Executive Summary
The month of January 2025 witnessed a notable surge in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda’s affiliate branch, Al-Shabaab, with approximately 40 recorded incidents across Somalia and Kenya. This marks a significant decline compared to the last two months of 2024—November and December—when over 70 attacks were reported. Despite the decrease in the number of attacks, the militant group sustained its operational tempo, continuing to target security forces, government officials, and critical infrastructure. The decline suggests increased counterterrorism measures, particularly in Kenya, where a more aggressive security posture has been evident. However, Somalia remained the epicenter of violence, with coordinated raids, ambushes, and IED strikes dominating the landscape.
The preferred attack methods used by Al-Shabaab during this period included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), direct assaults on military bases, ambushes, and targeted assassinations. IEDs remained the weapon of choice, frequently deployed against military convoys, security checkpoints, and strategic locations. The group also continued its reliance on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and suicide bombings, mainly aimed at military and government installations. Small arms fire, RPG launchers, and heavy machine guns were also used in direct combat, particularly in instances where militants launched full-scale assaults on bases in an attempt to overrun government and allied forces’ positions.
The most targeted areas in Somalia included Hiran, Galguduud, Lower Shabelle, Gedo, and Bay regions, with persistent attacks recorded in major towns such as Beledweyne, Bulobarde, Masagaway, and Bardere. High-profile attacks included a deadly raid on Somali forces in Masagaway, Galguduud, where a military base was overrun, and an IED attack in Beled Hawo that injured senior government officials. Additionally, Mogadishu saw multiple attacks, including mortar shell explosions in Hodan, Dharkeynley, and Heliwaa districts, reinforcing the capital’s vulnerability to urban insurgency. The combatants consistently sought to target Somali National Army (SNA) personnel, Danab Brigade commandos, Ethiopian and Ugandan forces under the African Union mission, as well as government officials and local security operatives.
In Kenya, Al-Shabaab focused its attacks primarily on the border regions of Lamu and Mandera counties, with security personnel being the primary targets. The most significant attack occurred in Kiunga, Lamu, where an IED struck a Kenyan military convoy, reportedly killing all troops on board. Additionally, Kenyan police checkpoints and patrols in border towns faced sporadic ambushes and explosive attacks. Unlike Somalia, where high-profile assassinations were common, Kenya’s incidents were characterized by attempts to destabilize security operations along major supply routes and key transit corridors used by security forces in counterinsurgency operations.
From a counterterrorism perspective, the mapping of January’s attacks highlights a shift in Al-Shabaab’s operational strategy, with a growing concentration of attacks within Somalia and a notable reduction in cross-border incursions into Kenya. This decline can be attributed to Kenya’s enhanced counterterrorism capabilities, including improved intelligence operations, military patrols, and surveillance along the border. The robustness of Kenyan security forces, particularly the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and elite anti-terror police units, has played a crucial role in curbing infiltration attempts. While attacks persist in Lamu and Mandera, their frequency and impact have diminished compared to previous months, signaling a weakening of Al-Shabaab’s ability to strike deep into Kenyan territory.
Terrorism Events: January 1st – January 31st.
Al-Shabaab militants assassinated a Somali government member and seized his weapons in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia, on January 30, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali forces’ Danab Brigade with an improvised explosive device (IED), inflicting many losses in Masagaway, Galguduud, Somalia, on January 30, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants ambushed and raided Somali forces, injuring at least three troops in Kamboni and Mado, Lower Juba, Somalia, on January 29, 2025.
Violent clashes continued for two days between Al-Shabaab militants and Somali forces, resulting in heavy losses in Bulobarde, Hiran, Somalia, on January 29, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali forces’ Danab Brigade military convoy with an improvised explosive device (IED) as it left Baledogle Airfield, between Wanlaweyn and Afgoye, Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 29, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali police gathering with an improvised explosive device (IED), inflicting many casualties in Beled Hawo, Gedo, on January 28, 2025.
