Standby class one order for the prisons for two months

 

Reports indicate that Gen. Muhoozi has ordered Uganda Prisons Service to be under Standby Class One order from December 15, 2025, to February 15, 2026, as part of heightened security measures ahead of the festive season and the January 15, 2026, general elections.

For those Not familiar with security matters, standby Class One is the highest state of operational readiness within Uganda’s uniformed security services. When declared, it places the entire institution on maximum alert to respond swiftly to any security threat, emergency, or unusual situation.

In this case, the declaration coincides with a politically sensitive period as Ugandans prepare to vote for a new president, as well as parliamentary and local government leaders. In a press statement, commissioner general of Prisons Dr Johnson Byabashaija directed all prison units across the country to intensify security, intelligence gathering, and coordination with sister security and intelligence agencies during the two-month period until they receive other orders.

According to information collected from a variety of talks from samples of different people from different public places,they are  praising the way Gen Muhoozi has woken up and getting serious on some of the most "unattended to" issues in respect to security and the bad vice of corruption .

...For God and My Country....

N.E

CDF decorates officers at Mbuyau

 

CDF Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba urged newly promoted UPDF officers to embrace greater responsibility and integrity. The decorated officers include Lt. Gens. Jack Bakasumba and Francis Okello; Maj. Gens. James Kinaalwa, Deus Sande, Charles Byanyima, William Bainomugisha & Christopher Ddamulira; and Brig. Gens. Mcdans Kamugira, Fred Zakye & Paddy Ankunda, among others.

Kenya has Cemented its Integrated Air Defense Capability with Ksh 3.4 Billion SPYDER System.

 

In a strategic enhancement of Kenya’s air defense architecture, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has transferred a SPYDER (Surface-to-Air Python and Derby) air defense battery, valued at Ksh 3.4 billion, to President William Ruto. The delivery, executed via an IDF-operated heavy air cargo sortie, reflects deepening bilateral defense cooperation and significantly upgrades Kenya’s aerial threat interdiction capacity.

The SPYDER system, developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, is a highly mobile, multi-role, short- to medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) platform engineered for tactical air defense operations. It is optimized for rapid target acquisition and simultaneous multi-target engagement against manned aircraft, rotary-wing platforms, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including low-observable and high-speed incursions.

System Architecture and Combat Capability.

The SPYDER platform integrates Python-5 and Derby missile interceptors, leveraging dual guidance modes — infrared homing and active radar guidance — to maximize kill probability in dense electronic warfare environments. Its high-mobility tactical launcher units, mounted on all-terrain platforms, enable rapid shoot-and-scoot deployment, ensuring survivability against counter-battery and air suppression operations.

Key operational characteristics include:

Engagement Envelope: Effective target engagement ranges of 1–50 km with altitudes up to 16 km, providing layered point and area defense.

Reaction Time: Combat-ready launch in under 10 seconds from target acquisition, suitable for dynamic threat environments.

Multi-Target Capability: Simultaneous engagement of multiple aerial vectors, supported by integrated command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) networks.

Mobility and Survivability: All-terrain launch vehicles equipped with rapid reload systems allow displacement between firing positions, mitigating counter-strike vulnerabilities.

Operational Impact on Kenya’s Air Defense Posture.

The SPYDER system significantly elevates Kenya’s aerial denial and interdiction capabilities, reinforcing strategic deterrence against asymmetric and conventional threats. Its deployment enables:

Integrated Air Defense Layering: Seamless integration with existing radar and surveillance assets to establish a multi-tiered air defense umbrella over critical infrastructure, ports, military bases, and urban centers.

Counter-UAV Operations: Effective neutralization of tactical UAV swarms and low-altitude threats increasingly utilized in modern hybrid warfare.

Force Projection and Rapid Response: Enhanced ability to deploy interceptors to high-threat sectors within minutes, supporting theater-level air defense contingencies.

Strategic Signaling: Demonstrates Kenya’s commitment to regional air superiority and deters potential aerial incursions by state and non-state actors.

Defense analysts note that the addition of SPYDER positions Kenya as a regional air defense node capable of conducting both defensive counter-air operations and tactical protection of critical national assets under high-threat scenarios.

The acquisition underscores Kenya’s continued investment in advanced kinetic and electronic warfare capabilities while reinforcing strategic defense partnerships with Israel. With the SPYDER battery fully operational, Kenya now possesses a robust, survivable, and responsive air defense shield capable of deterring and neutralizing contemporary aerial threats.

Are we at the verge of a regional war again?Will the accused Kagame manage it?

 

If  Paul Kagame were to open a new front against Burundi using eastern DRC as a rear base, it would mark the beginning of a far wider regional war. According to multiple political, diplomatic, and military indications, Burundi would not face such an aggression alone. Bujumbura would almost certainly receive robust diplomatic backing, significant political support, and substantial logistical assistance in terms of weapons, equipment, and manpower from regional and extra-regional actors. In that scenario, it is hard to see this new front being easy for  Paul Kagame to manage. Rather, it could become the overextension that begins to unravel what many of his critics describe as a brutal satanic regime in Kigali.

