, in February 2022, the Brazilian Air Force withdrew the entire fleet of Mi-35M from operations, citing high operating costs, inconvenient logistics and inadequate manufacturer support.

Azerbaijan signed a contract with Rosoboronexport for the delivery of 24 Mi-35M helicopters in September 2010. By 2012, 12 helicopters were delivered and the rest were delivered in November 2013.

The Iraqi Ministry of Defence received the first delivery of four Mi-35M helicopters in November 2013. Four helicopters were delivered in July 2014 and the rest were delivered in October 2014.Iraq also operates up to 40 Mi-17.

It operates a fleet of around 30 to 40 Russian Mi-17 [known to NATO as “Hip”] helicopters, acquired over multiple phases. The first installment of Mi-17s arrived in the early 2000s, soon after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. 

 However,On September 5, 2024, Iraq signed a landmark deal with Airbus to acquire 12 new H225M helicopters, alongside two refurbished units. These versatile helicopters are set to join the Iraqi Army Aviation Command, stepping in to replace the aging Mi-17 helicopters. The reasons for this replace;

The move to replace the Mi-17 fleet with French Airbus H225M helicopters comes down to several key factors. Chief among them is the difficulty in obtaining spare parts for the Russian helicopters, a problem exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and sanctions. 

Moreover, the Mi-17s, although highly effective in past missions, are now seen as technically outdated compared to newer, more advanced helicopters like the H225M. The French helicopters boast superior avionics, greater payload capacity, and a broader range of mission capabilities, from search and rescue to combat support and special operations.

By shifting to the H225M, Iraq aims to modernize its military aviation capabilities while reducing its dependency on Russian military technology. The Airbus helicopters are not only more versatile but are also better suited to meet Iraq’s current security needs thanks to their broad mission capabilities. 

Moreover, the H225M benefits from European suppliers, ensuring more reliable access to parts and service contracts. This translates to higher operational readiness without the supply chain disruptions often seen with the Mi-17 fleet. 

Nigeria ordered 12 Mi-35M combat helicopters in 2015. The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) received two helicopters in December 2016, while two more helicopters were delivered in April 2018. Nigeria ordered additional 12 helicopters in October 2019.

Pakistan signed an agreement to purchase four Mi-35M helicopters from Russia in 2015. The helicopters were delivered in 2018.

Rosoboronexport signed a contract with Kazakhstan for the supply of four helicopters in January 2017. Kazakhstan ordered four additional Mi-35M helicopters in May 2018. It received a batch of four helicopters in June 2020.

The Republic of Mali received two helicopters from Rosoboronexport in October 2017.

Russia and Uzbekistan signed a contract for the delivery of 12 Mi-35M helicopters in March 2018. Uzbekistan received the first helicopter in 2021.

Belarus signed a contract for four Mi-35M helicopters at the Army-2020 international military and technical forum in Russia in August 2020.