Al-Shabaab launched a sweeping attack on a Somali forces’ military base, capturing both the base and the surrounding village in Masagaway, Galguduud, Somalia, on January 27, 2025.
Clashes were reported between Al-Shabaab and Somali government forces near Buloburte, Hiran, on Monday. Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed 18 soldiers and seized weapons.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali gathering with an improvised explosive device (IED), injuring eight people, including Beled Hawo’s first and second deputy mayors and the financial officer, in Beled Hawo, Gedo, Somalia, on January 27, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants tightened control over the main security barrier of the new airport following a raid in Beled Hawo, Gedo, Somalia, on January 26, 2025.
Al-Shabaab claimed to have raided Somali National Army (SNA) forces using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Masagaway, Galgaduud, Somalia. The number of casualties remains unknown as of January 25, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants seized an RPG-2 launcher and injured two troops during clashes with Somali forces in Halgan, Hiran, Somalia, on January 23, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted Ethiopian forces with an improvised explosive device (IED) at Baidoa Airport, Bay State, Somalia, on January 23, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants raided two Ugandan military bases in Baraawe, Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 22, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted Somali forces’ gatherings with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), killing a Somali explosive expert in Burhakaba and Elder, Bay, and Galguduud, Somalia, on January 22, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants raided three Somali and Ugandan military bases in Bardere, Ceel Barde, and Qoryoley, located in Gedo, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 21, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali forces’ security checkpoint with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Mogadishu, Somalia, on January 21, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted the main Somali forces’ security checkpoint with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Beled Hawo, Gedo, Somalia, on January 21, 2025.
Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a direct raid on an SNA military base in Janale, Lower Shabelle, on January 20, 2025.
Suspected Al-Shabaab militants attacked a security checkpoint in Mogadishu’s Daaru Salaam district overnight. Two blasts and gunfire were heard, according to residents, on January 14, 2025.
Multiple mortar shell explosions were reported in Mogadishu, affecting the districts of Hodan, Dharkeynley, and Heliwaa, on January 13, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Kenyan forces’ military convoy with an improvised explosive device (IED), killing all troops on board in Kiunga, Lamu, Kenya, on January 13, 2025.
Al-Shabaab, part of Al-Qaeda, raided a Somali forces’ checkpoint in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle. The militants captured an MG3 machine gun, Type 69-1 and Type 69-3 anti-tank projectiles, Type 56-1 assault rifles, vehicles, ammunition, and other materials on January 12, 2025.
Clashes between Al-Shabaab militants and Somali forces erupted, injuring at least one Somali troop in Halgan, Hiran, Somalia, on January 12, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Ugandan forces’ military convoy with seven improvised explosive devices (IEDs), destroying a Humvee armored vehicle and inflicting losses between 60 kilometers and Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 12, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali forces’ military base in Bardere, Gedo, Somalia, on January 12, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali forces’ military base, inflicting heavy losses in Garbahaarrey, Gedo, Somalia, on January 11, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Ugandan forces’ military convoy with an improvised explosive device (IED) between 50 and 60 kilometers in Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 10, 2025.
Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen forces claimed to have attacked the World Food Programme (WFP) camp in Garbaharrey district, Gedo region, which is occupied by Federal Government soldiers, on January 10, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants raided a Somali forces’ military base, causing troops to flee and taking control of the area in Eel-Dheer, Galgaduud, Somalia, on January 9, 2025.
Violent clashes between Al-Shabaab militants and Somali troops left five soldiers dead and two wounded in Bulobarde, Hiran, Somalia, on January 9, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Ugandan forces’ military convoy with five improvised explosive devices (IEDs) between Afgoye and 50 kilometers in Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 9, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali government intelligence service gathering with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Buufow, Lower Shabelle, Somalia, on January 7, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants assassinated the mayor of a neighborhood in the city of Dinsoor, Bay State, Southwest Somalia, on January 6, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants assassinated two Somali intelligence officers and seized their weapons in Dagmada Daynile, Mogadishu, Somalia, on January 6, 2025.
Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Somali forces’ military checkpoint with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Beledweyne, Hiran, Somalia, on January 5, 2025.
Al-Shabaab claimed an IED attack on Baydhaba Airport in the Bay region of Somalia. No details on casualties were reported as of January 3, 2025.
Analysis, Observation & Insights
Al-Shabaab’s attacks in January 2025 continued to demonstrate its operational resilience, despite an overall decline in the number of incidents compared to previous months. The group sustained its asymmetric warfare campaign, leveraging ambushes, IED attacks, and targeted assassinations to exert pressure on security forces in both Somalia and Kenya. However, a key observation is the shift in attack patterns, with Somalia bearing the brunt of the violence while Kenya experienced relatively fewer but strategically targeted attacks. This indicates that Kenya’s counterterrorism measures, including enhanced intelligence gathering, drone surveillance, and rapid response operations, have limited the group’s capacity for cross-border incursions. Conversely, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab maintained its grip on key conflict zones, executing raids that tested the operational endurance of Somali forces and their international partners.
One of the most concerning trends in January was Al-Shabaab’s continued use of media and online propaganda to exaggerate its operational successes. Pro-militant media outlets actively disseminated fabricated claims of mass casualties among government forces and foreign troops, amplifying the group’s psychological warfare efforts. Al-Shabaab’s media wing routinely released staged footage of successful attacks, often misrepresenting the scale and impact of their operations. This strategy aims to bolster recruitment, instill fear among security personnel, and project an image of invincibility despite territorial losses. Counterterrorism forces in Somalia and Kenya have responded by strengthening cyber-monitoring mechanisms to debunk misinformation and disrupt online radicalization networks. However, Al-Shabaab’s adaptability in digital warfare remains a persistent challenge.
Geographical analysis of the January attacks reveals a strategic concentration of violence in Somalia’s Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, and Bakool regions. These areas have historically served as logistical hubs for Al-Shabaab, and their continued targeting indicates the group’s intent to safeguard supply chains and communication lines. The frequent attacks on ATMIS forces in Lower Shabelle suggest a deliberate effort to erode international support and weaken the morale of foreign troops stationed in Somalia. Meanwhile, in Kenya, the bulk of the attacks were confined to Lamu and Mandera counties, particularly in border towns where militant movement remains difficult to control. The choice of these regions underscores the group’s reliance on porous border networks to sustain operations, as well as its preference for targeting security personnel over civilian populations.
A particularly alarming development is Al-Shabaab’s increased reliance on IEDs, which accounted for a significant portion of the January attacks. The frequent targeting of military convoys, checkpoints, and supply routes demonstrates the insurgents’ refined ability to deploy sophisticated explosive devices with lethal precision. In Somalia, attacks on military installations such as Baledogle Airfield and Beledweyne’s strategic highways disrupted troop movements, hindering counteroffensives. The persistence of these IED attacks has forced security forces to adopt more rigorous counter-IED measures, including route clearance operations and enhanced intelligence sharing with international partners. Kenya’s proactive approach in deploying bomb disposal units and strengthening patrols in hotspot areas has contributed to reducing the frequency of such attacks within its borders.
Despite Al-Shabaab’s resilience, counterterrorism efforts in Kenya have yielded measurable success in limiting the group’s operational reach. The decline in cross-border attacks suggests that heightened military presence and fortified security positions have made it increasingly difficult for militants to penetrate deep into Kenyan territory. The concentration of attacks in Somalia further supports the notion that Al-Shabaab is being forced into a defensive posture, with fewer resources to sustain large-scale operations outside its core strongholds. However, security agencies must remain vigilant, as the group’s ability to adapt and exploit regional vulnerabilities remains a key threat. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether counterterrorism operations can sustain this momentum and further degrade Al-Shabaab’s capacity to launch high-profile attacks.