At present,  Paul Kagame appears to be weighing two highly risky strategic paths. On one side is the option of directly attacking Burundi from positions in and around Uvira, where his RDF–M23 forces are heavily entrenched themselves. From Uvira to Bujumbura is roughly 25 kilometres, a short distance in military terms, especially when staging from occupied territory. On the other side is the continuation of the offensive deeper into the DRC, pushing from Uvira towards Baraka and onward to the port city of Kalemie in Tanganyika Province. This second axis is attractive and being supported by mafias within RDF-M23 network who see this corridor to Katanga as the ultimate prize. As some of Kagame’s minions within RDF-M23 argue, once RDF–M23 forces enter Katanga, historically a hotbed of opposition to President Tshisekedi, the balance of power in Kinshasa could shift dramatically.

Yet both options carry immense risks. An incursion into Burundi would mobilise not only Burundian national sentiment but also regional security arrangements that cannot easily be controlled from Kigali. Burundi’s ruling CNDD-FDD party has its own painful history with attempted regime change, the failed 2015 coup d’état orchestrated by Paul Kagame and led by Burundian military officers who fled to Rwanda after the failed coup d’état. Any new attack traced back to Rwanda's sponsorship would be framed in Bujumbura, in the region and by many in international level, as the culmination of Kagame’s long-standing ambition to reshape the Great Lakes’ political map by force. Far from a quick operation, it could open a prolonged and unpredictable confrontation on Rwanda’s southern flank, stretching the RDF militarily and politically.

The alternative, pushing further into Tanganyika and towards Katanga, is hardly safer. The advance of RDF–M23 elements towards Baraka and potentially Kalemie is already sharpening national resentment inside the DRC. Katanga is not merely another province; it is the epicentre of powerful economic interests, international interests, long-standing political networks, and deep frustrations with central authority. Any perception that foreign troops are opening a path for a “Katangese solution” to Tshisekedi’s government would inflame tensions far beyond the control of Kigali’s planners. What might look like a tactical opportunity for Kagame and his Congolese mafia network within RDF-M23 could quickly transform into a quagmire of competing militias, political factions, and international pressure.

The strategic reality is that each new front increases the probability of miscalculation. Using Uvira as a forward operating base for regime-change ambitions in Burundi would bring Rwanda into more direct confrontation with regional players who have so far attempted to contain the crisis diplomatically. At the same time, pushing deeper into Congolese territory risks unifying disparate Congolese actors against a common external enemy and inviting broader Western sanctions, isolation, or even direct counter-measures. For a leadership already accused by its critics of overreach and impunity, either path could accelerate the erosion of both regional tolerance and internal stability.

In the end, the future of the region hinges on the choices made in Kigali, and on whether strategic restraint prevails over the temptation to gamble on yet another military adventure. From Uvira to Bujumbura is a short distance on the map, but politically and historically it may be the longest and most dangerous road Kagame could choose to take. If he miscalculates, what his opponents call a “satanic regime” may find that the very wars it launched for influence and resources become the catalyst for its own decline. The coming months will reveal whether Rwanda doubles down on confrontation or is forced, by pressure and reality, to retreat from the brink of a wider regional conflagration.

Major Gen.Ephraim Kabisa,is he the new chief of DRC army?

Will Emma Katabazi manage manage the volatility in the intelligence around the east African community?

Gen. Yoweri Museveni who is the commander in chief of Uganda’s military  appointed the former Deputy Director of the Internal Security Organisation, Col. Emmy Katabazi as Senior Presidential Advisor and Coordinator of Security and Intelligence.

The docket of the Coordinator of Security and Intelligence Services has been vacant since 2012, when Gen. David Sejusa, who had been the coordinator, fell out with the establishment. Katabazi served as the Deputy Director General of the ISO, a position where he often interacted with students and youth leaders to promote patriotism, discipline, and national development.

Nkkashama,Ndima or Itchaligonza,who will be the new chief of DRC army?

Following the fall of the strategic city of Uvira, President Félix Tshilombo is attempting to reorganize the army by appointing General Ichalingoza Nduru as Chief of Staff of the Congolese army.

But according to sources close to the Presidency, all his courtiers are opposed, claiming that this general is of Ugandan origin, a product of mixed ancestry.

The president's loyalists want General John Nkashama or Constant Ndima, one of these two generals, to be appointed. The president is opposed to appointing either of them.

Sayings inside the army has it that Uganda's  Yoweri Museveni, is putting pressure on President Félix Tshisekedi to appoint the Ugandan Ichalingoza Nduru as Chief of Staff of the army.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and President Félix Tshisekedi have reached a crossroads!

.....NE.....