Captured M23_RDF elements and several military effects attest once again to Rwanda's support for M23 rebels in Masisi territory.
According to UN experts, Lubanga, accompanied by Yves Khawa Panga Mandro, also targeted by international sanctions, played a key role in the mobilization, recruitment and training of thousands of fighters in Ituri. Acting as the "moral authority" of the Zaire/ADCVI group, he allegedly facilitated arms transfers, training in camps in Tchanzu (North Kivu) and Uganda, as well as the redeployment of fighters for offensives against the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC).
The report states that Lubanga moved to Kampala, Uganda, in July 2024, where he met with AFC-M23 leader Corneille Nangaa and other officials. Yves Khawa’s farm, located in Hoima District, Uganda, near Lake Albert, has been identified as a transit point for fighters and weapons. These activities include military training, conducted by Ugandan and Rwandan instructors, and organizing logistical movements across Lake Albert.
Experts report that Lubanga sent emissaries to reconcile different armed factions in Ituri, including the MAPI group and Zaire/ADCVI. Although MAPI chose to maintain its independence, it agreed to collaborate with the AFC-M23 coalition. This rapprochement made it possible to structure a common offensive strategy targeting the FARDC and to coordinate activities in the territories of Djugu, Mahagi and Aru.
The United Nations stresses that this mobilization, facilitated by regular meetings in Uganda and logistical support from regional networks, constitutes a major threat to the stability of Ituri and North Kivu. The report also highlights the role of Innocent Kaina, alias India Queen, an influential M23 commander, who works closely with Lubanga from Kampala to coordinate the activities of the armed groups.
The Ugandan government, when questioned by the group of experts, denied any knowledge of Lubanga and Khawa's presence and activities on its territory. However, the experts point to evidence of strategic meetings held in Uganda and arms flows through logistics bases established in the region.
This new alliance, orchestrated by historical figures of the conflicts in Ituri, therefore amplifies tensions in the east of the DRC. Thus, the strategy of mobilization and collaboration with the AFC-M23 coalition risks prolonging the clashes, compromising stabilization efforts in a region already devastated by decades of violence.
Photo:Getting snap from a ramashackled window....
There was heavy fighting since the morning of Thursday, January 9 in Masisi Centre.
The FARDC with the wazalendo are still holding on well against the M23/RDF rebels.
Information from the frontline area indicate that the fire was opened first by rebels who remained hidden in houses on Wednesday, who were waiting for reinforcements .
According to our intelligence along the border,the night of Wednesday, reinforcements in men, weapons and ammunition from the rebels came from Kitshanga to Masisi in order to launch fresh attacks for M23 to retake masisi centre.
The appearance of war on the ground indicates that the risk of the rebels taking back Masisi Centre is real, despite the efforts made by the wazalendo fighters.
...,still running up an down,we apologize for the spellings and other mistakes because we are typing in panicky mood.........but we will get a full report in evening..
According to experts, at least 150 tonnes of coltan were fraudulently exported to Rwanda from the Rubaya mines, where the AFC-M23 has established a parallel administration. These minerals were mixed with Rwandan production, leading to major contamination of the supply chains of the so-called “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum and tungsten) in the Great Lakes region. This mixture has been described as the largest contamination of its kind recorded in the last ten years.
The AFC-M23 coalition made significant profits from this illegal mining. Taxes on coltan production and trade in Rubaya brought in approximately $800,000 per month. A tax of $7 per kilogram was imposed on coltan and manganese, and $4 on tin (cassiterite). These funds allowed the AFC-M23 to finance its military operations and consolidate its territorial control.
The report said the coalition controlled the roads linking Rubaya to the Rwandan border, including through towns such as Mushaki, Kirolirwe, Kitshanga and Kibumba. Coltan convoys, comprising vehicles capable of carrying up to five tonnes per load, regularly passed through these routes on their way to Rwanda. Satellite imagery showed that the convoys were routed to a parking lot near the Kibumba market before being transferred to trucks from Rwanda.
In Rubaya, the AFC-M23 established a quasi-state administration, with a “ministry” in charge of mining. Permits were issued to miners and economic operators, for annual fees of $25 to $250. Miners’ salaries were doubled to encourage them to stay in the area, but coercive measures, such as armed patrols and arbitrary detentions, were applied to ensure that minerals were only sold to operators authorized by the coalition.
Experts point out that the fraudulent extraction and export of minerals has not only benefited the AFC-M23, but also the Rwandan economy, which has integrated these resources into its own production circuits.
This situation, which illustrates a systematic exploitation of natural resources for military and economic purposes, continues to fuel regional tensions and compromise stabilization efforts in the east of DRC.
According to the UN document, since April 2024, the M23, with the support of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), has intensified its territorial expansion in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), despite ceasefire agreements. "This strategy indicates a desire for long-term occupation and exploitation of conquered territories," the report states.
The overall military command of the M23 remains under the authority of Sultani Makenga, who, according to the report, continues to receive instructions and logistical support from the RDF and Rwandan intelligence services. The AFC, led by Corneille Nangaa, operates in close coordination with the M23, although the two entities remain distinct. “The AFC depends on Makenga’s authorization to conduct its operations,” the report says.
The report also details joint activities of the AFC-M23 coalition, including recruitment drives among local armed groups in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. “Both groups hold meetings in newly conquered territories to promote their coalition, recruit new members and set up parallel administrations,” the UN experts add.
In addition, historical figures such as René Abandi and Jean-Marie Runiga, the latter subject to international sanctions, have been recalled to strengthen coalition alliances. These actions aim to consolidate the support of local armed groups and to structure civilian and military administrations in occupied areas.
The report highlights that the AFC-M23 coalition is acting with the aim of "sustainably reshaping the Congolese political and military landscape", while benefiting from direct and indirect support from the Rwandan authorities. This situation continues to fuel regional tensions and compromise stabilization efforts in eastern DRC.
The presence of Rwandan short-range air defense systems (SHORAD) on Congolese territory was documented in the report of the United Nations Group of Experts published on Wednesday. These elements reinforce the accusations of direct military support from Rwanda to the M23 armed group.
On 25 October 2024, a SHORAD system was observed in Karuba, Masisi territory (North Kivu), approximately six kilometres from Sake. Imagery analysis reveals that this system corresponds to the Chinese-made Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6 model used by the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). The report highlights that this type of equipment offers a significant tactical advantage, particularly by neutralising enemy air assets.
According to the report, MONUSCO lost contact with a reconnaissance drone on 29 October 2024, during a mission over Mpeti, Walikale territory. The drone’s GPS was affected by jamming before it crashed near Kikuvo, confirming the use of electronic warfare technologies in the area.
Since April 2024, other SHORAD systems have been spotted in several strategic locations, including Kamulima, Kahunga, Kitchanga and Rubaya. As of November 2024, at least three of these systems were operational in the areas of Kibumba, Kitchanga and Karuba.
The report states that although the equipment identified is of Chinese origin, this does not necessarily imply a violation of international sanctions. However, the experts have addressed a request for explanation to the Rwandan government regarding the use and deployment of this military equipment in the DRC.
This evidence reinforces accusations of Rwanda's logistical and military support for the M23, an armed group involved in intense clashes in eastern DRC, worsening an already critical humanitarian and security crisis.
